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I. INTRODUCTION: COMMON PRACTICES THAT HAVE LARGELY AVOIDED
CLOSE SCRUTINY
A number of standard procedures that are widely utilized in estate planning raise
serious ethical questions. What is beneficial for a lawyer's estate planning practice
often involves conduct that is questionable from an ethical standpoint. For example,
many lawyers offer to retain, without charge, the original of their clients' wills in
their office safes.' Subsequently, on the death of a testator, the executor named in the
will or a member of the decedent's family typically will go to the drafting lawyer's
office to obtain the original will to offer it for probate. From one perspective, the
lawyer has provided a service to his or her client by safekeeping the will. Yet, it is
also true that the draftman's chances of being retained to provide legal services during
probate are undoubtedly enhanced by this face-to-face encounter. Thus, a lawyer's
offer to retain the original will may constitute solicitation of future legal business in a
manner inconsistent with the obligations arising out of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Before condemning this practice, however, the benefits of the safekeeping of
wills should be balanced against the potential ethical improprieties.
2
The ethical issues presented by safekeeping of wills are similar to questions
raised by other common practices utilized by attorneys engaged in estate planning.
These problems are pervasive throughout the practicing bar, because a substantial
number of lawyers draft wills and trusts even though they do not specialize in this
work.3 Yet, in spite of the widespread nature of these potentially unethical practices,
little attention is given to them in the codes of professional conduct, few disciplinary
proceedings involving these issues have been brought, and the literature has largely
ignored these ethical problems. Consequently, many of the practices have gone
unquestioned, and many of the lawyers engaged in estate planning do not fully
appreciate the ethical concerns that their activities raise.
This Article will explore in depth a number of common estate planning practices
from an ethical standpoint and will examine counterbalancing considerations to
weigh the benefits that may be presented by attorneys' actions in particular situations.
1. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 611-12, 196 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1972); J. BARNES, WHo WILL
GEr YOUR MONEY? 8 (1972); C. LYMAN, PRACrlCAL ASPECTS OF DRAFrING WILLS 127-28 (1962); Johnson, The Danger
of Retaining Custody of a Will, PRAc. LAw., Oct. 15, 1979, at 51; Herman, Mistakes in Writing Wills, Even by Lawyers,
Lead to Family Fights, Legal Problems for Heirs, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 50, col 1.
2. For a detailed discussion of the ethical issues that are raised by an attorney's practice of safekeeping clients'
wills, see infra text accompanying notes 426-92.
3. See, e.g., R. LYNN, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLANNING 2 (3d ed. 1983); Krnam, Estate Planning: The Public's
Perceptions and Attitudes, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 489, 492 (1973); Pedrick, Estate Planning and Future Shock,
The Alan N. Polasky Memorial Lecture of 1977, 11 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1800, 1802 (1977); Zabel, Legal Malpractice
in Estate Planning, 88 ADVANCED WILL DRAFrING 257, 264 (1978).
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No attempt will be made, however, to evaluate many of the conflicts of interest that
are inherent in estate planning, such as those raised when the same lawyer simul-
taneously draws wills for both husband and wife.4 Such questions are so broad and
complex that they require their own exhaustive treatment.5
The purpose of reviewing various ethical considerations involved in a number of
will and trust drafting practices is not so much to criticize or condemn lawyers'
conduct as it is to increase the sensitivity of practitioners by highlighting the problem
areas. This is done in the belief that many of the attorneys engaged in estate planning
would act differently if they perceived that their activities raised significant ethical
questions.
II. ATrORNEYS NAMED AS BENEFICIARIES IN WILLS THAT THEY DRAFr
The issues raised when an attorney drafts a will in which he or she is included as
a beneficiary are both obvious and straightforward from an ethical standpoint. An
inherent conflict of interest exists when an attorney is named as a beneficiary in a will
which he or she has prepared, since the draftsman has an obvious interest - fostering
the legacy - that is inconsistent with a lawyer's obligation to render independent
legal advice.6 Further, even in the absence of wrongdoing, the mere fact that the
drafting attorney is also a beneficiary under a document that he or she has prepared
inevitably involves an appearance of impropriety.7 This tends to discredit the legal
profession and is of considerable concern to both the courts and the bar.8 Moreover, a
4. For example, marital deduction provisions can raise conflicts of interest problems for the estate planner who is
preparing wills for both spouses. Prior to enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, wills were often prepared
to take advantage of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1976) and, inter alia, provided the surviving spouse with a general power of
appointment over the so-called marital deduction or "A" trust. Simultaneously, a will would also be drawn for the other
spouse that intentionally would not exercise the power of appointment, so that the proceeds of the "A" trust would pass to
the takers in default designated in the first will. See generally 1 F. Hoops, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE § 209, at
469-78 (3d ed. 1982); 4 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1484-1515 (4th ed. 1980). Under these circumstances, the
attomey-draftsman may be acting primarily for the testator with the larger estate, and the other spouse may receive little, if
any, independent advice about the desirability of exercising the general power of appointment. While I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5)
(1976) remains a useful planning tool, The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created yet another area for spousal
conflict by the addition of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981). This section permits a marital deduction for "qualified
terminable interest property" (QTIP), whereby one spouse's property can be left to the surviving spouse in a manner that
qualifies it for the marital deduction even though the surviving spouse has no power, even by will, over the property or its
ultimate disposition. The potential conflict arises because the surviving spouse has no control over the marital deduction
property, although, of course, that spouse must receive the income from that property for his or her life. Thus, the interest
of one spouse in setting up a QTIP trust may be very different from the interest of the other spouse. I F. Hoops, supra,
§ 212, at 481-82; Strauss, Qualified Terminable Interest Property Offers New Opportunities But Many Problems Are
Unresolved, 9 EST. PLAN. 74 (1982).
5. See, e.g., B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 98-99 (1981); Eckhardt,
The Estate Planning Lawyer's Problems: Malpractice and Ethics, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 74.600, .606.3, .609 (1974);
Flaherty, Conflicts of Interest Arising in the Two-Spouse Estate Planning Context, EST. GiFr & TR. J., May-June 1982, at
17; Midonick, Attorney-Client Conflicts and Confidences in Trusts and Estates, 35 REc. A. B. CIT' N.Y. 215 (1980);
Panel Discussion: Professional Ethics, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 74.700, at 7-3 to 7-9, 7-18 to 7-21 (1974); Role and
Function of the Estate Lawyer, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 223, 237-38 (1977).
6. See MODEL COD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-101(A), EC 5-1, 5-2, 5-5 (1983); MODEL RuLEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983).
7. MODAL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 9, EC 9-6 (1983) (Canon 9 provides that "A Lawyer
Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.").
8. See, e.g., In re Krotenberg, Il1 Ariz. 251,253,527 P.2d 510, 512 (1974); Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325,
331-32, 159 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1968).
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number of commentators who have written on this subject are highly critical of such
conduct. 9 Thus, it is not surprising to find that the courts are taking an increasingly
hard stand against this activity.'o Under the circumstances, it would be tempting to
omit discussion of the problems raised when an attorney prepares a will in which he
or she is named as a beneficiary but for the prevalence of the practice, which is
evidenced by the numerous reported cases" and ethics opinions' 2 that deal with the
propriety of this behavior. Furthermore, this conduct can not be dismissed as an
anomaly that pertains only to a fringe element among practitioners who are unable to
withstand the obvious enticements of being the recipient of a client's gratuitous
bounty, because there is evidence that any lawyer, no matter how successful or
well-known, may succumb to such temptations.
13
9. See, e.g., 2 A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 607-08; Miller, Functions and Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in
Drafting a Will, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 415, 439; PanelDiscussion: Professional Ethics, supra note 5, at 74.700, at 7-25 to
7-30 (1974); Comment, Considerations of ProfessionalResponsibility in Probate Matters, 51 NEB. L. REv. 456, 471-72
(1972) [hereinafter cited as NEB. L. Ray. Comment]. But see H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 94 (1953). Drinker, the leading
authority on professional responsibility during the middle of this century, was considerably more tolerant of an attorney
preparing a will in which he or she was named a beneficiary; although he advised that lawyers proceed with caution in
such situations, he concluded that the propriety of such conduct should depend on the particular circumstances.
10. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982) (indefinite suspension);
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979) (disbarment), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa) (indefinite suspension), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 805 (1979); Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969) (attorney's conduct in
preparing will in which he was named as a beneficiary held to be against public policy); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976) (one year suspension and return of sizeable fees); In re Gonyo, 73 Wis. 2d
624, 245 N.W.2d 893 (1976) (six month suspension); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972)
(sixty day suspension).
11. See, e.g., In re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251,527 P.2d 510(1974); In re Thompson's Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 18, 398
P.2d 926 (1965); Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); In re Saladino, 71111. 2d 263, 375
N.E.2d 102 (1978); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982); Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); In re Estate of Ankeny,
238 Iowa 754, 28 N.W.2d 414 (1947); DiMaggio v. Powers (In re Estate of Barclay), 215 Kan. 129, 523 P.2d 376
(1974); Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969); State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84
N.W.2d 136 (1957); Shaffer v. Graham (In re Estate of Lawson), 75 A.D.2d 20, 428 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1980); Haughian v.
Conlan, 86 A.D. 290, 83 N.Y.S. 830 (1903); In re Suydam's Will, 91 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (84 Hun) 514, 32 N.Y.S. 449
(1895), affd, 152 N.Y. 639, 46 N.E. 1152 (1897); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980);
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972); Hubbell v. Houston, 441 P.2d 1010 (Okla.
1967); In re Jones, 254 Or. 617, 462 P.2d 680 (1969); In re Kneeland, 233 Or. 241, 377 P.2d 861 (1963); In re Moore,
218 Or. 403, 345 P.2d 411 (1959); Lyons v. Wilson (In re Lobb's Will), 173 Or. 414, 145 P.2d 808 (1944); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976); In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104
(S.D. 1981); In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960); In re Gonyo, 73 Wis. 2d 624, 245 N.W.2d 893
(1976); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972); Komarr v. Beaudry (In re Estate of Komarr), 46
Wis. 2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968); State v. Horan, 21
Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
12. See Opinion 74-24, 3 ARIZ. ST. B. NEwsLETTER 3 (Nov. 1974), reported in 0. MARU, 1975 SuPPLEmEIN To
THE DiGEsr or BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 70, No.7626 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MARU 1975]; Opinion 840
(Oct. 25, 1973), N.C. ST. B. 11-266, reported in MARU 1975, supra, at 420, No. 9591; Opinion 71, 16 TEX. B. J. 223
(April 1953); Informal Opinion 1-3, 32 WASH. ST. B. NEws 27 (Jan. 1978), reported in 0. MARU, 1980 SUPPLEMENT TO
ThE DIGEsr OF BAR ASSOCtATION Ermcs OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as MARu 1980]; Memorandum Opinion 3-76, 52
Wis, B. BuLL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARu 1980, supra, at 613, No. 13186; Informal Opinion 1963-4, 2
ETIcs OPINIONS: OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON LEGAL ETnIcs OF THE Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 71
(1972) [hereinafter cited as L.A. ETHICS OPINIONS], reported in MARU 1975, supra, at 103, No. 7794.
13. See Randall v. Reynolds (In re Randall), 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1981) (subsequent disbarment from federal
courts). In In re Randall, John D. Randall, who was disbarred for conduct that included, inter alia, being both draftsman
and sole beneficiary of a client's will, was one of the leading attorneys in the State of Iowa and a past president of the
American Bar Association. Id. at 903; Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979)
(disbarment by Supreme Court of Iowa), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). See also In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217,
350 P.2d 631 (1960).
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A. An Overview of the Ethics Rules
In this area, at least, the current Code of Professional Responsibility contains a
provision directly relevant to attorneys who are considering the preparation of a will
in which they are to be named a beneficiary:
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for his
benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge
that he unduly influenced or over-reached the client. If a client voluntarily offers to make
a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing so, he should urge
that his client secure disinterested advice from an independent, competent person who is
cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer
should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be
prepared by another lawyer selected by the client.' 4
EC 5-5 is clearly weakened by the use of the permissive verb "should" rather than
the mandatory "shall" or "must."' 5 Further, the phrase "exceptional circum-
stances" is not defined, thus adding a needless ambiguity that might exempt an
attorney's conduct from the provisions of EC 5-5.16 But perhaps the greatest over-
sight in EC 5-5 is its failure to recognize that questions regarding the propriety of an
attorney's inclusion of such a gift, at least in the will drafting context, are likely to
arise only after the testator has passed away and the will is probated.' 7 Thus, the
person who would be in the best position to shed light on the testamentary gift to the
scrivener has been silenced by death, and the lawyer may be free, without fear of
contradiction, to testify that he or she did not "suggest" the gift, that the draftsman
did "urge" the testator-client to seek disinterested advice, and that the attorney did
"insist," without success, that the testator-client utilize another lawyer to prepare the
will. 18
The comparable provisions of the new ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct represent a distinct improvement over the Code of Professional Responsibility:
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (1983).
15. This comment is applicable, of course, to the entire Code of Professional Responsibility and not just to EC 5-5,
since the Disciplinary Rules, which establish minimum standards, are generally stated in mandatory terms, whereas the
Ethical Considerations, which are supposedly aspirational in nature, virtually always use permissive verbs like "should"
or "may." See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILTY EC 7-25, 7-28 (1983).
16. Neither the annotations to the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the extensive comments to the comparable
provisions of Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct shed any light on the meaning of the phrase
"exceptional circumstances." See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY 190-92 (1979); MODEL RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(c), Legal Background (Proposed Final Draft 1981). See also Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Opinion 74-24, 3
ARIZ. ST. B. NEWSLETTER 3 (Nov. 1974), reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 70, No. 7626.
17. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963). But see In re Saladino, 71 I1. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d
102 (1978) (testator, while still alive, complained about attorney's conduct, which included, inter alia, the preparation of
a series of wills and codicils that contained bequests to the draftsman).
18. See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 426-27, 374 P.2d 807, 809, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841
(1962) (court comments that the attorney-draftsman's testimony was "the only direct evidence of what occurred during
the 10 to 15 minutes he was alone with [the testatrix] in his office"); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433,
435, 441 (N.D. 1980) (highlighting the benefits of an attorney-draftsman's self-serving testimony).
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A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.'
9
The prohibition is thus elevated to a mandatory black letter rule rather than buried in
an Ethical Consideration. Unfortunately, the insertion of the modifier "substantial"
immediately preceding "gift" unnecessarily adds uncertainty to the prohibition, 20
and the exception for the drafter's relatives is needlessly broad. 2 1
Significantly, the original Discussion Draft of the Model Rules contained a
broad provision prohibiting lawyers from participating in the preparation of such a
will without an exception for the attorney-draftsman's relatives. 22 Such an all-
inclusive prohibition has much to commend it,23 but, as was often the case, response
from the practicing bar caused the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards to modify its views in an effort to gain support for the adoption of the new
rules.24 These efforts were not totally successful, since the provisions in Rule 1.8(c)
of the Proposed Final Draft were altered again at the ABA's mid-Winter meeting in
New Orleans in February of 1983, where the House of Delegates voted in favor of
other changes that further softened the prohibition to its present language.
25
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (as amended Feb. 1983) (emphasis added).
20. The preceding draft of Rule 1.8(c) prohibited a lawyer from preparing a will in which the draftsman received
"any gift" except when the client was related to the attorney. The addition of the word "substantial" was obviously an
effort to relax the rule and permit "modest" bequests to the attorney-draftsman. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 91-109 for a discussion of the case
law relating to modest bequests to the will's scrivener.
21. In this respect, Rule 1.8(c) is considerably less stringent than a number of the reported cases and ethics
opinions. See, e.g., State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123
N.W.2d 488 (1963); Informal Opinion E-80-1, 53 Wis. B. BULL. 79 (Apr. 1981). But see Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58
Cal. 2d 423, 432-33, 374 P.2d 807, 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1962); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Informal Opinion 1145 (1970); Informal Opinion 89, 57 MitC. ST. B.J. 311 (Special Issue, Feb. 1978),
reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 289, No. 11520. See also infra text accompanying notes 35-179 (discussing the
propriety of the preparation of wills by attorneys who are named as beneficiaries therein).
22. Rule 1.9(b) of the initial Discussion Draft provided that "A lawyer shall not participate in the preparation of an
instrument giving the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's family any gift, including a testamentary gift, from a client."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.9(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 144-79.
24. The changes from the Discussion Draft (quoted in full supra note 22) to the Proposed Final Draft were
substantial. In its May 30, 1981 version, the applicable provision had been relocated to Rule 1.8(c), which then provided
that "A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's family any gift from a
client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is a relative ofthe donee." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (emphasis added).
25. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Reporter for the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, which was responsible for preparation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, offered the following
explanation for the changes that were made in what is now Rule 1.8(c):
Many commentators objected to the total prohibition on the ground that it would require lawyers to decline the
preparation of wills for members of their own families, except where the lawyer was to be entirely excluded as a
beneficiary. Typical situations would involve preparation of a will for a parent, spouse, or sibling. It seemed to
us that the risk of abuse was small in the intrafamily sitation. In the first place, the family social unit would
normally exercise some inhibitive influence against the lawyer's abusing his position as draftsman. In the
second place, the lawyer would ordinarily be among the "natural objects of the testator's bounty" where the
lawyer is a member of the family. Moreover, some lawyers in small towns expressed opposition to having to
open their family affairs to another lawyer, who might be aligned with competitive social or economic interests.
The Commission considered these factors in relation to the major objective, that of reducing the risk of
exploitation of the grateful and perhaps lonely client. It seemed to us that the reformulation substantially
achieved the intended objective, while allaying opposition that seemed to us to stand on legitimate ground.
Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Gerald P. Johnston (March 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Hazard Letter].
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In addition to these code provisions, numerous cases and ethics opinions discuss
the propriety of including a bequest or devise to a lawyer or a member of the lawyer's
family when that lawyer drafted the will. These court decisions usually originate in
one of two contexts: will contests based on undue influence emanating out of a
scrivener's action in preparing a will in which the drafting attorney is named as a
beneficiary, or disciplinary proceedings brought against an attorney on the basis of
similar conduct. A presumption of undue influence will generally arise in a will
contest when a named beneficiary had a confidential relationship with the testator and
was involved in the preparation of the testator's will.2 6 In the case of a lawyer, the
required confidential relationship can be readily established, and the drafting of a will
certainly qualifies as necessary involvement in the preparation of that document.2 7
Disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, are instituted by bar officials based on
alleged ethical violations that occur when an attorney drafts a will under such
circumstances, 28 and the proceedings are often brought in the aftermath of will
contest litigation in which the attorney's conduct has been brought to light. 29 In either
instance, however, the factual issues regarding the attorney's conduct and the
relationship with the client are largely the same.
30
Because the focus of this Article is on the ethical aspects of estate planning,
attention will be devoted primarily to disciplinary proceedings rather than an ex-
amination of comparable factual situations presented in will contests. Nevertheless, it
is significant that the risk of having a will overturned because an attorney-draftsman
is named as a beneficiary raises, by itself, serious ethical questions. 31 In some
26. See In re King's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 2d 365, 371-75, 146 P.2d 952, 955-57, (1944); Carpenter v. Carpenter
(In re Estate of Carpenter), 253 So. 2d 697, 700-02 (Fla. 1971); Schwartz v. Lamberson (In re Estate of Schwartz), 407
So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Bosheck v. Gappa (In re Kajewski's Estate), 134 Neb. 485, 490-94, 279
N.W. 185, 188-89 (1938); 3 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS §§ 29.84, 29.95 (1961) [hereinafter cited as PAGE
ON WILLS].
27. See In re Thompson's Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 18, 398 P.2d 926 (1965); Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Shaffer v. Graham (In re Estate of Lawson), 75 A.D.2d 20,428 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1980); Nelson
v. First Northwestern Trust Co. (In re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978); Komarr v. Beaudry (In re Estate
of Komarr), 46 Wis. 2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970). Contra Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433, 441
(N.D. 1980) (quoting Storman v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 517 (N.D. 1954).
28. In Re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251, 527 P.2d 510 (1974); In re Saladino, 71 Il. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978);
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982); Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke,
276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D.
1980); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972); In re Jones, 254 Or. 617, 462 P.2d
680 (1969); In re Kneeland, 233 Or. 241, 377 P.2d 861 (1963); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432,
366 A.2d 563 (1976); In re Gonyo, 73 Wis. 2d 624, 245 N.W.2d 893 (1976); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196
N.W.2d 730 (1972); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
29. See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962); State v.
Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); In re Moore, 218 Or. 403, 345 P.2d 411 (1959); In re Discipline of
Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981); In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960); State v. Horan, 21
Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
30. Compare In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981) with Nelson v. First Northwestern Trust
Co. (In re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978); compare In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631
(1960) with Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. (In re Swan's Estate), 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956); compare
State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963) with Hover v. Horan (Estate of Barnes), 14 Wis. 2d 643, 112
N.W.2d 142 (1961).
31. See State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 123 N.W.2d 488,490 (1963); NEB. L. REv. Comment, supra note 9, at
473. See also H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 94; MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.8(c), Legal Back-
ground (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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jurisdictions this conduct can jeopardize an entire will, and not just the bequest or
devise to the attorney.3 2 Hence, a lawyer who allows the inclusion of a legacy in his
or her favor has permitted self-interest to conflict with the attorney's duty to render
independent advice to the client. 33 As DR 5-101 warns, an attorney should not accept
employment if his or her professional judgment may be impaired by the lawyer's own
personal and financial interests.
34
B. Disciplinary Actions Against Attorney-Draftsmen
1. Early Case Law
In many of the early disciplinary proceedings involving lawyers who had drafted
wills in which they were named as beneficiaries, the courts did not seem particularly
concerned with the propriety of the attorneys' conduct. 35 Although the decisions were
critical of the attorneys' dual roles as adviser and beneficiary and recommended
against this practice, they tended to be lenient as to the imposition of discipline. 36 In
State v. Richards,3 7 for example, a lawyer was charged with unethical conduct for,
inter alia, drafting a will for a testatrix in her early seventies in which the attorney
was named as a principal beneficiary and designated as executor. 38 The Nebraska
Supreme Court was generous in its evaluation of the attorney's conduct:
We do not think respondent was guilty of unethical conduct merely because he
drafted a client's will containing a provision therein whereby he became a beneficiary of a
part of her estate when, as the record here shows, she insisted he do so. [Citations
omitted.] Attorneys for clients who wish to leave them or their families a bequest or
devise of part of their property, which they have a perfect right to do, will do well to have
the will drawn by some other lawyer. But if a client insists on having his or her attorney
draft a will containing such a provision we can see no reason why the attorney should
refuse to do so and thereby defeat his client's wishes. 39
Unfortunately, the opinion in State v. Richards does not indicate the derivation
of the evidence that the testatrix "insisted" that her attorney be included as a bene-
32. McCarthy v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30 S.W.2d 19 (1930); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d
66, 74, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1963); 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 26, at § 26.111. Many jurisdictions, of course,
follow the rule of partial invalidity. Under this rule, if an attorney-draftsman exerts undue influence over the testator, only
the bequest to the attorney-draftsman will be jeoparized. See In re Estate of Ankeny, 238 Iowa 754, 764-67, 28 N.W.2d
414, 419-20 (1947); In re Lattouf, 87 N.J. Super. 137, 142,208 A.2d 411,414 (1965); Shaffer v. Graham (In re Estate of
Lawson), 75 A.D.2d 20, 22, 428 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1980); 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 26, at § 26.111.
33. "A lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his personal interests or desires will, or there is a
reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be rendered the prospective
client .... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (1983).
34. Id. at DR 5-101(A).
35. See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962); State v.
Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); Haughian v. Conlan, 86 A.D. 290, 83 N.Y.S. 830 (1903); In re
Suydam's Will, 91 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (84 Hun) 514, 32 N.Y.S. 449 (1895), affd, 152 N.Y. 639, 46 N.E. 1152 (1897).
Contra In re Moore, 218 Or. 403, 345 P.2d 411 (1959) (Oregon Supreme Court overturns the unanimous vote of the
Board of Governors not to discipline an attorney who, inter alia, prepared a will in which he was the sole beneficiary, and
suspends him for one year).
36. See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 433,374 P.2d 807, 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1962)
(disciplinary proceeding dismissed).
37. 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957).
38. Id. at 93-94, 84 N.W.2d at 143-46.
39. Id. at 94-95, 84 N.W.2d at 146.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ficiary, or the basis for its conclusion that the testatrix was adamant that her lawyer,
rather than another attorney, draft the will containing the legacy in question.4 0 The
source of much, if not all, of this information was presumably the attorney himself,
thus providing little chance for contradiction since the other principal party to any
relevant conversations, the testatrix, was obviously unable to testify at the discipli-
nary hearing.4 1
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Magee v. State Bar of
California4 2 similarly reflects this early permissive attitude towards this type of
conduct. The lawyer in Magee had drawn a will for the testatrix, who was eighty-one
years old and in declining health, in which he was named as residuary beneficiary and
designated as executor. Shortly after will execution, the testatrix also gave the attor-
ney $4,500 in cash, allegedly as an advance on the legacy. After the death of the
testatrix a relative contested the will, and it was found to have been the product of the
attorney's undue influence.4 3 In subsequent disciplinary proceedings based on the
same conduct, the court acknowledged that an attorney who obtains an inter vivos or
testamentary gift from a client by undue influence is guilty of an act of moral
turpitude. 44 Nevertheless, in its review of the Board of Bar Governors' recommenda-
tion of a two-year suspension, the court determined that it was not bound by the
earlier will contest decision, and hence that it could review the undue influence issue
de novo.45 After studying the same evidence that had been presented in the will
contest, the court concluded that the attorney had successfully rebutted the presump-
tion of undue influence. 46 Although unwilling to discipline the attorney for his
conduct, the court did set out some guidelines for the benefit of other lawyers who
might one day find themselves in a similar situation:
The danger of a lawyer's advancing his self-interest at a client's expense is recog-
nized by the profession generally and is reflected in the American Bar Association's
Canons of Professional Ethics .... Since the client is entitled to disinterested advice, an
attorney should not place himself in a position where his self-interest might prevent his
giving that advice.
For the very reason that the boundary between ethical and unethical behavior in such
cases is not clearly defined, attorneys should avoid drawing wills containing gifts to
themselves under circumstances in which there is a reasonable basis for suspicion that the
40. Id.
41. According to the court,
[The attomey-draftsman] offered a great deal of evidence to show the close friendship between decedent
and [the attorney's] family; her mental condition at the time she executed her last will . . . the reason why
decedent changed her wills so often ... and the fact that she had informed others that she was going to give
[the attorney] some of her property. He also did the same regarding the preparation, execution, and handling of
her last will.
Id. at 95-96, 84 N.W.2d at 146.
42. 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
43. Ruckes v. Magee (In re Rohde's Estate), 158 Cal. App. 2d 19, 323 P.2d 490 (1958) (the testatrix's name was
Mary Rohde; the draftsman-beneficiary's, Edward Howard Magee).
44. Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 429, 374 P.2d 807, 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1962).
45. Id. at 429, 374 P.2d at 810-11, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
46. Id. at 429-30, 374 P.2d at 811, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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client was overreached or that the gift would prevent the attorney from acting in the
client's best interests. Such a practice would remove any temptation to deal unfairly and
would protect the reputation of the profession. When an attorney does draw a will under
circumstances that suggest that he took advantage of a client's weakness or that he
benefited unduly he must justify his action as he must when an inference of undue
influence arises.47
Regrettably, after issuing this useful admonition, the court became an apologist for
the particular attorney whose conduct was in issue:
There is no rule that attorneys should never draw wills in which they receive gifts.
There is nothing improper in an attorney's drawing wills for his family or for relatives,
provided the gift to him is reasonable under the circumstances. Similarly, there is nothing
improper in drawing wills for close friends or for clients if the gift to the attorney is a
modest one. [Citation omitted.] As the instant case suggests, however, attorneys take a
grave risk in drawing wills in which they receive more than a modest gift that is in keeping
with the nature of the relationship they have with the client. Petitioner took this risk,
unwisely, and one consequence was that he lost the substantial gift in Mrs. Rohde's will
when it was contested.
48
The California court obviously felt that the loss of the legacy was punishment
enough. The rationale for this conclusion is, however, difficult to comprehend. If the
only "risk" for the attorney-draftsman is loss of the legacy, without need for concern
about possible disciplinary measures, then attorneys who are in a position to unduly
influence their clients have little to lose by drafting wills that include gifts for
themselves. If a will is not challenged or if it is contested and the legacy to the
attorney is upheld, then so much the better. 49 But, even if a contest is successful and
the legacy is overturned by reason of undue influence, the scrivener is not any worse
off financially than if the attorney had not improperly influenced the client at the
outset.5 o
The decision in Magee is also of interest because of the court's indication that
the only evidence of the reason for the client's inter vivos gift of $4,500 in cash to her
47. Id. at 431, 374 P.2d at 812, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
48. Id. at 433, 374 P.3d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
49. Of course, innumerable reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of a suit might persuade a testator's heirs
or beneficiaries not to contest a bequest to the attomey-draftsman. For instance, the heirs or beneficiaries might not have
sufficient funds to finance such a suit, including the expense of hiring a lawyer who might be hesitant to take the case on a
contingent fee basis. See generally 3 PAGE ON WuI~s, supra note 26, at § 26.148 (excellent discussion of the many open
questions about the award of attorney's fees in a successful will contest). Disgruntled heirs and beneficiaries may also be
reluctant to undertake a will contest because often they are not experienced in business pursuits and thus may be hesitant to
file suit and undergo the rigors of a trial. Further, if the heirs or beneficiaries live in a different section of the country than
where the testator's will is being probated, this would undoubtedly increase the burden of bringing suit. Also, if the
bequest to the attomey-draftsman was not substantial, then the other beneficiaries under the will might feel that it would
not be worth the effort to challenge the gift, no matter how offensive and unethical the attorney's conduct may have been.
50. The word "financially" is used advisedly, for a lawyer who is the object of a will contest based on undue
influence may suffer, even if the contest were ultimately settled or decided in the attorney's favor at trial, in many tangible
and intangible ways from the publicity associated with the proceeding. Cf. O'Hara, Sued!-Not Me, I'm A Lawyer, 40
KY. BENcH & B. 28 (Oct. 1976) (discussing the anxieties, adverse publicity, and other problems that a lawyer might face
as a defendant in a legal malpractice suit).
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attorney, 5 1 and the only direct evidence of what transpired during the crucial ten or
fifteen minute period when the testatrix met with the attorney to discuss the pro-
visions of her proposed will, was the lawyer's testimony at trial.52 This highlights the
inherent problem in situations in which an attorney has drafted a will in which he or
she is named as beneficiary. In almost all instances, the testator has passed away by
the time the propriety of the attorney-draftsman's conduct is questioned,53 and the
lawyer's testimony often goes uncontradicted.
2. State v. Horan
The more modem view, which holds attorneys to a much higher degree of
accountability in will drafting situations, has been spearheaded by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Horan.54 That decision, which remains a
leading case in the field, was decided two decades ago, just a year after the California
Supreme Court held in Magee that an attorney-draftsman was not subject to discipline
even though a will contest jury had previously found that he had unduly influenced
his client into making him a substantial beneficiary of her estate.
In Horan, an attorney drafted six wills and a codicil for an eighty-seven-year-old
client who was also a close friend. Under each succeeding instrument the legacies to
the attorney grew larger, at the expense of the other beneficiaries, until the attorney's
share was in excess of $50,000 of a $265,000 estate.55 After noting that the then
applicable Canons of Professional Ethics5 6 did not expressly cover the situation in
which an attorney-draftsman was named as a beneficiary in a will, the court openly
rejected the position set forth by the ABA Committee of Professional Ethics and
Grievances 7 and espoused by two leading scholars 58 that condoned this conduct in
broad, undefined circumstances and simply suggested that it would be desirable in
such situations to have another attorney review the document prior to execution.
Instead, the court in Horan adopted a comprehensive prohibition because of the
inherent conflict of interest between the attorney and the client in such circumstances,
the resulting incompetence of an attorney to testify in support of the will's admission
51. Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 428, 374 P.2d 807, 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1962). The
attorney was the subject of disciplinary proceedings not only for his conduct in preparing a will in which he was named as
the residuary beneficiary, but also for accepting a substantial cash gift from his client. The client allegedly gave the money
to the attorney because she already had enough for her needs and thought that since he would be getting it under her will,
he might as well have it early. Id.
52. Id. at 426-27, 374 P.2d at 809, 24 Cal Rptr. at 841.
53. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
54. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
55. Id. at 68, 123 N.W.2d at 489.
56. Id. at 70-71, 123 N.W.2d at 490. The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and remained in force until the Code of Professional Responsibility became effective in 1970. The
portions of the Canons referred to by the court in Horan were Canon 6 (prohibiting representation of "conflicting
interests" except by express consent) and Canon 11 (proscribing an attorney's taking advantage of a client for that
attorney's own "personal benefit or gain"). Id.
57. See Id. at 70-71, 123 N.W.2d at 490; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Decision 266, at 641
(1957).
58. See State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 70-71, 123 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1963); H. DRINKER supra note 9, at 94; M.
ORKIN, LEGAL ETHICS 104 (1957).
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to probate, the possibility of harm to other beneficiaries arising from the attorney's
actions, and the undermining of the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. 59 The court, however, excepted one particular situation from its general
prohibition against an attorney's dual role as draftsman and beneficiary, and this
exclusion has been reaffirmed in numerous decisions 60 and incorporated into the
provisions of the new ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 6' According to the
court:
We do not mean to state that a lawyer may never draw a will for a personal friend or
members of his family or close relatives in which he or a member of his family is a
beneficiary. A lawyer may draft a will for his wife, his children, or his parents, or other
close relatives, in which he is a beneficiary and stands in the relationship to the testator as
one being the natural object of the testator's bounty. 62
Recognizing that its decision was turning new ground, that the bar had not previously
given the matter adequate consideration, and that there was no indication of undue
influence on the part of this particular attorney, the court felt that a reprimand and
costs of the proceeding would be sufficient discipline under the circumstances. 63
3. State v. Collentine
Five years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had an opportunity in State v.
Collentine64 to review the Horan decision. Because of its concern that the conduct of
the lawyer in question was arguably within the letter of the exception set forth in
Horan, the court reluctantly concluded that discipline was not warranted. 65 The court
warned, however, that the actual innocence of a lawyer in a particular situation would
not overcome the detriment to the legal profession caused by such conduct, and
therefore decided to restrict its earlier ruling:
In order to prevent future misunderstandings, we conclude and establish as a rule for
prospective application that a lawyer may be the scrivener of a will in which he is a
beneficiary only when he stands in relationship to the testator as the natural object of the
testator's bounty and where under the will he receives no more than would be received by
law in the absence of a will. Under any other circumstances in which the lawyer-
draftsman is a beneficiary, this court will conclude that the preparation of such a will
constitutes unprofessional conduct.
When a testator wishes to have his attorney draft a will in which that attorney is
entitled to anything more than he would be at law, it is the absolute duty of the attorney to
refuse to act. He has the responsibility of advising his client to consult another attorney if
he wishes to pursue such a bequest. While adherence to this standard will result in
59. State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 123 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1963).
60. See, e.g., Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599,
196 N.W.2d 730 (1972); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
61. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.8(c) (1983).
62. State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 75, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1963) (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
65. Id. at 330-31, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
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occasional inconvenience to members of the bar, the problems that are inherent in the
drawing of an unnatural will far outweigh such inconveniences....
In Horan, the door was left ajar to permit unnatural wills in certain circumstances.
By this opinion, that door is closed. 66
In the fifteen or so years since Collentine, the courts in Wisconsin 67 and
elsewhere68 have become noticeably more rigorous in disciplining attorneys who
have drafted wills in which they have been named as beneficiaries. Of course,
considerable correlation exists between the reprehensiveness of an attorney's conduct
and the discipline mandated, 69 but beyond this factor there is no question that lawyers
in similar situations are held to a much higher standard of accountability than was the
case a decade or two ago. 70 Clearly, the admonishments and reprimands of the 1950s
and 1960s have become the suspensions and disbarments of the 1970s and 1980s.
Even in two recent decisions in which the courts have consciously adopted a less
stringent rule than that espoused in Horan and Collentine, the facts were considerably
more sympathetic to the attorney's position than is usual.
7 1
66. Id. at 332-33, 159 N.W.2d at 53-54.
67. In re Gonyo, 73 Wis. 2d 624, 245 N.W.2d 893 (1976); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730
(1972). See also State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972). In this, the second disciplinary action
brought against the Gulbankian firm, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was highly critical of a number of estate planning
practices employed by the Gulbankians, including designation of themselves as executors and attorneys for the estate in
their clients' wills.
68. In re Krotenberg, Il1 Ariz. 251, 527 P.2d 510 (1974) (6 month suspension); In re Saladino, 71111. 2d 263, 375
N.E.2d 102 (1978) (3 month suspension even though client suffered no financial loss); Committee on Professional Ethics
v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982) (indefinite suspension); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979) (past president of ABA disbarred), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa) (indefinite suspension for violation of an Ethical Consideration),
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969)
(bequest to attorney-draftsman under prior will held contrary to public policy and therefore void); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976) (one year suspension and return of executor's and attorney's fees
totaling $84,500).
69. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 844-46 (Iowa), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 805 (1979), in which the attorney-draftsman took advantage of a wealthy brother and sister in their eighties, who
were in poor health and had no close family ties. The attorney received an inter vivos gift of $7,500 from his clients, and
was a contingent beneficiary of $320,000 that would be payable to him in the event the 85-year-old sister predeceased the
testator. To make matters worse, within a period of three years immediately preceding the brother's death, the brother and
sister changed lawyers several times and each time a different lawyer prepared their wills, Behnke's legacy disappeared
only to reappear, in substantial amounts, in each sueceeding will that Behnke prepared. See also Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 436-39, 366 A.2d 563, 565-66 (1976). In Walker the attorney-draftsman prepared a
series of wills for an 88-year-old woman designating himself and his father coexecutors (in which capacities they received
fees totaling $95,000). The attorney-draftsman subsequently appointed himself attorney for the estate (for which he
received another $22,000), and was a residuary beneficiary of $239,000 under the terms of the will. If this conduct was
not bad enough, after the testator's death, Walker actively discouraged the other beneficiaries from consulting in-
dependent counsel to advise them of their rights. Moreover, he was guilty of a conflict of interest as executor and counsel
for the estate in settling claims against the estate in order to preserve his favorable status as beneficiary. Id. at 439-44, 366
A.2d at 566-69.
70. Compare Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
805 (1979) and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976), with Magee v. State Bar of
Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962) (disciplinary proceeding dismissed in spite of prior suit in
which the attorney's conduct was held to constitute undue influence over an 81-year-old woman in declining health) and
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972) (mere public reprimand given even though
testatrix was elderly, was in poor mental health, and had seen the attorney on only one prior occasion before designating
him remainderman of her entire estate in the will that he drafted).
71. See, e.g., Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303
N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981). See also Legal Ethics Inquiry 83-3 (W. Va.), reported in 6 W. VA. ST. B.C.L.E. BuLL. No.
16 (Mar. 21, 1983).
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4. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke
The most significant decision that has been rendered in the years after Horan and
Collentine is the Iowa Supreme Court's milestone opinion in Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics v. Behnke.72 The facts in Behnke were no more egregious than those
in a number of other disciplinary proceedings that had previously been brought. 73 In
Behnke, however, the lawyer argued vigorously that even if he had violated the
provisions of EC 5-5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,74 his conduct would
not provide a basis for disciplinary action since Ethical Considerations are intended
only to be aspirational. 75 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the attorney's position,
holding that "violation of an ethical consideration, standing alone, will support
disciplinary action.', 76 The court then suspended the attorney's license for a mini-
mum of three years.
77
Because the attorney's conduct in Behnke was inexcusable, the discipline that
was ordered is understandable, and the court should be commended for its efforts to
impose high ethical standards on attorneys practicing in that jurisdiction. But the
court's decision is tainted by its conclusion that a violation of an Ethical Considera-
tion, by itself, provides an adequate basis for disciplinary action. 78
The Preliminary Statement in the ABA-approved version of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility explains that the Disciplinary Rules provide "a basis for
disciplinary action," 79 and that the Ethical Considerations are "aspirational," 80 pro-
72. 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979).
73. See supra note 69. Cf. In re Saladino, 71111. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey,
32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972); In re Moore, 218 Or. 403, 345 P.2d 411 (1959); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976).
74. EC 5-5 provides:
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for his benefit. Ifa lawyer accepts
a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the
client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing
so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested advice from an independent, competent person who is
cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an
instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the
client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsImtLrry EC 5-5 (1983).
75. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805
(1979).
76. Id. at 840, 846. In the process, the Iowa Supreme Court relied on five earlier Iowa cases in which attorneys had
been disciplined for violation of ethical considerations, but the court then admitted that the lawyers in those other cases
"were not disciplined for ethical considerations violations alone .... I d. at 840.
77. Id. at 846.
78. Due process may entitle lawyers to some warning of the rules which, if violated, will result in disciplinary
action. In this regard, the applicable sections of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility may have been misleading,
since EC 5-5 is the only provision dealing directly with improprieties inherent in an attorney's preparing a will in which he
or she is named as a beneficiary, and the Ethical Considerations may not be intended to form a basis for disciplinary
action. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressly
rejected this position and revoked, on the basis of EC 5-5, an attorney's license to practice before that court. Randall v.
Reynoldson (In re Randall), 640 F.2d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 89-90). See
generally In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (a leading case on the due process requirements applicable in attorney
disciplinary proceedings). This problem has been resolved in Iowa, at least, where the substance of EC 5-5 has been
transferred to a new disciplinary rule, DR 5-101(B). See Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838,
840 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979).
79. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESPONSIBILtTY Preliminary Statement (1983).
80. Id.
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viding "objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive." 8 1
Iowa, however, is one of a handful of states that omitted the Preliminary Statement
when it enacted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 82 While this could
help explain the conclusion in Behnke that violation of an Ethical Consideration can
result in the imposition of discipline, the court did not attempt to justify its decision
on that basis.8 3 Fortunately, the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, with its
"Restatement" format, avoids the dilemma presented by the Code's division into
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations.
84
Any doubt that the Iowa Supreme Court meant what it said in Behnke was
extinguished eight months later when the same court decided Committe on Pro-
fessional Ethics v. Randall,85 which also dealt with the propriety of drafting a will in
which the attorney was named as a beneficiary. The court again asserted its position
that a violation of EC 5-5 could provide the basis for disciplinary action, and then
added: "We have passed from the era in which it can be argued it is professionally
acceptable for a lawyer to draw a client's will in his own favor unless undue influence
can be shown. We made this clear in Behnke ... .,,86 On the basis of the evidence 8
7
and the court's reaffirmation of its holding in Behnke, John D. Randall, a past
president of the American Bar Association, had his license to practice revoked. 88 The
same issues then made their way to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
where Randall challenged his disbarment from practice before that court.89 In re-
sponse to the attorney's contention that a violation of EC 5-5 was not grounds for
disciplinary action, the court of appeals threw its considerable weight behind the
rationale of the Iowa Supreme Court:
Randall's contention that violations of ethical canons could not lead to professional
discipline, as that would be violative of due process, is not well taken. Ethical con-
81. Id.
82. IOWA CODE at 3545 (1979). See also GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9, app. pt. 111 (1973); LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, ch.
4 app. art. XVI (West 1974); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, app. art. 12 (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
app. 9 (Supp. 1983). Several other states have adopted the ABA's Disciplinary Rules, but have omitted the Ethical
Considerations as well as the Preliminary Statement. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN., 2 Judicial Volume, Pamphlet I1
(1982); 11 OKt.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3 (West 1982).
83. The court in Behnke made no reference to the fact that the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility does not
include the ABA's Preliminary Statement. This may be attributable to the confusion that existed as to whether the ABA's
Preliminary Statement had been adopted in that state. For example, West's Iowa Code Annotated, 40 IowA CODE ANN.
§ 610 app. (1975) includes the Preliminary Statement as part of Iowa's Code of Professional Responsibility, but the
official Code of Iowa correctly omits the Preliminary Statement. IOWA CODE at 3545 (1979). Iowa's failure to include the
Preliminary Statement appears to be inexplicable, and the omission may have been inadvertent. However, the basic
purpose in dividing the Code of Professional Responsibility into Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations, to provide
rules for disciplinary purposes and ethical guidelines for general use, is obvious from the format and terminology of the
Code. This would appear to be true even when that purpose is not made explicit because of the deletion of the Preliminary
Statement. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad vs. Narrow
Proscriptions, 65 IowA L. Rnv. 1386, 1387-93, 1387 n.9 & 1391 n.43 (1980).
84. For an excellent discussion of the reasons behind the decision to forego the Code of Professional Responsibility's
format of Canons, DRs, and ECs in favor of the Model Rule's Restatement organizational structure, see MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Chairman's Introduction (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
85. 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 161-64.
88. Id. at 165.
89. Randall v. Reynoldson (In re Randall), 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1981).
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siderations are more than aspirational and are mandatory.... Furthermore, it appears that
the prohibition contained in EC 5-5, prohibiting the drafting of a will by an attorney
making himself a beneficiary, is but the current articulation of a long-standing prohibition
against that practice. Obviously such a situation is fraught with a high potential for
overreaching and abuse. The prohibition in EC 5-5 is also only a restatement of old Canon
9, Canons of the American Bar Association.
90
C. Propriety of "Modest" Bequests
Limited authority in a couple of older cases indicates that a "modest" bequest to
an attorney-draftsman does not form a sufficient basis to support a claim of undue
influence. 9 ' By analogy, this type of testamentary gift would not provide grounds for
disciplinary action against the attorney who drafted and was named in the will. 92
Dicta in several decisions provides additional support for a modest bequest exception.
Thus, in Magee v. State Bar of California,9 3 the court stated that "there is nothing
improper in drawing wills for close friends or for clients if the gift to the attorney is a
modest one." 94 This statement, however, was not applicable to the facts in Magee,
where the attorney-draftsman, as sole residuary legatee, received $21,000 - an
amount that constituted all but a few thousand dollars of the testatrix's entire estate. 95
In State v. Horan96 the court phrased the issue in terms of whether an attorney could
ethically draw a will in which he or she is named as a "substantial beneficiary,"
97
and later stated that an attorney's integrity would be questioned if he or she drew a
will that contained "more than a token or modest bequest."- 98 In State v.
Gulbankian,99 the court disciplined an attorney for preparing a will in which her sister
received a $10,000 legacy, and held that "a bequest of $10,000 is not a token or
modest bequest in an estate of $180,000. .. .
EC 5-5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not contain any language
that would support a contention that the preparation of a will including only a
"modest" or "token" gift to the scrivener would not constitute unethical conduct. 10 1
Furthermore, a number of reported disciplinary and will contest proceedings found
attorneys guilty of improper conduct for drawing wills in which they were named as
beneficiaries, even though the bequests in question could easily be described as
90. Id. at 905.
91. Haughian v. Conlan, 86 A.D. 290, 83 N.Y.S. 830 (1903); In re Suydam's Will, 91 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (84 Hun)
514, 32 N.Y.S. 449 (1895), affd, 152 N.Y. 639, 46 N.E. 1152 (1897).
92. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 602, 196 N.W.2d 730, 731 (1972). See supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the similarity of issues in undue influence and disciplinary cases based on an
attorney's conduct in drafting a will in which he or she is named as a beneficiary.
93. 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
94. Id. at 433, 374 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
95. Id. at 427, 374 P.2d at 809, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
96. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
97. Id. at 69, 123 N.W.2d at 489.
98. Id. at 75, 123 N.W.2d at 492.
99. 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972).
100. Id. at 602-03, 196 N.W.2d at 731.
101. EC 5-5 is quoted in full supra note 74. Nothing in the history of the adoption of EC 5-5 indicates that any
consideration was given to inclusion of an exception for a token or modest bequest to the scrivener. See ANNOTATED COiE
OF PROFESStONAL RESPONSIBILITY 191-92 (1979).
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modest. In State v. Collentine,10 2 for instance, an attorney who was named as the
residuary beneficiary was admonished for his conduct despite the insolvency of the
estate and the attorney's knowledge of the insolvency when he drafted the will. 
10 3
The Collentine court also appeared to retract that portion of its earlier opinion in
Horan relating to "token or modest" bequests. 104 Furthermore, in several recent
decisions in which the legacy in question did not seem to be large, the courts still
found the drafting attorney guilty of misconduct. 1
05
By an amendment to Rule 1.8(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
adopted by the American Bar Association in August 1983, however, what had been
a prohibition of "any" gift to an attorney-draftsman or a member of that attorney's
family was changed to prohibit only "substantial" gifts. 106 This modification makes
a basic and significant change in the applicability of Rule 1.8(c), and breathes
considerable new life into the modest or token bequest exception. As a consequence
of this amendment prohibiting only "substantial" gifts to drafting lawyers, the
Model Rules will, unfortunately, reduce the ethical proscription to a point below that
established by EC 5-5, which contains no similar limitation.107
Even in the absence of specific provisions like those in Rule 1.8(c) of the Model
Rules, an attorney might not be subject to disciplinary action in every instance in
which he or she drafted a will containing a token bequest to the draftsman. If the gift
can truly be described as de minimus, it is unlikely that the decedent's heirs or
beneficiaries would be sufficiently upset by the legacy to complain to the disciplinary
authorities or to file a will contest challenging the particular disposition. But what is a
modest gift to one person may well be substantial to another, and thus an attorney-
draftsman may find that he or she is more vulnerable than anticipated by acceding to a
client's wishes and including what is believed to be a small bequest to himself or
herself. In addition, even an object intended only as a token of the testator's apprecia-
tion, like a small cash bequest, an old piece of furniture, or an oil painting, may well
be viewed by others, after the testator's death, as the direct result of overreaching
during the attorney-client relationship.10 8 Thus, the appearance of impropriety is
102. 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
103. Id. at 328-31, 159 N.W.2d at 51-53.
104. Id. at 332-33, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
105. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982) (attorney-draftsman's license to
practice suspended indefinitely for being named as one of 32 beneficiaries); Shaffer v. Graham (In re Estate of Lawson),
75 A.D.2d 20,428 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1980) (attorney-draftsman received a $20,000 bequest out of an estate of S150,000).
106. For the full text of Rule 1.8(c) see supra text accompanying note 19. See also supra note 20 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this change.
107. Compare the provisions of Rule 1.8(c) with the precise terms of EC 5-5.
108. One would expect that beneficiaries of an estate might disagree whether a bequest to an attorney was "mod-
est," because of the emotion involved in the inheritance of a friend's or relative's estate, but it is significant that judges
differ considerably on this issue. Thus, in Haughian v. Conlan, 86 A.D. 290, 83 N.Y.S. 830 (1903), although the
attorney-draftsman was the recipient of $10,000 in cash and $1,200 in stock out of an estate of $225,000, the court was
not troubled by the attorney's conduct:
As to the charge of undue influence, we find nothing to support it except the fact that [the attorney-
draftsman] received a legacy of $10,000 thereunder and also ten shares of the capital stock... which he
afterwards sold for $1,200. This is utterly insufficient to warrant the inference of undue influence.... In the
case at bar the value of the estate appears to have been at least $225,000 and the amount of the legacy to [the
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likely to exist whenever a testamentary gift is left to the attorney who drafted the
will.' 0 9 Under these circumstances and in view of all of the potential problems that
can result, it is clearly preferable to have an ethical rule that prohibits an attorney
from preparing a will containing any bequest or devise to the draftsman - without
exception for token or modest testamentary gifts.
D. Ethics Opinions Dealing with the Draftsman-Beneficiary
In addition to the reported cases, a number of published ethics opinions deal
with various aspects of the problems presented when an attorney drafts a will in
which he or she is named as a beneficiary. "0 As might be expected, the opinions vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with some taking a more lenient approach along the
lines of the provisions of EC 5-5,111 and others, particularly those issued by the
Wisconsin Committee on Professional Ethics, following a course consistent with the
holdings in Horan and Collentine. 112 All of the published opinions tend to discourage
this conduct, and the differences in attitude are primarily attributable to the extent of
the exceptions that are recognized and permitted.
113
attorney-draftsman] was not so disproportionately large as to suggest the exercise of any improper solicitation or
control on his pan.
Id. at 292-93, 83 N.Y.S. at 832. But see State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972), a disciplinary
action in which a will prepared by an attorney contained a $10,000 bequest to the draftsman's sister out of a $180,000
estate. Under these similar circumstances, the Wisconsin court was clearly more concerned by the attorney's conduct than
its counterpart in Haughian had been:
The complaint against [the attorney-draftsman] claims she acted in an unprofessional manner in drafting the
will because it gave a substantial bequest to her sister ....
Although the referee has found no ill intent on behalf of [the attorney-draftsman] in preparing this will, we
find a bequest of $10,000 is not a token or modest bequest in an estate of $180,000 ....
Id. at 601-03, 196 N.W.2d at 731. Notwithstanding that Haughian involved a will contest in which undue influence was
charged, whereas the Wisconsin action was a disciplinary proceeding, and that the New York case was decided some 70
years prior to the Gulbankian decision, when courts, in general, were considerably more lenient in their disposition toward
such conduct, the difference in judicial attitudes is still significant.
109. The courts have shown particular concern about the appearance of impropriety in evaluating conduct in which
an attorney is named as a beneficiary in a will that he or she drafted. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
110. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Opinion 1145 (1970); Opinion 74-24, 3 ARIZ.
ST. B. NEwsLrrER 3 (Nov. 1974), reported in MARu 1975, supra note 12, at 70, No. 7626; Opinion 367, 60 ILL. B.J.
73 (1971); Informal Opinion 89, 57 MicH. ST. B.J. 311 (Special Issue, Feb. 1978), reported in MARu 1980, supra note
12, at 289, No. 11520; Opinion 840 (Oct. 25, 1973), N.C. ST. B. 11-266, reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 420,
No. 9591; Opinion 71, 16 TEx. B.J. 223 (Apr. 1953); Informal Opinion 1-3, 32 WAsH. ST. B. NEws 27 (Jan. 1978),
reported in MARu 1980, supra note 12, at 582, No. 13035; Opinion E-80-1, 53 Wis. B. BULL. 79 (Apr. 1980);
Memorandum Opinion 6-77, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 93 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MAttu 1980, supra note 12, at 613,
No. 13186; Informal Opinion B-1968, 47 Wts. B. BULL. 38-39 (Supp. Dec. 1974), reported in MARu 1975, supra note
12, at 501, No. 10189; Informal Opinion 1963-4 (L.A. County, Cal.), L.A. ETHics OpmioNs, supra note 12, at 71,
reported in MARu 1975, supra note 12, at 103, No. 7794.
111. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Opinion 1145 (1970) (relying on
"exceptional circumstances" language of EC 5-5); Opinion 74-24, 3 ARiZ. St. B. Newsletter 3 (Nov. 1974), reported in
MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 70, No. 7626 (also employing the "exceptional circumstances" terminology); Opinion
367, 60 I11. BJ. 73 (1971) (quoting from H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 94).
112. See State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d
50 (1968). See also Opinion E-80-1, 53 Wis. B. BULL. 79 (Apr. 1980); Opinion 3-67, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 91 (Supp. June
1979), reported in MAu 1980, supra note 12, at 613, No. 13186; Informal Opinion B-1968, 47 Wis. B. BULL. 38-39
(Supp. Dec. 1974), reported in MAu 1975, supra note 12, at 501, No. 10189.
113. Compare, e.g., Opinion 74-24, 3 ARtz. ST. B. NEwSLETrER 3 (Nov. 1974), reported in MARu 1975, supra
note 12, at 70, No. 7626 and Opinion 367, 60 ILL. B.J. 73 (1971) with Opinion E-80-1, 53 Wis. B. BULL. 79 (April
1980).
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In general, the ethics opinions issued in the last ten years seem to be more
tolerant than court decisions rendered during the same period, but this disparity may
be more apparent than real. Many of the court decisions involve egregious conduct
that literally cries out for disciplinary action," 4 and it is not surprising to see the
courts taking a hard line in these cases. 115 On the other hand, the underlying facts in
the ethics opinions are either extremely limited or generally favorable to the attor-
ney's position, and none involve the sort of flagrant conduct that is often noted in
judicial decisions.116 This distinction is undoubtedly due to the difference in the
forums. Disciplinary proceedings are based on the presentation of evidence both for
and against the lawyer who has been charged, and as a consequence the attorney's
conduct is not always presented in the best possible light." 17 In contrast, ethics
opinions are advisory in nature and are derived from an ex parte factual narrative
posed by a member of the bar in which the lawyer's activity, not surprisingly, is
described in a more generous fashion.1
18
Several of the ethics committee opinions are particularly noteworthy because
they consider important issues that have not been resolved by the cases. For instance,
in Informal Opinion 1145, issued in 1970, the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances relied on the "exceptional circumstances" terminology in EC
5-5 in ruling that a lawyer-spouse could ethically draft a will for a nonlawyer-spouse,
even though the draftsman stood to receive more than an intestate share under the
terms of the will. 19 In reaching this conclusion, the committee quoted extensively
from the holding in State v. Horan,120 and thus was able to "reconcile" the familial
and professional responsibilities of a lawyer. 121 Inexplicably, the opinion made no
reference to the later Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in State v. Collentine,
22
which was decided two years before the ABA opinion and which specifically mod-
ified Horan to allow an attorney to draft this type of will only when his or her portion
would be no greater than an intestate share. By way of comparison, in 1968 the
Committee on Professional Ethics of the Wisconsin State Bar relied on Collentine
in finding that it would be improper for a lawyer to draft a will for a spouse that
contained a bequest equal to the maximum marital deduction, since that could exceed
114. See supra note 69.
115. For a summary of the disciplinary action taken by the courts in the last decade, see supra notes 67-70.
116. See, e.g., Opinion 367, 60 ILL. B.J. 73 (1971). In that opinion, the facts provided to the Ethics Committee,
even in a fairly complex situation, were limited:
A lawyer whose father recently died has been asked by his stepmother to draw a new will for her deleting
his deceased father as principal beneficiary and naming the lawyer as executor and trustee of the assets of the
estate. The trust assets are to be used for the support and education of three minor half-brothers and on the trust's
termination the lawyer will share the remaining trust estate equally with his three half-brothers. The lawyer
inquires if it is professionally proper for him to draw such a will and in addition poses certain legal questions to
the Committee.
117. See generally L. PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAw 286-90 (1971).
118. Id. at 45; see also Cheatham & Lewis, Committees on Legal Ethics, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 28 (1935).
119. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Opinion 1145 (1970).
120. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
121. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Opinion 1145 (1970).
122. 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
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the draftsman's intestate share. 23 Similarly, in 1980, the same committee opined that
the decided cases in its jurisdiction precluded an attorney in a law firm from drafting a
will for the spouse of another lawyer in the same firm, when the will would leave the
entire estate to the lawyer-spouse to the exclusion of children.' 24 Apparently the
Wisconsin Ethics Committee is unable to "reconcile" what may be inherently
irreconcilable, and has decided to err in favor of high ethical standards at the expense
of familial relationships.
On the basis of the reported cases and ethics opinions, the authorities appear to
be in general agreement regarding the impropriety of a lawyer's conduct in preparing
for a client a will in which the drafting lawyer is named as a beneficiary. Numerous
court decisions attest to the fact that the attorney-client relationship can provide the
means by which a lawyer, if so inclined, may be able to take advantage of that
position and ingratiate himself or herself to the extent that the client-testator may
"decide" to include the attorney in a will drawn, not coincidently, by the same
individual. 2 5 If the decision to include the attorney as a beneficiary has been made as
a result of the exercise of the testator's own free will, the bequest or devise would
similarly be incorporated in a will drawn by another lawyer, who would be in a
position to offer independent legal advice untainted by self-interest. 126 Admittedly,
this could cause some inconvenience to a testator who simply wants to remember the
lawyer in his or her will, but this is not an unreasonable price to exact in order to
provide needed protection against the sort of overreaching that can easily occur in
such situations. A single highly publicized instance where an attorney drafted a will
in which he or she is named as a substantial beneficiary can undo innumerable good
123. Informal Opinion B-1968, 47 Wis. B. BuLL. 38-39 (Supp. Dec. 1974), reported in MARu 1975, supra note
12, at 501, No. 10189.
124. Opinion E-80-1, 53 Wis. B. BuL.. 79 (Apr. 1980). The decision was based on the theory of "imputed
disqualification." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RasPONSiBILrrY DR 5-105(D) (1983).
125. See, e.g., In re Saladino, 71 Ill. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke,
276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631
(1960).
126. EC 5-5 provides in pertinent part: "Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an
instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the client."
MODEL CODE OF PROFEssiONAL RasPONstatIrrv EC 5-5 (1983). Also, when a will contains a legacy to the attorney-
draftsman and the testator then changes lawyers and has another will prepared, the second will may omit any reference to
the original attorney. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 844-45 (Iowa), appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541,544, 170 N.W.2d 166, 168 (1969). If
independent legal counsel is sought, then it is essential that the second lawyer is in fact independent in order for the legacy
to the original attorney to withstand scrutiny. In re Moore, 218 Or. 403,410, 345 P.2d 411,414 (1959); Lyons v. Wilson
(In re Lobb's Will), 173 Or. 414, 427-32, 145 P.2d 808, 813-14 (1944); Komarr v. Beaudry (In re Estate of Komarr), 46
Wis. 2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970). But cf. Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 426-30, 374 P.2d 807,
809-11, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-43 (1962).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has succinctly explained the value of retaining independent counsel to draw a
will in such circumstances:
The purpose [for insisting that the client see another attorney] is that the client have independent advice and
counsel. If, after receiving that independent advice and counsel, the testator remains steadfast in the desire to
name the attorney as a beneficiary in the will, there should be little doubt that the will expresses the intent of the
testator.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433, 441 (N.D. 1980).
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deeds performed by other members of the bar in a particular community.127 Under the
circumstances, compelling reasons exist for the adoption of an ethical rule that
contains a clear and concise prohibition which leaves no room for interpretation or
manipulation.
E. An Evaluation of EC 5-5 and Rule 1.8(c)
Although EC 5-5 of the current Code of Professional Responsibility addresses
the ethical problems inherent in situations where attorneys draft wills or trusts in
which they have beneficial interests, its provisions should be mandatory. For ex-
ample, no justification exists for providing that a lawyer "should not" suggest to a
client that a gift be made to him or her, rather than unequivocally stating that a lawyer
"shall not" make such a suggestion. 12 8 Furthermore, an attorney should not be given
the leeway to argue that he or she was unsuccessful in urging the client to seek
independent advice, therefore permitting the attorney-draftsman to be a beneficiary
under a will or trust.12 9 When the will becomes effective and the bequest or devise
subject to challenge, death will have silenced the testator. The person who could best
confirm where the idea for the legacy arose can no longer testify.' 30 Thus, it is often
the attorney's testimony alone that may be controlling on the all-important questions
of the testator's motivation and mental capacity at the time of will execution.' 3 ' The
distinct possibility that the determinative issue may turn on an attorney's credibility in
a situation fraught with self-interest is a sufficient reason, by itself, to consider all
such conduct improper. Because the appearance of impropriety, if not actual impro-
priety, is blatant in such circumstances, the small amount of inconvenience involved
in insisting that a client utilize the services of independent counsel seems well jus-
tified.
Even if certain exceptions are to be recognized in a rule prohibiting an attorney
from drafting a will or trust in which he or she is named as a beneficiary, the
"exceptional circumstances" language of EC 5-5 is totally inadequate because it is
not defined or limited,13 and the cautious practitioner is left to his or her own devices
in determining when a client's will ethically can be drawn to include a bequest or
devise to the draftsman. The overall format of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity simply compounds this problem; although EC 5-5 deals directly with the issue of
127. See Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); Randall v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1981) (prominent Iowa attorney and past president
of the American Bar Association disbarred first from practicing in Iowa and then before the federal courts in the Eighth
Circuit for his conduct in preparing a will in which he was the sole beneficiary of a millionaire's estate). See, e.g., the
reference to Randall in the cover story on "Why Lawyers Are in the Doghouse" that appeared in U.S. News & World
Report, May 11, 1981, at 38.
128. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC 5-5 (1983). See also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
129. See supra note 126. This argument has been made with some success in a number of cases. See, e.g., State v.
Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 95-96, 84 N.W.2d 136, 146 (1957); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433,441 (N.D.
1980); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 329-30, 159 N.W.2d 50, 52 (1968).
130. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 18.
132. See supra note 16.
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the drafting attorney as beneficiary, its proscription is seriously diluted because the
Code, by its own terms, makes its Ethical Considerations "aspirational" only.
133
The decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Behnke134 was able to avoid this dilemma, but attorneys in other jurisdictions should
be able to rely on their ethics code's own statements concerning the consequences of
conduct that falls short of breaching its disciplinary rules. 1
35
The earlier versions of Rule 1.8(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
represented a significant improvement over EC 5-5, but the current blanket ex-
ceptions to cover gifts that are less than substantial and situations in which the client
is a relative of the attorney-beneficiary are needlessly broad. 136 For example, why
should an attorney be permitted to prepare a will for a distant cousin when he or she is
to be named as a beneficiary?
F. An Approach Based on Horan and Collentine
A better and more stringent approach might be posited on the ethical principles
developed in the Horan137 and Collentine138 cases. These decisions prohibit an
attorney from preparing a will in which he or she is designated as a beneficiary,
except when the client is a close relative and the amount of the legacy to the attorney
is no greater than an inheritance would have been if the client-relative had died
intestate. This minor exception would allow an attorney to prepare a will in situations
when it might be awkward, unfortunate, or unnatural if he or she had to refuse to
perform such a service for a close family member. If a lawyer is married and has
several children, it is arguable that he or she should be permitted to prepare a spouse's
will under which the estate is to be divided in a manner similar to that provided for
under the applicable statute of descent and distribution. 139 This rule would also
permit a lawyer to draft wills for his or her parents, if the attorney's share did not
exceed the intestate portion.' 40
Thus, the Horan - Collentine approach offers a reasonable compromise between
high ethical standards and familial obligations. Certainly, the ethical problems arising
from a conflict of interest or an appearance of impropriety are minimized in the
limited situations when an attorney-beneficiary would be permitted to draft a will for
a relative, but problems still exist. Even with these restrictions, the ethical concerns
have not been totally resolved. If an attorney were to draw a will for a widowed
mother under which her estate would be shared equally by the attorney and two
siblings, exactly in the manner that the estate would be divided if the mother had died
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1983).
134. 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 74-84.
136. For the full text of Rule 1.8(c), see supra text accompanying note 19. For a discussion of the history of Rule
1.8(c), see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
137. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
138. 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
139. See generally T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 61-65 (2d ed. 1953).
140. Id. at 64-65.
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intestate, there is still no assurance that the attorney did not take advantage of his or
her fiduciary relationship. The draftsman may have included a bequest, albeit in the
amount of an intestate share, that was greater than what he or she would have
received had the mother had her will prepared by independent counsel.14 1 After all, it
is not unusual for testators to divide their estates along lines other than those specified
in the intestacy provisions; the wills of parents do not always provide for equal
treatment of offspring. 14' Even if equality was in fact desired by the testator, that
would not necessarily overcome the appearance of impropriety that could result when
the scrivener of a relative's will is named as a substantial beneficiary under its
terms. 143 The ethical rule developed in Horan and Collentine, although a significant
improvement over the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsiblity and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, is more a realistic compromise than an all-
purpose panacea.
G. An Alternative Based on an All-Inclusive Prohibition
Despite the benefits of the Horan-Collentine approach, much can be said for the
adoption of a concise ethical provision that would prohibit the inclusion of an
attorney-draftsman as a will or trust beneficiary without exception.144 An absolute
ethical restraint would serve the bar by providing an unambiguous rule of conduct
uneroded by conditions or exclusions. One major disadvantage to such a rule is that a
client would be put to the trouble of seeking new counsel if the testator wanted to
include his or her original attorney as a beneficiary of a will or trust. It is difficult
enough to persuade the public of the benefits of having a will drawn in order to avoid
intestacy,145 and it might be inadvisable to make the process any more burdensome,
even when a client may desire to make a devise or bequest to the drafting attorney.
141. Assume, for purposes of illustration, that a widowed mother was survived by three adult children who lived in
the same general area of the country as their mother, and that one of these children was an attorney. Assume further that
the mother's will, which was prepared by the child who was an attorney, split the estate into equal shares, exactly as if the
mother had died intestate. If one of the children, however, had been much closer to the mother than the others, or had been
in greater financial need, then it is possible that a will prepared by independent counsel, rather than the attorney-offspring,
would have divided the estate in some other manner. Thus, the mere fact that a will disposes of property in the same
manner as the applicable law of descent and distribution is hardly determinative of the ethical propriety of the draftsman's
conduct. Of course, the risk of abuse is considerably less in the family setting. For a discussion of this point, see Hazard
Letter, supra note 25.
142. This creates the need for statutory provisions regarding a spouse's forced share and children's rights as
pretermitted heirs to provide protection against a testator's disinheritance of his or her family. 1 PAOE ON WILLS, supra
note 26, at § 16.7; 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra, § 21.05; T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 118-26, 138-46.
143. This would, of course, depend largely on the circumstances. But if the relative-draftsman was not particularly
involved in the testator's day-to-day life, whereas other relatives were, and the estate was substantial, it would be difficult
if not impossible to avoid some appearance of impropriety, even though the draftsman received only the sham that he or
she would have received if the decedent had died intestate. See supra note 141. Often, the true intentions of a testator are
buried with the person, except as they may be reflected in the terms of the will. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
144. The original version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contained an absolute prohibition. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.9(b) (Discussion Draft 1980) (quoted in full at supra note 22.).
145. See generally R. LYNN, supra note 3, at 77-81; Pedrick, When Does the Estate Planning Team Huddle? (The
Roles of the Several Estate Planning Professionals and the Nature of Their Relationship-In Fact), 5 INsT. ON EST. PLAN.
71.1900, 71.1903 at 19-10 to 1-11 (1971); Wellman, Selected Aspects of Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROP.
PRon. & TR. J. 199. 206-07 (1968).
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But if the initial lawyer were to explain the reasons behind the ethical prohibition, the
client might gain an appreciation for the desire to instill a high level of integrity in the
legal profession even though the testator may believe that this protection was un-
necessary in his or her particular case. Further, inclusion of a gift to a drafting
attorney is unusual enough that only a small fraction of all testators would be put to
the inconvenience of seeking independent counsel. 1
46
The real danger, of course, is that an attorney in these circumstances may lose
the benefit of a legacy. Once the ethical prohibition is explained, it is possible that the
testator would prefer to delete the gift rather than seek out the services of another
attorney. The likelihood of a client reacting in this way would seem greatest when the
legacy is small in value, and intended to serve only as a token of the client's
appreciation. 147 While it can certainly be argued that clients should be permitted to
show their gratitude, the application of an all-inclusive ethical rule that would pre-
clude such legacies does not seem onerous. In other instances involving a more
substantial legacy, a risk of losing that benefit would exist if a client were advised to
go to another attorney, and, in the process of having that second lawyer prepare a
will, the testator decided against inclusion of the testamentary gift to the original
attorney.148 Yet, this would prove the merits of utilizing independent counsel in order
to be certain that such a legacy is the result of the testator's own gift-giving disposi-
tion.
It is not surprising that no direct precedents in the reported disciplinary cases
support the imposition of an all-inclusive prohibition, because the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, including the provisions of EC 5-5, has been adopted to
govern ethical conduct in a large number of jurisdictions. 149 Nevertheless, over the
past decade or two 150 the courts have tended to impose serious disciplinary sanctions
in cases involving attorney-beneficiaries for conduct that, no matter how offensive,
might have escaped discipline in years past.' 5 ' Additionally, the court in Committee
on Professional Ethics v. Behnke 152 held that attorneys who draft wills in which they
146. The Wisconsin Supreme Court spoke to this point in State v. Collentine:
When a testator wishes to have his attorney draft a will in which that attorney is entitled to anything more
than he would be at law, it is the absolute duty of the attorney to refuse to act. He has the responsibility of
advising his client to consult another attorney if he wishes to pursue such a bequest. While adherence to this
standard will result in occasional inconvenience to members of the bar, the problems that are inherent in the
drawing of an unnatural will far outweigh such inconveniences. The inclusion of a clause making the scrivener a
beneficiary is an invitation to a will contest and places in jeopardy the admission of a will that might otherwise
go unquestioned ....
39 Wis. 2d 325, 332-33, 159 N.W.2d 50, 53-54 (1968) (emphasis added).
147. See supra text acccompanying notes 91-109 (discussing token or modest bequests).
148. As might be expected, this is often the case. See supra note 126.
149. See 2, 2(A), 2(B) NATIONAL REPORTER oN LEGAL ETHIcs & PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBIIrry (1982) (contain-
ing the ethics codes of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and demonstrating that the great majority of
these jurisdictions have adopted verbatim the provisions of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 54-90 (discussing the trend toward the imposition of more stringent
discipline in cases in which an attorney has drafted a will and is named a beneficiary therein).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 35-53 (discussing earlier disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions
imposed).
152. 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979).
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are named as beneficiaries are subject to high ethical standards; it determined that a
violation of an Ethical Consideration provided a sufficient basis for imposing disci-
pline. Thus, in the draftsman-beneficiary situation, the courts in recent years have
indicated a willingness to adopt ethical principles that go considerably beyond the
applicable provisions of-the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
1. Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot
Private suits involving similar attorney conduct have also produced results that
are consistent with an all-inclusive ethical prohibition. Numerous reported cases have
relied on a presumption of undue influence when an attorney prepares a will and
includes himself or herself as a beneficiary. 53 Moreover, the unparallelled decision
in Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot154 provides perhaps the closest analogy in private
litigation to an absolute ethical restraint against attorneys drafting wills in which they
are named as beneficiaries. In Karabatian, an attorney prepared a will under which
he was to receive a $10,000 bequest and was designated as executor. Thereafter, the
testator executed a second will, drawn by another lawyer, 155 which omitted the first
attorney entirely. 156 Upon the testator's death, the attorney who drafted the first will
contested the admission of the later will to probate. In granting the motion for a
directed verdict in favor of the proponents of the second will, the trial judge ques-
tioned the ethics of the lawyer who designates himself or herself as a beneficiary in a
will that he or she has drawn. 157 On appeal, the court not only condoned the trial
judge's exercise of supervisory control over an attorney's professional conduct, but
the court based its entire ruling on this ethical point:
Apparently warnings [in earlier cases about the practice of drafting a will in which
the scrivener is named as a beneficiary] do not suffice. If an attorney's conduct so violates
the spirit of the lawyer's code of ethics, it also runs contrary to the public policy of this
state. The bequest to contestant being void, he has no standing to contest the later will.' 58
Since the Karabatian court held, without the benefit of legislation, that a bequest to
an attorney who drafted the underlying will is void as against public policy, the
adoption of a comparable ethical rule prohibiting the drafting of all such wills would
be a logical progression. Unfortunately, there is no indication that this action has
been taken. 15
9
153. See supra note 27.
154. 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969).
155. Id. at 544-45, 170 .N.W.2d at 168.
156. Id. at 544, 170 N.W.2d at 168.
157. Id. at 545, 170 N.W.2d at 169.
158. Id. at 546-47, 170 N.W.2d at 169.
159. See Informal Opinion 89, 57 MICH. ST. B.J. 311 (Special Issue, Feb. 1978), reported in MARU 1980, supra
note 12, at 289, No. 11520, decided 9 years after Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166
(1969), in which it was held that an attorney may prepare a will for a family member absent any appearance of
impropriety. Karabatian has not been widely followed in the fourteen years since it was decided. It has been cited on only
four occasions, and only one of those decisions arguably relies on the case for its main proposition, that a violation of the
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2. Kansas' Statutory Prohibition
Kansas, by statute, automatically invalidates a will drawn by a "confidential
agent" or "legal adviser" if that person is "the sole or principal beneficiary" under
the will. 6 0 The courts have construed the statute literally, holding that its application
is limited to situations when an attorney-draftsman was the only beneficiary or re-
ceived the largest legacy, thus excluding instances in which the attorney was simply a
substantial beneficiary under the testator's will. 6 ' Even though this legislation has
limited applicability, the policy reflected by its terms suggests that the statute could
be expanded to vitiate any testamentary gift made to a lawyer or other "confidential
agent" who drafts such a will. 162 But, even accepting this expanded application, it
might be ill-advised to provide that an entire will would be invalidated, rather than
just the bequest or devise in question. This would be comparable to the rule in a
number of jurisdictions that excises any testamentary gift made to an individual who
served as a witness, but otherwise leaves' the will intact. 163 The Kansas statute, if
extended in the suggested manner, would be analogous to an absolute prohibition
precluding attorneys from drafting wills or trusts in which they are named as bene-
ficiaries.
For all of these reasons, including, in particular, the trend of the courts in both
disciplinary cases and will contest litigation toward a high standard of conduct when
an attorney drafts a will or trust in which he or she is named as a beneficiary, a broad
ethical prohibition against the inclusion of any gift in favor of the scrivener would, in
code of ethics renders a will in which the drafting attorney was a beneficiary void as against public policy. People v.
Green, 405 Mich. 273, 310, 274 N.W.2d 448, 462 (1979) (Levin, J., dissenting) (involving a violation of an ethical
provision by a prosecuting attorney). The other three cases cite Karabailan for entirely different points. In re Estate of
Small, 346 F. Supp. 600, 601 (D.D.C. 1972) (executor's fees); Estate of Vollbrecht v. Pace, 26 Mich. App. 430, 435,
182 N.W.2d 609, 612 (1970) (attorney's fiduciary relationship with testatrix); In re Estate of Koch, 259 N.W.2d 655,
660-61 (N.D. 1977) (testator not suffering from insane delusion by writing will that leaves out the attorney who was a
beneficiary under a prior will). Professor Casner, however, discusses Karabatian in considerable detail. 2 A. CASNER,
supra note 4, at 607.
160. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (1976). The statute provides:
If it shall appear that any will was written or prepared by the sole or principal beneficiary in such will, who,
at the time of writing or preparing the same, was the confidential agent or legal adviser of the testator, or who
occupied at the time any other position of confidence or trust to such testator, such will shall not be held to be
valid unless it shall affirmatively appear that the testator had read or knew the contents of such will, and had
independent advice with reference thereto.
Id.
161. See, e.g., DiMaggio v. Powers (In re Estate of Barclay), 215 Kan. 129, 523 P.2d 376 (1974); Stunkel v.
Stahlhut, 128 Kan. 383, 277 P. 1023 (1929); Kelty v. Burgess, 84 Kan. 678, 115 P. 583 (1911); In re Estate of
Giacomini, 4 Kan. App. 2d 126, 603 P.2d 218 (1979).
162. In other words, if the policy behind the provisions of the statute renders the will invalid in the limited situation
in which the will is prepared by a "confidential agent" or "legal adviser" who is named therein as the sole or principal
beneficiary, then it would seem that the same policy should apply to invalidate a bequest or devise to any person who
serves as "confidential agent" or "legal adviser," prepares the will, and receives a legacy thereunder. See infta text
accompanying note 163. This would be analogous to an irrebuttable presumption of undue influence. If desired, an
all-inclusive statutory prohibition could still include language like that in § 59-605, which provides an exception when the
testator read or knew the contents of the will and received "independent advice" as to the provisions of the will.
163. See generally T. ATxtNsoN, supra note 139, at 315-17.
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the long run, be beneficial to the public and the practicing bar. 164 Such a provision
was initially included in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but was sub-
sequently diluted by the inclusion of a number of exceptions and limitations.
165
Obviously, application of an all-inclusive ethical rule would cause some in-
convenience in certain cases. But this is not too great a price to pay for the advantages
of a prohibition that would be binding in all situations and would need little in-
terpretation. Unfortunately, in all too many cases lawyers appear to have taken
advantage of the attorney-client relationship for their own personal benefit. 166 Severe
problems require stem measures, and a comprehensive ethical rule is an appropriate
solution. If a violation is minor (i.e., a token bequest to the drafting attorney or a
legacy to an attorney that is no greater than he or she would have received if the
client-relative had died intestate), then the disciplinary process itself can take those
circumstances into account in determining the appropriate sanction.167 In such in-
stances, the subject attorney might be given a private or a public reprimand, rather
than suspension or disbarment. 168
3. The Need for Independent Advice
An all-inclusive rule would, of course, result in more situations in which an
attorney who is to be named as a beneficiary would be required to refer preparation of
a testator's will to another lawyer. Because of the provisions of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility relating to imputed disqualification, an attorney would not be
able to assign such a will drafting project to a partner or associate in the same firm. 16 9
But even aside from these disqualification rules, there would be too great an opportu-
nity for abuse if an attorney to be named as a beneficiary were able to avoid any
ethical problems by "referring" preparation of the client's will to another lawyer in
164. The "appearance of impropriety" is of major concern in a number of the cases that have scrutinized situations
where the attorney has prepared a will in which he or she is named as a beneficiary. See, e.g., In re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz.
251,253,527 P.2d 510, 512 (1974); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Iowa), appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 331-32, 159 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1968). The
appearance of impropriety is virtually impossible to avoid when the attorney-draftsman is named as a beneficiary, even
when the draftsman is a close relative. See supra text accompanying note 141. The public would benefit from an
all-encompassing prohibition, which would give needed protection against unscrupulous attorneys who are willing and
able to take advantage of the attorney-client fiduciary relationship for their own benefit. In the long run, the bar would also
stand to benefit, because it would avoid the adverse publicity that it receives when one of its members is severely
disciplined for his or her unethical conduct in preparing a will that contains a legacy for the draftsman. See, e.g.,
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
165. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Rule 1.8(c) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
166. See supra note 69.
167. See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIsCIPLINE AND DISABILrrY PROCEEDINGS §§ 6-7. 1, commentaries (1979).
168. Id. at §§ 6.9-6. 10. See Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980) (reprimand for conduct
subsequent to testator's death); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972) (public
reprimand); In re Jones, 254 Or. 617, 462 P.2d 680 (1969) (reprimand for failure to insist that client obtain independent
legal advice);In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981) (public censure); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis.
2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972) (60 day suspension of lawyer who drew will containing a $10,000 bequest in favor of her
sister); State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968) (attorney-draftsman admonished for naming himself
beneficiary of residuary of estate even though residue was worthless); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488
(1963) (reprimand only, because prior law on subject not clearly defined).
169. MODL COD OF PROFESSIONAL RSFPONSIBILrrY DR 5-105(D) (1983).
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the same office. 170 EC 5-5 speaks in terms of obtaining "disinterested advice" from
an "independent, competent person" who is "selected by the client.' ' 171 Although
all of these phrases are subject to interpretation, a number of reported decisions
provide assistance in determining the kind of conduct that would satisfy the require-
ment of having a will prepared by independent counsel.
This same issue has arisen in will contest litigation based on undue influence in
which the testator's attorney was named as a beneficiary under the will but a second
lawyer was retained to review the testamentary instrument and preside over its execu-
tion. To the extent that the second attorney provided independent advice and counsel,
that fact could rebut the presumption of undue influence that would otherwise apply
when an individual who had been acting as the testator's lawyer was named as a
beneficiary under the will. 172 For example, in In re Estate of Komarr173 a confused
and disoriented sixty-eight-year-old widow who had just been hospitalized wanted
a will prepared naming her attorney as a beneficiary to the exclusion of her son.
The attorney, a close friend who had previously rendered legal services for the testa-
trix, was also serving as her conservator.' 74 In an obvious effort to avoid questions
concerning the propriety of his actions, the attorney-beneficiary contacted a second
lawyer, took him to the hospital, introduced him to the testatrix, and waited in the car
while the other attorney drafted and presided over the execution of a will that named
the first attorney as the sole beneficiary. 175 In spite of the fact that another attorney
talked with the testator, drafted the will in question, and supervised the will's execu-
tion, the court held that the circumstances were sufficiently "suspicious" to create an
inference of undue influence.
176
In In re Moore 177 an attorney was disciplined for conduct that included, inter
alia, having his secretary draw a will in which the attorney was named as sole
beneficiary, notwithstanding the fact that the client reviewed her will prior to execu-
tion with another lawyer who shared office space with the first attorney. 178 The court
found that these acts were but "feeble, if not insincere, gestures" that clearly fell
short of the need for a testator to obtain "independent advice" prior to execution of a
will containing this type of a bequest. 179 Thus, whether for purposes of being certain
that a testator secures "disinterested advice" as suggested in EC 5-5, or that the
client receives "independent advice" in order to rebut a presumption of undue
170. Problems sometimes arise when the second lawyer, who actually prepared or reviewed the will, was considered
not to have offered independent advice and counsel to the testator. See, e.g., In re Moore, 218 Or. 403, 410, 345 P.2d
411,414 (1959); Lyons v. Wilson (In re Lobb's Will), 177 Or. 162, 168-69, 187-88, 160 P.2d 295, 297-98,305 (1945);
Komarr v. Beaudry (In re Estate of Komarr), 46 Wis. 2d 230, 234, 240-41, 175 N.W.2d 473, 475, 478 (1970).
171. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (1983).
172. See Morrison v. Linn (In re Anderson's Estate), 142 Okla. 197, 286 P. 17 (1929); 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra
note 26, at § 29.94. Cf. Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962).
173. 46 Wis. 2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
174. Id. at 234, 175 N.W.2d at 475.
175. Id. at 234, 240-41, 175 N.W.2d at 475, 478.
176. Id. at 240-41, 175 N.W.2d at 478.
177. 218 Or. 403. 345 P.2d 411 (1959).
178. Id. at 410, 345 P.2d at 414.
179. Id.
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influence, the few cases on point make it clear that an attorney-beneficiary must
comply with these requirements both in substance and form to ensure that the pro-
visions of the will were the result of the testator's free and unfettered intent to make
the attorney the object of his or her bounty.
III. DESIGNATION OF ATTORNEY-DRAFTSMAN AS EXECUTOR
The practice exists among attorneys in certain areas of the country to name
themselves as executors in wills that they draft.1 80 This practice appears to be even
more common in situations in which the drafting attorney is also named as a ben-
eficiary. 1
8 1
There are a number of reasons why a lawyer engaged in estate planning might
have an interest in being designated as an executor in clients' wills. An attorney
might be motivated to serve in this capacity to accommodate the client. This could be
the case, for example, when the provisions of the will vest considerable discretion in
the executor, and for this reason the testator would prefer not to appoint a corporate
fiduciary, and feels that friends or relatives would not be appropriate persons to serve
in this capacity. 182 Alternatively, the attorney, having rendered legal services to the
testator in the past, may have become familiar with the testator's family, assets, or
business interests, and therefore might be the logical choice to look after these
180. See Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); In re
Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972);
Opinion No. 446, 63 ILL. B.J. 220 (1974); Opinion No. 71, 16 TEX. B.J. 223 (Apr. 1953); C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at
113; Martin, Professional Responsibility and Probate Practices, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 911, 921-23; A Bakers' Dozen
Topics, 10 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243, 261-62 (1975); Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, 7 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 745 (1972).
However, the practice is apparently not common in other sections of the country. A survey reviewing the provisions
of 140 wills filed for probate from July 1, 1982 to October 31, 1982 in Fayette County, Kentucky, and 60 wills filed for
probate from October 28, 1981 to October 27, 1982 in Bourbon County, Kentucky showed that of the 140 Fayette County
wills, the attorney-draftsman was named as executor in only six instances. On two other occasions the attorney was named
as an alternate executor, and in one additional will the executor who was named appeared to be a member of the drafting
attorney's family. In the Bourbon County survey, an attorney-draftsman was named as executor on only one occasion, and
as alternate executor in four other instances. Survey of Wills in Fayette County, Kentucky and Bourbon County,
Kentucky, conducted by Gerald P. Johnston & Christine N. Westover during the fall of 1982 [hereinafter cited as Johnston
Survey].
181. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982); Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); State v. Richards, 165
Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); Shaffer v. Graham (In re Estate of Lawson), 75 A.D.2d 20,428 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1980);
Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432,
366 A.2d 563 (1976); Nelson v. First Northwestern Trust Co. (In re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978);
State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
182. Wills that contain marital deduction provisions illustrate situations in which an executor typically will have a
significant amount of discretion in the administration of an estate. Thus, for example, the executor generally decides what
property is to be designated for funding of the marital share and what is then to be allocated to the non-marital portion. See
generally 1 F. Hoops, supra note 4, §§ 190-227; H. WEtNSTOCK, PLANNING AN ESTATE 49-100 (rev. ed. 1982). Further,
ifa will is drawn so that Qualified Terminal Interest Property (QTIP) can be utilized to fund the marital deduction, then it
is the executor of the estate who must decide whether to make an election to take advantage of these provisions. 26 U.S.C.
§ 2056(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981); see I F. Hoops, supra, § 213, at 481-83. For an illustration of when a personal
representative was given broad discretionary powers in a non-tax context, see In re Estate of Nelson, 232 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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matters once the testator has died. 183 In these situations it is possible that the testator
was the first one to raise the possibility of the drafting attorney's willingness to serve
as executor.
184
Furthermore, attorneys who draft wills as a part of their practice are particularly
interested in providing legal services in connection with the administration of an
estate after a testator's death, because they can earn substantial legal fees during
probate that more than offset the tendency among practitioners to undercharge for
their work in planning estates and preparing the necessary implementing
documents.' 8 5 Similarly, an attorney might have an interest in serving as executor
since that, too, can be lucrative.' 86 An attorney qua executor can, in a par-
ticular estate, "earn" a fee that is well beyond what that same attorney might
receive for the performance of comparable legal services involving the same ex-
penditure of time and effort. 187 Moreover, an executor is entitled to select an attorney
to provide necessary legal services to the estate, and in most jurisdictions a lawyer
who is named as executor can also act in a legal capacity or retain some other attorney
to provide any required assistance in the probate of the estate.188 In a majority of
states the same individual serving in two different capacities-as executor and as
attorney for the executor-is entitled to a separate fee for each task.189 Even in
183. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972) (a disciplinary proceeding in which the
attorneys effectively argued that they had an unusual relationship with their clients of Armenian ancestry which resulted in
their designation as executors and attorneys in the wills that they drafted); Sheppard, The Lawtyer's Ethical Response, 16
LAw OFF. ECoN. & MO.'.. 265, 271 (1975); A Bakers' Dozen Topics, supra note 180, at 261-62; NEB. L. REv.
Comment, supra note 9, at 457.
184. See, e.g., Opinion No. 367, 60 ILL. B.J. 73 (1971); Opinion F-75-3, 52 Wis. B. BuuL. 56 (Supp. June 1979),
reported in MAtu 1980 supra note 12, at 589, No. 13057.
185. See P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL 34-38 (1980); Kabaker, Probate Fees-Where Are We Headed?, 46 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 577 (1974); Sussman, Cates & Smith, Will Making: An Examination of Client and Lawyer Attitudes, 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 25, 43-50 (1970).
186. In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972); Wright v. Heron (In re Estate of Wright), 132 Ariz.
555, 647 P.2d 1153 (1982); Smith v. Murphy (In re Estate of Smith), 131 Ariz. 190, 639 P.2d 380 (1981); In re Estate of
Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978); Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647,
386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976). See generally
Corcoran, Fees of Legal Representatives and their Attorneys-Six Years After Goldfarb, 67 ILL. B.J. 618 (1979);
Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees in the Wake of Goldfarb, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 238 (1978).
187. In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600, 601 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The [executor's] commission was a guarantee of
what could well be lucrative work and what in all probability would be fully compensated work."); In re Estate of
Margow, 77 N.J. 316,328,390 A.2d 591, 597 (1978) ("In most cases, the [executors'] fees which are allowed by statute
are generally felt to be very good pay for the work and responsibility. The appointment is, in fact, lucrative .... )
(quoting 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 26, § 26.55 at 125-26); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432,
366 A.2d 563 (1976) (S95,000 in executors' fees, most of which were required to be repaid as part of the sanction in a
subsequent disciplinary proceeding).
188. E. TOMLINSON, ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDNrs' ESTATES § 20.3-7, at 300 (2d ed. 1978); Martin, supra note
180, at 921-23.
189. Although the common law was to the contrary, in most jurisdictions today an executor who is also a lawyer
may serve as attorney for the executor and receive separate compensation for each position. See Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976); E. TOMLINSON, supra note 188, § 20.3-7; Martin, supra note
180, at 921-23; Draft Statement of Principles Regarding Probate Practices and Expenses, 6 REAL PROt'. PROB. & TR. J.
590, 593 (1971). A minority of states, however, still follow the common law rule and deny double compensation in these
situations. See, e.g., In re Hallenback's Estate, 122 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1954) (since the executrix could not employ
herself as attorney for the estate for additional compensation, she could not employ her law partner); Steams v. Abbott (In
re Parker's Estate), 200 Cal. 132, 251 P. 907 (1926) (executor may employ another attorney but not himself; may be able
to employ his law firm if he receives none of the profit); 2 A. RussEU. & J. MmERrrr, KENTUCKY PRACTICE 112 (1955).
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jurisdictions that do not permit double compensation, an attorney may be able to
avoid this barrier by providing in a client's will that the individual designated to serve
in the two roles is to be fully and separately compensated for each position.190
Although this discussion will focus on situations in which the attorney who has
drafted a will is nominated therein as executor, the same considerations apply when
an attorney prepares an inter vivos or testamentary trust and is named to serve as
trustee. 19' An attorney may be willing to be named trustee as an accommodation, or
he or she may be primarily interested in the commission that can be earned.' 92
Similarly, the suggestion that the drafting attorney also serve as trustee may have
come from the settlor, the testator, or the attorney. 193 Hence, although it is consider-
ably more common for attorneys to serve as executors than it is for them to be
trustees, virtually the same ethical considerations arise in each situation.'
94
A. Conflict of Interest and Improper Solicitation
From an ethical standpoint, the first and foremost question that must be ad-
dressed is whether it is improper for an attorney to draft a will in which he or she is
designated as an executor. The attorney's conduct is certainly not unethical merely
because the appointment may be lucrative. After all, if the lawyer who prepared the
will does not serve as executor, someone else will be appointed, and that other person
or entity will be entitled to the same commission. 195 Furthermore, an attorney is at
least as competent to act in the capacity of executor as most other individuals, and
may be as qualified to serve as a corporate fiduciary.' 96 Rather, the ethical problems
center around questions of improper solicitation and conflicts of interest.
190. See 2 A. RUSSELL & J. MEmRrr, supra note 189, at 112. In Panel Discussion: Professional Ethics, supra note
5, 74.700, at 7-1, 7-31, one of the panel members described a past president of a state bar association "who followed
the practice of naming himself as executor, and then providing that he could be compensated both as executor and
attorney." See also Hartford v. Burfurd (In re Estate of Miller), 259 Cal. App. 2d 536, 66 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1968) (court
frowns on the attorney's conduct, but permits him to draw a will naming himself as executor and trustee and providing that
his law firm should be attorneys for the executor and that separate fees should be paid for services rendered in each
capacity).
191. EC 5-6 provides: "A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or
lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the
lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESStONAL RPspoNsmLrry EC 5-6 (1983)
(emphasis added). See also Zeigler v. Coffin, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22 (1929); Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d
667 (1955); In re Estate of Nelson, 232 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
1955); Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N.E. 5 (1915); Estate of Vollbrecht v. Pace, 26 Mich. App. 430, 182
N.W.2d 609 (1970); Shelton v. McHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S.W.2d 173 (1936); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio
St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972); In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981); Opinion No. 367, 60
ILL. B.J. 73 (1971); Opinion E-75-3, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 56 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at
589, No. 13057.
192. See supra notes 186-87.
193. See Opinion No. 367, 60 ILL. B.J. 73 (1971); Opinion E-75-3, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 56 (Supp. June 1979),
reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 589, No. 13057; MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-6
(1983); H. DPiNKFR, supra note 9, at 94.
194. See A Bakers' Dozen Topics, supra note 180, at 261-62; Lawyers Serving As Executors and Trustees, supra
note 180, at 745-48.
195. See, e.g., E. ToMLINsoN, supra note 188, §§ 20.4-1 to .4-8, at 300-06; Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees
in the Wake of Goldfarb, supra note 186; Lawyers Serving As Executors and Trustees, supra note 180, at 748-59.
196. Although some of the services required in the administration of an estate, such as the preparation of inventories
and accounts, may be routine and may not require the expertise of a lawyer, legal training can be particularly useful in a
number of areas, such as the preparation of estate and inheritance tax returns. Also, certain work involved in the
administration of an estate can only be performed by a member of the bar. See, e.g., Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1964).
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The ethical questions raised when an attorney-draftsman is nominated as ex-
ecutor are not as obvious as those that are presented when the attorney is named as a
beneficiary under a will that he or she has drafted. Since the potential ethical im-
proprieties in the attorney-executor context are more subtle, the testator is less likely
to detect them. 197 The conflict of interest issue is analogous to that presented in the
draftsman-beneficiary situation: did the draftsman take advantage of the attorney-
client relationship and obtain a benefit that he or she would not otherwise have
received? 19 8 The benefit, of course, is not as apparent when the attorney must "earn"
a commission as it is when the scrivener receives a bequest or devise under a will.' 99
Even more intriguing is the question whether an attorney who has been desig-
nated as an executor in a document that he or she has prepared has engaged in
improper solicitation of future business. The actual facts in a particular will-drafting
situation are often difficult to ascertain since the testator is usually dead by the time
the issue is raised and the attorney-draftsman may be the only person who is able to
offer evidence concerning what transpired during preparation of the will.200
The leading case on in-person solicitation is the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.20 1 The attorney's conduct
in that case was particularly invidious since it involved aggressive solicitation of two
eighteen-year-old girls shortly after an automobile accident, while one was still in the
hospital. 20 2 Neither of the young women had previously been a client of the attorney,
nor were they acquainted with him. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court had
little difficulty holding that the attorney's action was not constitutionally protected
and therefore could be regulated by a state bar association. 20 3 In contrast, the conduct
of an attorney in an estate planning setting who succeeds in being named as executor
in a will that he or she prepares is far less repugnant since it involves a client who
initially retained a lawyer's services to have a will drawn, rather than an attorney who
sought out an individual to offer legal services.
In short, it is hard to think of the draftsman-executor problem in the same light
as the ambulance-chasing tactics apparent in Ohralik. The potential for abuse,
however, is just as real, albeit less distasteful. In Ohralik, at least, the individuals
being solicited were aware of the attorney's intentions-that he was soliciting them to
197. When an attorney-draftsman "suggests" that he or she might be an appropriate person to designate as executor
in a will, it is unlikely that a testator would realize that the draftsman has solicited future business. A testator may,
therefore, "agree" to the naming of the scrivener as executor even though the testator has dealt with the attorney only in
connection with preparation of the will. See, e.g., Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d
647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976). Perhaps because such solicitation is subtle, Weinstock is one of the few cases in which action
has been taken against an attorney for overreaching in securing designation as executor in a will that the attorney has
drawn. However, even Weinstock did not involve disciplinary action, but rather the successful opposition to the appoint-
ment of the drafting attorney as executor. See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563
(1976). Walker arose out of an attorney's conduct in drawing a will naming himself both as a beneficiary and executor.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in addition to suspending the attorney from the practice of law for one year, required
him to reimburse the estate for the $62,500 he received in executor's commissions, and $22,000 in attorney's fees.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 6-13.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
201. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
202. Id. at 450-53.
203. Id. at 456-60.
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represent their interests arising out of the automobile accident-although his manner
and tactics were clearly excessive.20 4 In the will planning context, however, the
testator is already a client and is not likely to be aware that the attorney may be
soliciting future business by expressing an interest, although indirectly, in being
named as executor. In many instances, a testator may have little conception of who an
executor is and what such a fiduciary does. Also, the testator may have little or no
information on the size of the commissions that can be earned for services rendered in
that capacity. 20 5 It is difficult for an individual to protect his or her own interests from
an overzealous attorney when the person being solicited is not even aware of the
solicitation. Furthermore, the potential for overreaching may be greater when an
attorney-client relationship already exists, with its inherent trust and confidence,
20 6
than when an attorney, no matter how aggressively, solicits legal business from
someone who is a stranger.
Similarly, although the situation involving the draftsman-beneficiary seems
more reprehensible, it is not necessarily more serious from an ethical standpoint.
Assuming that the testator is fully aware of the surroundings (an assumption admit-
tedly not warranted in a number of the reported cases), 20 7 then the testator at least
knows that he or she is making a testamentary gift to the attorney who prepared the
will, even though the suggestion for the transfer may have come from the
draftsman.20 8 On the other hand, the testator is hardly likely to view the designation
of an attorney as executor as bestowing a gratuity on that individual, even though in a
large estate the commission may have a comparable effect.20 9 And, of course, the
financial benefit to the draftsman-executor can be significantly increased if the ex-
ecutor also functions as an attorney and is able to charge a separate fee for the
performance of each service.2
B. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The current Code of Professional Responsibility has several provisions bearing
on situations in which an attorney draws a will and is named as an executor therein.
204. Id. at 450-53. In fact, the mother of one of the eighteen-year-old girls called the attorney and tried to repudiate
her daughter's oral agreement to retain the attorney's services. Id. at 452-53.
205. See supra notes 186-87.
206. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has noted:
Sometimes the longstanding friendship and confidential relationship between a client and an attorney serves as
an effective opportunity in the eyes of others for exerting an undue influence by the attorney upon the testator.
Such strength of implication might not arise between an attorney and a client who is relatively a stranger.
State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 603, 196 N.W.2d 730, 732 (1972). See also Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d
132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 805 (1979); State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock),
40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d
831 (1972).
207. See, e.g., In re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251, 527 P.2d 510 (1974); In re Thompson's Estate, I Ariz. App. 18,
398 P.2d 926 (1965); In re Kneeland, 233 Or. 241,377 P.2d 861 (1963); In re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217,350 P.2d 631
(1960); Komarr v. Beaudry (In re Estate of Komarr), 46 Wis. 2d 230, 175 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
208. Cf. In re Saladino, 71111. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Randall, 285
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Hubbell v. Houston, 441 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1967); State v.
Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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The first, DR 2-103(A), is directed at improper solicitation, but its terms appear to be
applicable in the draftsman-executor context: "A lawyer shall not ... recommend
employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a lay-
person who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." 2 1' In
contrast to this rather general provision, EC 5-6 is explicitly on point: "A lawyer
should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer
in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such,
care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety." 2 12
Of course, as is generally the case with Ethical Considerations, the language is
permissive, although in the situations specified in EC 5-6, it clearly should be manda-
tory. Further, while it seems salutary to provide that a lawyer should "avoid even the
appearance of impropriety" when a client names the scrivener as executor or trustee,
no indication whatever is given concerning how this might be accomplished. In a
million dollar estate, even assuming the testator did in fact suggest the attorney's
appointment as executor and this designation was logical, the appearance of impro-
priety may be unavoidable, since the fee to be earned by the attorney-draftsman is
likely to be substantial.2 13
The newly adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct are considerably less
specific with regard to the potential impropriety of an attorney preparing a will in
which he or she is designated as executor. Although some of the general provisions
relating to conflicts of interest and solicitation may be applicable, the Rules contain
no language comparable to that found in EC 5-6.2 14 In this respect, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct fall far short of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
because specific rules provide more effective guidelines for lawyers seeking to act
within ethical bounds. 15
211. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNtBnSILY DR 2-103(A) (1983) (emphasis added). It could be argued
that DR 2-103(A) does not apply to situations in which the attorney-draftsman has recommended his or her designation as
executor in a client's will, because an executor's duties do not encompass the practice of law. See Martin, supra note 180,
at 921 n.45.
212. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpONSImLrry EC 5-6 (1983) (emphasis added).
213. In a significant number ofjurisdictions, a statutory schedule sets executors' commissions based on a percentage
of the value of the estate's assets. See Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees in the Wake of Goldfarb, supra note 186, at
243-45. See generally E. TO.ILINSON, supra note 188, § 20.4-1 to 20.6 at 300-06. In North Carolina, for example, the
executor's commission on an estate of $1,000,000 could run as high as $50,000 (based on a statutory provision allowing
commissions not to exceed 5% on the amount of receipts, including personal property, and expenditures during estate
administration). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-23-3 (1976).
214. The notes to Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer the following explanation:
EC 5-6 of the Code states that a lawyer should not seek to have himself or a partner or associate named in
an instrument as executor of the client's estate .... Such an appointment is not expressly prohibited under this
Rule, but is subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 and the more specific requirements of
paragraph (a) of this Rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8, Legal Background (Proposed Final Draft 1981). See also id. Rules
1.7, 1.8(a) & 7.1 to .3.
215. In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has rendered decisions in several disciplinary pro-
ceedings that have served not to sanction the particular lawyer in question but to provide useful guidelines to govern future
conduct by members of the bar of that jurisdiction. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972);
State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
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C. Ethics Opinions
A number of ethics opinions have considered the propriety of a testator's naming
an attorney-draftsman as executor or attorney for the estate, but most of these add
little to what is already reflected in EC 5-6. For example, if the idea that the drafting
attorney serve as executor was initiated by the testator and not the scrivener, these
opinions express the view that the designation would not be unethical.2 16
However, two ethics opinions are worthy of special note because they tend to fill
in some of the void left by EC 5-6. In recognizing that "the draftsman of a will is
uniquely situated to secure additional employment for himself," 21 7 the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association has interpreted the phrase
"consciously influence" as utilized in EC 5-6 to mean "substantially less psycholog-
ical pressure than 'undue influence.' -218 The opinion goes on, nevertheless, to
indicate that ethical conduct does not require, in all instances, that the suggestion for
the lawyer to serve as executor originate with the testator. According to the com-
mittee, in certain situations when, for example, the parties have had a long-term
relationship and the lawyer has reason to believe that the client would ask the attorney
to serve if the client was aware of the lawyer's willingness to do so, an attorney who
drafted the will could be justified in offering his services as executor. 2 19 This gener-
ous interpretation of the provisions of EC 5-6 is counterbalanced by an opinion issued
by the Wisconsin Ethics Committee, which determined that although it was not per se
unethical under EC 5-6 for a lawyer drafting a will to name himself or herself
executor or legal counsel for the estate, the subject attorney should be prepared to
furnish "persuasive evidence" that the client-testator formed this intent entirely on
his own. 2 2 0
D. Applicable Court Decisions
A number of reported court decisions have considered the propriety of an attor-
ney's action in drafting a will in which that same individual is designated as executor.
These cases arise in several different contexts. Some are disciplinary proceedings,
usually in situations in which the attorney's conduct involved certain other alleged
improprieties in addition to being named as executor.2 2' Also, virtually the same
point can be presented in a proceeding brought by the decedent's beneficiaries in an
216. Opinion No. 446, 63 ILL. B.J. 220 (1974); Opinion No. 71, 16 TEx. B.J. 223 (Apr. 1953); Memorandum
Opinion No. 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARu 1980, supra note 12, at 614, No. 13193;
Informal Opinion 3/31,64, 38 Wis. B. BULL. 52-53 (Supp. Dec. 1965).
217. Opinion No. 481, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 356, 356 (1978).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 357.
220. Memorandum Opinion No. 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARu 1980, supra
note 12, at 614, No. 13193.
221. See, e.g., State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297
N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972); In re Discipline of
Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
[Vol. 45:57
1984] ETHICS OF COMMON ESTATE PLANNING PRACTICES 93
effort to prevent the nominated attorney's appointment as executor. 22 2 Alternatively,
a question relating to the propriety of the attorney's conduct during the will drafting
process can be raised at the conclusion of estate administration in a challenge to the
fees that the attorney qua executor has claimed. 223 Finally, the issue can arise out of a
claim that the designation of an attorney as executor in a will drawn by the same
lawyer results in an inference or presumption of undue influence.
224
1. In re Estate of Weinstock
The decision that is perhaps the most instructive on this ethical issue is the
holding of the New York Court of Appeals in In. re Estate of WeinstoCk.225 In
Weinstock two attorneys (father and son), who had just met the eighty-two-year-old
testator, were named as coexecutors in the will they drafted for him.226 The nomina-
tion of the lawyers as executors was subsequently challenged on the testator's death,
and the court held, on the basis of EC 5-6, that the testator had not independently and
freely designated the attorneys to be his executors. 227 The court concluded that the
two were guilty of "impropriety" and "overreaching" that amounted to "con-
structive fraud" on the decedent, thereby precluding their appointment as ex-
ecutors.228 The court also noted that, unknown to the testator, the executors each
would have been entitled to a full commission under New York law because the estate
was valued at over $100,000, notwithstanding that no legitimate purpose was to be
served by the designation of multiple executors.229
2. State v. Gulbankian
In the leading decision in the area of ethics in estate planning, State v.
Gulbankian,230 the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed possible improprieties in
attorneys' conduct with regard to a number of common will drafting practices, in-
cluding lawyers' drafting wills in which they are named as executors. Gulbankian
involved a disciplinary proceeding brought against two attorneys, who were brother
and sister, for the unethical solicitation of the probate of estates evidenced by their
consistent practice of drafting wills in which one or the other was designated as
executor or attorney for the estate. Over a seventeen-year period, a total of 44 out of
222. See, e.g., Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976).
See also In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978) (testatrix's nephew successfully challenged the
appointment of a legal secretary as executrix because she had been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
preparing the testatrix's will in which she was named).
223. See, e.g., In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker,
469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 260-62.
225. 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976).
226. Id. at 4, 351 N.E.2d at 648, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
227. Id. at 7, 351 N.E.2d at 649-50, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4.
228. Id. at 7, 351 N.E.2d at 650, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
229. Id. at 2, 351 N.E.2d at 648, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
230. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
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135 wills that the Gulbankians had drafted contained directions that one or the other
Gulbankian, or a sister who was a real estate agent, be appointed executor. 231 In fact,
only one will drafted after 1957 failed to name at least one member of the Gulbankian
family to some legal or fiduciary position. 232 In an effort to justify their conduct, the
Gulbankians, who were of Armenian ancestry, claimed that their clients, who were
also Armenians, had all "spontaneously" asked them to serve in various
capacities,233 and they produced several clients at trial who testified that they had
initiated the request that the Gulbankians probate their estates. 234
The Wisconsin Board of Bar Commissioners, seeking to discipline the Gulbank-
ians, argued that an inference of solicitation should be drawn because of the large
percentage of wills the two attorneys had drafted that specified their employment in
connection with probate of the estates.235 The court agreed that it would be unethical,
either directly or indirectly, to solicit the naming of the draftsman as executor or
attorney. Further, the court concluded that it was "fairly rare" 236 for a client to ask a
lawyer to serve as executor or attorney for the estate, but that if the client did so
request, no improper solicitation would occur. Later in the opinion, the court sim-
ilarly indicated its belief that the number of times that a client might ask the drafting
lawyer, in an unprompted manner, to serve in a fiduciary capacity "will be few and
the percentage in total of such wills drawn low." 237 Although obviously concerned
about the Gulbankians' conduct, for a number of reasons, including that the case
before it was one of first impression, the court held that it would not draw an
inference of improper solicitation in the particular circumstances presented. 238
In a recent decision arising in another jurisdiction, In re Discipline of
Theodosen,239 the court publicly censured an attorney whose standard practice, as
indicated in over twenty wills he had drafted, was to name himself as executor,
coexecutor, or trustee. 240 Theodosen, however, involved certain unethical activities
above and beyond designation of the attorney as executor or trustee. The disciplinary
proceeding in Theodosen was an outgrowth of an earlier will contest in which the
attorney's conduct in drafting a will in which he was named executor and sole
beneficiary was found to constitute undue influence. 24 1 The attorney's propensity to
name himself as executor in numerous wills that he drafted was, therefore, but one
factor that led to the disciplinary action taken. Nevertheless, Gulbankian and
231. Id. at 607, 196 N.W.2d at 734.
232. Id. at 608, 196 N.W.2d at 734.
233. Id. at 609, 196 N.W.2d at 735.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 607-08, 196 N.W.2d at 734-35.
236. Id. at 610, 196 N.W.2d at 736.
237. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 737.
238. Id. at 608-13, 196 N.W.2d at 735-37.
239. 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981).
240. Id. at 105. This disciplinary proceeding was a direct outgrowth of a will contest in which an attorney, who was
the sole beneficiary under a will he drafted, was charged with unduly influencing the testator. See also Nelson v. First
Northwestern Trust Co. (In re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978). The court noted that the lawyer in
question had a standard practice of including himself as executor in the wills that he prepared for his clients. Id. at 589.
241. Nelson v. First Northwestern Trust Co. (In re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978).
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Theodosen certainly indicate that an inference can be properly drawn that a lawyer
"consciously influenced," as that phrase is used in EC 5-6, 242 his or her clients to
name the draftsman as executor, by showing the existence of a substantial number of
wills prepared by the same attorney in which such a designation appears. This is a
significant therapeutic development because it is unlikely that direct proof will be
available to prove that a lawyer initiated the insertion of his or her own name as
executor, since the issue is rarely addressed until after the testator's death.243
3. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker2" is another significant disciplinary
case that evolved from an attorney's conduct during estate planning and in the
subsequent administration of the estate. Walker illustrates the obvious "benefits"
that can accrue to a lawyer who is willing to take advantage of the fiduciary relation-
ship existing between an attorney and an elderly, wealthy client. In Walker, the
attorney drew a will for his eighty-eight-year-old client, who had an estate in excess
of $2,000,000. In addition to being named coexecutor (along with his father), the
attorney was a substantial beneficiary under the will. 245 The testatrix died a few
months later and, after securing his appointment as coexecutor, the lawyer also
named himself attorney for the estate.2 46 Upon conclusion of estate administration, a
first and final account was filed in which the attorney-executor claimed his one-
quarter share of the rest and residue (totaling $239,000), $62,500 as his executor's
commission, $32,500 in executor's commissions for his deceased father, and
$22,000 in attorney's fees.2 47 Other residuary legatees filed exceptions to the
accounting, and the attorney-executor agreed to settle the objections by paying an
additional $80,000 to the other beneficiaries. 248 Although the account was then
approved, the probate court referred the matter to the state's disciplinary board. 2 49
A hearing committee designated to review the attorney's conduct expressed
particular concern about the serious conflicts of interest that the attorney in Walker
completely ignored during administration of the estate, and recommended a private
censure. 25 The state disciplinary board agreed with the committee's findings, but felt
that a public rather than a private censure was appropriate.25' Upon review, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided to increase the sanction to a one-year suspen-
242. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983).
243. See supra text accompanying note 200. See also supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
244. 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976).
245. Id. at 436, 366 A.2d at 565.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 437, 366 A.2d at 565.
248. Id. The attorney-beneficiary also personally paid S72,500 toward a settlement of$ 112,500, which he arranged
in his capacity as executor with a disinherited nephew who had contested the will. Id. The attorney's conduct in
negotiating these settlements, involving blatant conflicts of interest in his roles of executor and substantial beneficiary,
was severely criticized by the court. Id. at 442-44, 366 A.2d at 568-69.
249. Id. at 437, 366 A.2d at 565-66.
250. Id. at 438, 442, 366 A.2d at 566, 568.
251. Id. at 439, 442, 366 A.2d at 566, 568.
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sion, and directed that all of the executor's and attorney's fees that the lawyer had
collected be returned to the estate. Thus, in addition to the suspension, the attorney
was required to refund $84,500 in fees. 2
The court in Walker is to be commended for its innovative handling of this
disciplinary matter. Imposition of these sanctions, including, particularly, the court's
ordering of a refund of fiduciary fees under its inherent power to control and regulate
attorneys' conduct,253 should go a long way toward convincing lawyers that it is in
their own professional and financial best interests to avoid taking personal advantage
of the attorney-client relationship in the estate planning setting.
In re Estate of Margow254 is another imaginative decision demonstrating the
capabilities of courts to devise remedies that should help prevent the recurrence of
ethical improprieties. The executrix-designate in Margow was a former legal secre-
tary who assisted the testatrix in the preparation of a new will. Interestingly, the
testatrix wanted to revise her will because the attorney who had drafted it had
apparently named himself as executor "without consulting her." 25 5 After the death
of the testatrix, the principal beneficiary under the new will questioned the secretary's
right to serve as executrix, and the court upheld the challenge on public policy
grounds. Since the former legal secretary had been engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law by preparing the decedent's will, the court felt compelled to deny her
the fruits of her unlawful act, even though this required it to override the traditional
deference given to a testator's choice of executor. 25 6 According to the court, since the
appointment as executrix of the decedent's rather substantial estate would be very
"lucrative," barring the secretary from that post seemed to be the only reasonable
sanction. 2
57
It could be argued, of course, that Margow simply demonstrates the judiciary's
willingness to impose harsh penalties on nonlawyers when similar conduct by a
lawyer would have gone largely unnoticed or unpunished. There is something to be
said for this interpretation since the scrivener in Margow was not named as a benefici-
ary in the will that she drafted, and in this respect her conduct was considerably less
252. Id. at 442, 366 A.2d at 568.
253. See id. at 442 n.7, 366 A.2d at 568 n.7 (the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's discussion of its authority to
regulate attorneys' conduct beyond the sanctions specified for ethical violations). There is no question about the effective-
ness of a court's direct regulation of attorneys who practice before it, without reliance on the disciplinary process. In
Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969), the court refused to permit an attorney, who
was a beneficiary under a prior will, to contest the validity of the testator's last will, because the attorney had violated
public policy in drafting the first will naming himself as a beneficiary. Subsequently, the power to regulate attorneys'
conduct as an additional mechanism for the enforcement of the provisions of the code of ethics was praised by Justice
Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court:
One theme runs through the varied factual circumstances and results of these cases: courts do not rely on
disciplinary proceedings alone to effectuate the purposes of the Code of Professional Responsibility. They will
do what is necessary to undo the results of unethical behavior and thereby protect individuals who may have
been harmed by such behavior.
People v. Green, 405 Mich. 273, 310-11, 274 N.W.2d 448, 462-63 (1979) (Levin, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
254. 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978).
255. Id. at 319-21, 390 A.2d at 593.
256. Id. at 326-29, 390 A.2d at 596-97.
257. Id at 328, 390 A.2d at 597.
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reprehensible than that of a number of lawyers in comparable situations. 258 On the
other hand, Margow serves to illustrate the sort of flexible approach that courts
should utilize in developing sanctions that would help preclude similar conduct by
others in the future. The Supreme Court of New Jersey should be equally innovative
when presented with a case in which an attorney has taken advantage of his or her
fiduciary relationship with a testator and has been designated for a "lucrative"
appointment as executor in a will that the attorney has drawn.
There is yet another substantial reason why an attorney should be exceedingly
cautious about naming himself or herself as an executor or trustee in a document that
he or she drafts. When an attorney who has prepared a will is named as a
beneficiary, the courts have generally found that this conduct raises a presumption of
undue influence. 259 On the other hand, the majority of courts that have addressed the
issue have held that the mere fact that the attorney who drafted an instrument is
designated as an executor or trustee does not give that individual a significant enough
beneficial interest in the estate to result in a presumption of undue influence.
260
However, case law in a number of jurisdictions indicates that an attorney-draftsman
who is also named as executor or trustee can be treated as a "beneficiary," thereby
raising a presumption of undue influence. This is particularly applicable to situations
in which the fiduciary is vested with a substantial amount of discretion over the estate
26or trust assets. 61 In these jurisdictions, at least, a lawyer who is drafting a will or
trust would be well advised not to designate himself or herself as a fiduciary, since
this conduct might unnecessarily jeopardize the validity of the entire will or trust.2 6 2
E. The Case for an Absolute Prohibition
All things considered, much can be said from an ethical standpoint for an
absolute prohibition of the designation of an attorney-draftsman as executor or trus-
tee. The attorney-client relationship in estate planning can provide a unique opportu-
nity for a lawyer to take advantage of the situation and recommend his or her own
appointment as a fiduciary. 263 Many clients will readily accept this suggestion, be-
cause they have no inkling that such a designation is anything but routine under the
258. See supra text accompanying notes 35-109 (discussing cases involving attorneys who have drafted wills in
which they are included as beneficiaries); supra notes 69-70 (describing attorneys' reprehensible conduct in several
proceedings).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
260. See, e.g., Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1955); Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N.E. 5
(1915); Shelton v. McHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S.W.2d 173 (1936).
261. Zeigler v. Coffin, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22 (1929); Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d 667 (1955); Allen
v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); In re Estate of Nelson, 232 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Estate of Vollbrecht v. Page, 26 Mich. App. 430, 182 N.W.2d 609 (1970).
262. See supra text accompanying note 32 (in some jurisdictions undue influence by a lawyer can jeopardize an
entire will and not just the legacy to the attorney-draftsman or his or her appointment as executor or trustee).
263. See, e.g., Hartford v. Burford (In re Estate of Miller), 259 Cal. App. 2d 536, 66 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1968);
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Katz v.
Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); Disciplinary Bd. v.
Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972);
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976); Nelson v. First Northwestern Trust Co. (In
re Estate of Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1978); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
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circumstances. Some testators, because of advanced age, poor health, or lack of close
family, may be particularly vulnerable to this proposal.2 64 Certainly, in the case of a
substantial estate, an appointment as executor can be lucrative, and therefore the
temptation to overreach may be considerable. 265 Although the great majority of
lawyers engaged in estate planning would be unwilling to prepare wills in which they
are named as substantial beneficiaries because of the obvious improprieties, these
practitioners may have little, if any, of the same reservations about being designated
to serve as an executor or trustee, even though the fee that could be earned may be
just as financially rewarding.
Little is wrong, of course, with the designation of the scrivener as executor if the
idea for this appointment originated with the client. But as was noted in State v.
Gulbankian,266 it is unusual for a client to ask an attorney to serve in such a fiduciary
capacity, unless the seeds of that "request" were planted by the attorney-
draftsman.267 Unfortunately, questions concerning the propriety of the appointment
of an attorney as executor or trustee generally do not arise until after the testator's
death, when it is often the attorney's testimony alone that may be the only evidence
on this crucial issue.
268
The current Code of Professional Responsibility is to be commended for its
provision in EC 5-6, which warns that a lawyer should not "consciously influence" a
client to name him or her as executor or trustee in a will or trust that the attorney
drafts. Although not rising to the level of a mandatory Disciplinary Rule, EC 5-6 at
least recognizes the existence of an ethical issue in the nomination of a fiduciary, and
attempts to provide guidelines to deal with that problem. 269 The new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct contain no comparable provisions, and thus, inexcusably, do
not expressly preclude this behavior. Although an attorney's action in designating
himself or herself as a fiduciary may violate some of the more general ethical rules,
such as those pertaining to conflicts of interest,2 7 it would have been infinitely better
if the new code had expressly forbidden this conduct.
F. An Alternative Solution
An all-inclusive ethical prohibition can legitimately be urged to cover
draftsman-executors in a manner similar to that recommended when a drafting attor-
ney is named as a beneficiary.27 1 This approach recognizes that a client rarely is the
264. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
805 (1979); Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); Office of
Disciplinary Council v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976).
265. In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972); Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d
1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976); Office of Disciplinary Council v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563
(1976).
266. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
267. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 737; Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976). Cf. Opinion No. 71, 16 TFx. B.J. 223 (April 1953); Memorandum Opinion No. 10-76, 52 Wts. B.
BULL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 614, No. 13193; Informal Opinion 3131,64, 38
Wis. B. BULL. 53 (Supp. Dec. 1965).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
269. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 5-6 (1983).
270. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rules 1.7, 1.8(a) (1983).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
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one who initiates a request that the attorney-draftsman serve in a fiduciary capacity,
and that the truth in these situations is usually impossible to determine after the fact.
At the same time, certain situations may occur in which the client may really want the
attorney to serve as executor or trustee, and in which the lawyer's designation, rather
than that of some other individual or corporate fiduciary, may serve a bona fide
purpose. 272 If another attorney were always required to draft an instrument in which a
lawyer is designated as a fiduciary, this would discourage this type of appointment,
even in those instances when it might be particularly useful. 273 By way of contrast,
little reason exists for not deterring the practice of an attorney being named as a
beneficiary under a will or trust that he or she has prepared.
As an alternative to an all-inclusive prohibition, a lawyer who has been desig-
nated as executor or testamentary trustee in a will that he or she has drawn could be
required, after death of the testator, to prove that the decedent did in fact request that
the attorney-draftsman act in a fiduciary capacity, and that the scrivener did not
improperly influence the testator in this regard. This approach would, at a minimum,
serve to cull out situations in which the attorney did not previously know the testator
and yet was named as executor in a will that the lawyer drew.2 74 In these circum-
stances, in which little plausible basis for the nomination would exist, the drafting
attorney should be precluded from serving in a fiduciary capacity.
This procedure, in which the attorney-draftsman would be called upon to justify
the appointment, could be handled by the probate court at the outset of the estate
administration process.2 75 Although interested parties, like beneficiaries named in the
testator's will, should be given an opportunity to be heard on this issue, the court
should not rely solely on those having an interest in the estate to oppose the attorney's
appointment. After all, beneficiaries named in wills are often not familiar with
judicial proceedings and may be hesitant to become involved, even when an attorney-
draftsman's designation as executor was in fact improper. 276 Moreover, an attorney's
conduct may be subject to question from an ethical standpoint even though private
272. See A Bakers' Dozen Topics, supra note 180, at 261-62; Sheppard, supra note 183, at 271; NEB. L. REV.
Comment, supra note 9, at 457.
273. For a discussion of the selection of a personal representative, see S. KEss & B. WEsiN, CCH ETATE
PLANNING GUIDE INCLUDING FINANCiA. PLANNIN 235-36 (1983). An individual's familiarity with the testator's
family may cause the testator to designate that person as executor rather than utilize a corporate fiduciary. Id. When the
testator has no close family, or otherwise feels that his or her relatives would not do a competent job, then his or her
lawyer might appear to be a logical choice if the testator already has a preference for an individual to serve as executor.
274. See, e.g., Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976)
(two lawyers, who were father and son, had no previous dealings with the testator, but in the process of preparing his will
they were named co-executors of his substantial estate); see also In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591
(1978) (the testatrix sought out a former legal secretary to draft her will, because she was upset that the lawyer who had
previously prepared her will had included himself as executor without her approval).
275. In analogous circumstances, a similar procedure appears to be utilized in New York. In that jurisdiction, if an
attorney who drew a will is named as a beneficiary he or she is required to file an affidavit with the probate court in order
to explain the situation and attempt to justify the legacy. This procedure is described in Panel Discussion: Professional
Ethics, supra note 5, 74.700, at 7-30, and in Midonick, supra note 5, at 219-20.
276. This may explain the dearth of case law in which heirs or beneficiaries have challenged an attorney-draftsman's
appointment as executor pursuant to a direction in the testator's will. See supra note 222. By contrast, most of the
decisions in which an attorney's conduct has been challenged arise in situations in which the attorney-draftsman has also
engaged in some other questionable practice, usually when the attorney has named himself or herself as a beneficiary, as
well as being designated as executor. See supra note 221.
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parties decide not to challenge the appointment. 277 An attorney who has acted un-
ethically should not be permitted to enjoy the benefit of his or her impropriety.278
The proceeding in which the attorney would be called on to explain his or her
fiduciary appointment need not be very extensive, nor unduly delay admission of the
will to probate, and could be handled in much the same manner as other routine
probate matters.27 9 The suggested procedure, of course, would occur during the
initial stages of probate, and thus may seem inconsistent with the spirit of the Uni-
form Probate Code with its emphasis on limited judicial involvement and informal
probate administration. 280 Even so, the modest time and expense required to de-
termine the propriety of the appointment seems well worth the effort. Moreover, this
procedure would only be applicable to wills in which the attorney-draftsman is
designated to serve as executor or trustee, which constitute only a fraction of the wills
offered for probate.2 8' If the probate court were to determine that the attorney's
conduct was sufficiently improper to preclude his or her appointment, then the matter
should also be referred to local bar authorities for the investigation of ethical
violations.282 This referral may also be appropriate, depending on the circumstances,
277. Many disciplinary proceedings arising out of the estate planning context are brought in the aftermath of a will
contest in which the attorney-draftsman's conduct has been brought to light. See supra note 29. In this respect, private
parties have been a major contributing factor, at least indirectly, to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. An extreme
example of the point that a disciplinary proceeding can be initiated without being founded on the objections of clients or
former clients is In re Gonyo, 73 Wis. 2d 624, 245 N.W.2d 893 (1976). In Gonyo an attorney was charged with, inter
alia, drafting a will in which he was named as the residuary legatee. In spite of the numerous, serious charges he faced,
none of his clients registered any complaint about his conduct. Id. at 628, 245 N.W.2d at 894-95. Nevertheless, the
attorney was suspended from practice for six months. Id. at 628-29, 245 N.W.2d at 895.
278. This has been highlighted in several will drafting cases. See, e.g., Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App.
541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969) (court refuses to allow an attorney-beneficiary under a prior will to contest the validity of the
last will because his conduct in preparing a will in which he was named as a beneficiary so violated the code of ethics that
it was against public policy); In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978) (nonlawyer precluded from
receiving a lucrative appointment as executrix because she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by her
assistance in the preparation of the will); Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647, 386
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976) (attorneys precluded from being appointed to profitable positions as executors of decendent's estate
because of improprieties committed in drafting testator's will and in securing their designation as executors); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976) (in addition to a one year suspension, court requires
attorney to return all fees, totalling $84,500, received as a consequence of serving as executor and attorney for the estate).
279. These would include matters like filing the will, determining the place of domicile, notifying the heirs-at-law
and next-of-kin, appointing an executor or administrator, and posting a bond. See generally E. ToMLINSON, supra note
188, §§ 5.1-5.11.
280. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-301 to 3-311, 8 U.L.A. 245-56 (1983). For a detailed discussion of the trend
toward reduced court supervision over decedents' estates, see Wellman, Recent Developments in the Struggle For Probate
Reform, 79 Mtctt. L. REv. 501 (1981).
281. Unfortunately, there are no figures documenting the percentage of the total wills that are probated in which the
attorney who drafted the instrument is named as executor. In some communities, this practice may be common, and the
percentage of wills containing such designations may be higher than one would expect. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis.
2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972), which apparently reflects the practices in Racine, Wisconsin. However, a limited survey
of recent wills admitted to probate in Fayette and Bourbon Counties, Kentucky, indicates that in these two communities,
at least, the practice of a drafting attorney naming himself or herself as executor is not common. See Johnston Survey,
supra note 180. Because corporate fiduciaries are often named and because when an individual executor is desired, the
testator may well have a spouse or other close family member in mind, it seems likely, when the practices of all
communities across the country are taken into consideration, that designations of the drafting attorney as executor would
appear in less than 10% of the wills filed for probate.
282. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 437, 366 A.2d 563, 565-66 (1976) provides a good
example of a situation in which the probate court, after approving a first and final account, was sufficiently concerned
about the attorney's conduct that it referred the matter to the state's disciplinary board for review.
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even in situations in which the probate court does not think the improprieties were
serious enough to prevent the lawyer's appointment as a fiduciary.283
This proposed approach, based on an ethical rule similar in content to the
provisions of EC 5-6 and on procedures for enforcement at the outset of probate
administration, may dissuade attorneys who draft wills from allowing themselves to
be nominated as executors or trustees, particularly in circumstances in which the
appointment might be difficult to justify. If the suggested ethical measures have these
consequences, then they will have served their purpose well.
IV. THE SCRIVENER NAMED AS ATTORNEY IN THE TESTATOR'S WILL
Although it is not unusual for practitioners engaged in estate planning to be
designated as executors, 284 it is even more common for the draftsman to be named as
attorney for the estate of a testator whose will is being prepared. 285 The extent of this
custom varies, but considerable evidence indicates that the practice is extensive in
certain areas of the country. 286 Thus, it is not surprising to find that many form books
283. In In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the
lower court's refusal to appoint a woman as executrix because she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
helping to prepare the will in which she was designated. The court seemed considerably more concerned with the
unauthorized practice of law than it was with the question of a draftsman naming herself as executrix, and it was, of
course, inappropriate to forward the case to a disciplinary committee since the person involved was not a lawyer. But had
the draftsman been an attorney, then, from the court's tone, it appears that the appointment of the scrivener as executor
would have been approved, in spite of the ethical problems, because of "the traditional deference given to testator's
choice of executor .... I "d. at 326, 390 A.2d at 596. Even if a court would rule in favor of appointment of an
attorney-draftsman as executor, it should refer the matter of the lawyer's conduct to the appropriate bar authorities for
investigation and review. In Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1,351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1976), the court should have referred the matter to the disciplinary authorities for consideration of ethical violations, even
though the court imposed its own sanction by precluding the attorneys in question from serving as executors. It is possible,
of course, that the matter was in fact referred in the suggested manner, but no mention of it was made by the court, and no
subsequently reported case indicates that any disciplinary action was taken against the particular attorneys.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
285. See, e.g., Highfield v. Bozio, 188 Cal. 727, 207 P. 242 (1922); In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381, 35 P. 900
(1894); Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Hogan, 1 Hawaii
App. 560, 623 P.2d 450 (1981); Haines v. George (In re George's Estate), 1111. App. 2d 359, 137 N.E.2d 555 (1956); In
re Estate of Giacomini, 4 Kan. App. 2d 126, 603 P.2d 218 (1979); Succession of Martin, 56 So. 2d 176 (La. Ct. App.
1952); In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907); State v. Duerksen (In re Heitholt's Estate), 202 Okla. 351,213
P.2d 865 (1950); Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 170 P.2d 748 (1946); Pickett's Will, 49
Or. 127, 89 P. 377 (1907); State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972); Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In
re Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964); Laus v. Braasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80
N.W.2d 759 (1957); 2 F. Hoops, supra note 4, § 336, at 68; H. Twars & W. PARSoNs, LIFEwIME AND TESTAMENTARY
ESTATE PL.ANtNo 86 (7th ed. 1966).
286. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605,607, 196 N.W.2d 733,734 (1972). In Gulbankian, 94% of the
wills the Gulbankians drafted after 1956 contained instructions to the executor to employ one or the other as attorney. As a
part of their defense in the disciplinary proceeding brought against the brother and sister, the Gulbankians argued that it
was the custom in Racine County, Wisconsin for lawyers who draft wills to include a provision for their appointment as
attorneys to assist in probate, and they presented evidence based on wills prepared by seven other law firms in the
community, in which a similar practice was extensively followed. Id. at 610, 196 N.W.2d at 735-36. In fact, the
percentage of wills drafted by the various finns that contained such provisions ranged from a low of 22.6% to a high of
70.8%. Id. at 610 n.l, 196 N.W.2d at 736 n.l.
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contain clauses for the designation of the scrivener, or the scrivener's law firm, to
serve as attorney for the estate,287 or, more precisely, as attorney for the executor.288
As in the case of an appointment as executor, a lawyer who is retained to assist
in the probate of an estate is often able to earn a substantial fee. 289 To a large extent,
this is attributable to the fact that the law in a number of jurisdictions still enables
attorneys to charge for their services on the basis of a percentage of the value of the
estate being administered,2 90 which may bear little relationship to the difficulty of the
work or the time required to perform the services. 29 1 Thus, lawyers doing probate
work are often able to earn fees that substantially exceed the amount that they could
charge for other comparable legal work. 292 Because it can be so lucrative, attorneys
engaged in estate planning are obviously interested in being retained to provide legal
services during probate administration. In fact, probating estates tends to be suf-
ficiently profitable that practitioners have a tendency to undercharge their clients for
will preparation and related estate planning services, in the hope that the testator's
representatives will subsequently employ the drafting attorney to assist in probate of
the testator's estate.2 93
287. See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D § 266:123 (1974); E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FoRMs § 9763
(1968); FIRsT KENTUcKY TRUST Co., WILLS AND TRUST MANuAL XVI-53 (1964); 2 KEmNTcKY LEGAL FoRMs §§
1317.01-.02 (1978 rev.).
288. The accurate terminology is "attorney for the executor." As the Supreme Court of California explained in an
early decision: "There is no such office or position known to the law as 'Attorney of an Estate'.... [H]e acts as the
attorney of the executor, and not of the estate .... In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381,385, 35 P. 900, 901 (1894).
This distinction is apparently made because the executor is personally liable for the conduct of any attorney that is
retained, See, e.g., In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907); Laus v. Brasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274
Wis. 569, 80 N.W.2d 759 (1957). This seems needlessly technical, at least for purposes of the present discussion, since
the executor certainly represents the estate and its interests, and if the attorney represents the executor, that cannot be very
different from the attorney acting on behalf of the estate. Furthermore, even if the executor were liable for the acts of the
attorney, he presumably would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate unless, of course, the executor had been
negligent in making the selection in the first place. Perhaps because of some skepticism on the author's part about the
precise terminology in this particular instance, the phrase "attorney for the estate" is sometimes utilized in this article and
is intended to mean the same thing as the more awkward, but perhaps more precise term "attorney for the executor."
289. See, e.g., P. STERN, supra note 185, at 34-38; Kabaker, supra note 185, at 577-86.
290. For a recent effort to justify the percentage approach for determination of attorneys' fees for administration of
estates, see Bank of America v. Koslow (In re Estate of Effron), 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924-28, 173 Cal. Rptr. 93,
98-100, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981). There has been, however, considerable support for reforming the
percentage formula for compensation of attorneys' estate work. See Eubank, The Future for Estate Laiyers, 10 REAL
PROP. PRon. & TR. J. 223, 223 (1975); Statement of Principles Regarding Probate Practices and Expenses, 8 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 293, 294-95 (1973). See also Wright v. Heron (In re Estate of Wright), 132 Ariz. 555, 647 P.2d
1153 (1982); Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Painter), 39 Colo. App. 506,567 P.2d
820 (1977) (describing the change in that jurisdiction from a percentage of the estate formula to a "reasonableness"
standard for determining attorneys' fees). In spite of this trend, in many jurisdictions attorneys' fees for probate work are
still primarily based on a percentage of the value of the estate, although this approach can be based on informal custom in
localities in which no statutory percentage is applicable. See generally Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees In the W ake of
Goldfarb, supra note 186.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90 (discussing the similar issue of attorney compensation for services
as a personal representative). This was dramatically illustrated in an editorial appearing in the Washington Post that dealt
with attorneys' fees for probate work in the state of Maryland. In that jurisdiction, attorneys can charge 10% of the first
$20,000 of an estate, and 4% of the remainder. In one instance cited by the Post, an attorney in Maryland, employing the
percentage formula, "earned" a fee of $5,724 for handling an estate valued at $113,103, even though only 3 hours of
legal work were required, which resulted in an hourly rate of $1,908. Washington Post, March 9, 1981, at A12, col. 1.
This, of course, represents an extreme example of the benefits of a formula approach.
292. See supra note 291.
293. See Sussman, Cates & Smith, supra note 185, at 48, 50, in which the authors discuss the prevailing attitude
among a number of estate planning attorneys that low-cost wills are used to provide a means of earning substantial income
in lawyers' later years through the administration of the estates of clients whose wills they drafted. Id.
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EC 5-6 addresses the problem of attorney designation by providing that "[a]
lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as ... lawyer" in a
will that is being prepared. z94 The difficulty, again, is the virtual impossibility of
determining whether the draftsman or the client first suggested appointment of an
attorney and, if the draftsman did so, whether that necessarily constitutes improper
influence in the particular circumstances. 2 95 As in the case of designation of the
drafting attorney as executor, the ethical issues generally do not surface until after the
testator's death, when the will becomes effective, and it may therefore be difficult to
contradict the attorney's contention that it was the testator who suggested that the will
designate the draftsman to provide legal services to the estate.
2 9 6
A. Ethical Issues Raised by Attorney Designation
Substantial ethical problems are raised by the designation of the draftsman as
attorney for the estate, since it appears unlikely that a testator would know about the
role of an attorney in the probate of an estate, much less think it desirable to include a
specific appointment at the time the will is drafted. It is therefore questionable
whether a client, on his or her own initiative, would request the lawyer preparing the
will to insert a provision specifying that the drafting attorney or that attorney's firm
be retained after the testator's death.2 97 In this respect, the problem is different from
the designation of an executor, since testators may be more familiar with the ex-
ecutor's position, may associate it with the administration of estates, and may possi-
bly even have some concept of the duties involved in such an appointment.
2 98
The insertion into a will of a provision that designates a particular attorney raises
a number of serious questions, including the possibility of an improper conflict of
interest. A lawyer in the process of drafting a will has an obligation to furnish
294. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983).
295. These are continuing problems with regard to ethical questions in the estate planning context since they
virtually always arise after the client-testator's death. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
296. The evidence presented in Laus v. Bmasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W.2d 759 (1957),
provides an excellent illustration of this point. In Braasch the testatrix's will included a specific provision that the executor
nominated therein should retain the attorney-draftsman to assist in probating the will. Id. at 569-70, 80 N.W.2d at 759.
The attorney testified that another client of his had brought the testatrix to his office, and that the first draft of her will
named an executor but contained no mention of the retention of an attorney. The client, who was deceased at the time of
the litigation, supposedly read the draft and expressed concern that the attorney-draftsman's name was not included, since
she wanted to be sure that he would be in charge of the probate of her estate. The attorney further testified that he then
modified the will as the testatrix had requested. Interestingly, after this will-drafting session, the attorney never saw the
testatrix again. Id. at 570, 80 N.W.2d at 759-60. In spite of the incredulity of the testimony, no one could refute the
attorney's statements once the testatrix had died.
297. See supra note 296 (discussing Laus v. Brasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W.2d 759
(1957)).
298. Banks undoubtedly have done their share to make the general public aware of what is involved in the
administration of an estate and of the duties of an executor appointed for this purpose through their marketing effort to
persuade people to utilize their fiduciary services. See, e.g., Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d
778 (Ky. 1964) (describing the extensive advertising by banks of their estate administration services). See also 122
TRUSTS & EsTATEs, March 1983 at 37 (advertisement of estate services offered by Trust Department of the Atlantic Bank
of New York). Many financial institutions display a number of brochures that provide free information on such matters as
the appointment of an executor and the probate of an estate. Generally, no comparable widespread source of information is
readily available to the public about the separate role of attorneys in the administration of a decedent's estate, although
such material may be distributed in a limited fashion through the efforts of state and local bar associations.
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independent legal advice to the testator,2 99 and that duty would clearly conflict with
any effort on the draftsman's part to promote his or her own self-interest by securing
an appointment as attorney to provide legal services to the estate. 300 It is important
that some individual or entity be designated as executor, 30 ' but in the vast majority of
situations it serves no legitimate purpose to name an attorney in a will. 302 Yet, the
practice is fairly common, and the ethical issues loom particularly large when the
attorney's own interests are juxtaposed with the responsibility to render independent
counsel to a client. 3 3 Self-interest is a strong motivating factor, and the conflicts of
interest involved in this situation are both real and substantial.
The conduct of practitioners designating themselves as attorneys in wills they
prepare also raises serious questions of improper solicitation. In many instances the
draftsman may have simply inserted the subject language into the will, along with
certain standard provisions like the executor's administrative powers, without specif-
ically discussing this designation with the testator. 30 4 The testator arguably
"approved" of this provision, because he or she read, or at least had the opportunity
to read, the entire will prior to execution. 30 5 To the extent that the testator did not
agree with the attorney designation, in theory, he or she should have objected. The
failure to protest is arguably tantamount to approval.
More realistically, wills contain a great deal of language that most testators do
not fully understand, and simply accept on faith. This is certainly true of many of the
299. "Attorneys must not allow their private interests to conflict with those of their clients.... They owe their
entire devotion to the interests of their clients." United States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 111, 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963)
(citiations omitted).
300. Cf. State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957) (disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who,
inter alia, prepared a will naming himself a principal beneficiary and executor). The court expressed grave concern about
the attorney's dealings with the other beneficiaries in his capacity as executor because it was apparent from his conduct
that "he was more concerned in making secure his rights under the will than he was of performing his duty as an
attorney." Id. at 101, 84 N.W.2d at 149.
301. See generally 2 F. Hoops, supra note 4, §§ 336-38; E. TOMLINSON, supra note 188, §§ 1.1-.9. This is not to
say, of course, that administration of an estate will fail if a will does not name an executor, since the probate court, at the
initiation of the administration process, will appoint an executor, technically known as an administrator cum testanento
annexo or "c.t.a." Id. §§ 1.4-2. But the position of executor is sufficiently important that the testator should always
designate some person or entity in the will, rather than leave that determination to the court.
302. First, the designation of an attorney in a will is generally not binding, and the executor remains free to employ
any attorney that the executor may choose. See infra note 310 and accompanying text. Moreover, since the attorney
retained to assist in probate must work closely with the executor, it makes considerable sense to let the executor employ
the attorney, rather than to allow the testator to bind the executor to his or her own personal choice. Lachmund v. Moody
(In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 428-30, 170 P.2d 748, 752 (1946); Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's
Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 128 N.W.2d 443, 445-46 (1964); P. ASHLEY, You AND YOUR WILL 88 (1977). If the
testator feels strongly about the selection of a particular lawyer to provide services to his or her estate, then it perhaps
would be advisable to name that person as executor of the estate. See Miller, supra note 9, at 439.
303. The problems involved in this ethical issue are best highlighted in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's landmark
decision in State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 322-30.
304. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Informal Dec. 602 (1963); Opinion 171 (Tex.), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 270 (1966); Opinion
152 (Tex.), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 259-60 (1966); Opinion 580, (Oct. 16, 1941), OPINIONS OF THE COMA-
MtTE55 ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs OF THE AssOCIATtONS OF THE BAR OF HE CITy OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK
COUNTY LAwYERs' AssociArtoN 327 (1956). Cf. In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d 591 (1978) (designation
of attorney-draftsman as executor without testatrix's consent); In re Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D.
1981) (discussion of attorney's standard practice of designating himself as executor).
305. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Dec. 602 (1963); Opinion 171 (rex.),
reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. Rev. 270 (1966).
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standard executor or trustee powers, such as the authority to retain and invest in
securities and other property without regard to the limitations that may otherwise be
applicable to fiduciary investments. 30 6 Similarly, a testator may not understand the
legal consequences of provisions relating to the waiver of a fiduciary's bond or the
full implications of a simultaneous death clause. 30 7 Likewise, a testator may simply
accept a clause that designates an attorney to assist in probate in the belief that such a
provision is normally included as part of any will. In this respect, the testator does not
understand that the lawyer who drafted the will has, in reality, engaged in solicitation
of legal business, and thus the testator is unable to protect his or her own interests.
The insertion of a clause appointing the drafting attorney as executor may not put the
testator on notice that the draftsman is seeking future business, 30 8 and the designation
of an attorney to provide legal services to the estate is even less likely to be detected
as solicitation, because the testators generally do not understand the meaning of such
a legal position or that an appointment in advance is hardly necessary or desirable in
the way that the selection of an executor is. 3 0 9 Thus, solicitation in this context
presents a serious ethical problem.
B. Attorney Designation-Not Binding on Personal Representative
A provision in a will to the effect that a particular attorney or law firm should be
retained by the executor could be misleading. It is settled law in all but one or two
jurisdictions that such a provision, even when its terms appear to be mandatory, is not
binding on the executor. 310 The courts have consistently reasoned that an attorney
who is to provide legal services to the estate is the executor's lawyer, and not a
representative of the testator, the estate, or the estate's beneficiaries. Accordingly,
the executor should be free to employ an attorney of his or her choice. 311 Yet, in most
instances the language the draftsman has utilized to name himself or herself as
attorney to assist in probate administration seems to be more than a mere
306. For an example of standard "boilerplate" language utilized in wills for this purpose, see 2 F. Hoops, supra
note 4, § 338 at 81-82. If such a provision is automatically incorporated in every will by reason of a statutory provision
such as the Fiduciaries Powers Act, then the drafting attorney may be relieved from explaining the force and effect of this
terminology. But if it is to be written into the will, then the attorney should make a reasonable effort to explain it to the
client, even though that may meet with only limited success, since a testator should understand, to the extent possible, all
of the terms and provisions in a will before it is executed.
307. Id. §§ 331, 336 at 69.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 200-10.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 297-302.
310. See Highfield v. Bozio, 188 Cal. 727, 207 P. 242 (1922); In re Estate of Ogler, 101 Cal. 381,35 P. 900 (1894);
Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Hogan, I Hawaii App. 560, 623 P.2d 450 (1981); In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663
(1907); Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 170 P.2d 748 (1946); Pickett's Will, 49 Or. 127,
89 P. 377 (1907); Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964); 2 F.
Hoops, supra note 4, § 336 at 68; H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, supra note 285, at 86; Scott, Testamentary Directions to
Employ, 41 HARV. L. REv. 709 (1928). In Louisiana, on the other hand, this type of will provision is binding and the
executor is required to employ the attorney that the testator has selected. Succession of Stovall, 193 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct.
App. 1966); Succession of Martin, 56 So. 2d 176 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
311. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381,384-85, 35 P. 900, 901 (1894); In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115,
121, 80 N.E. 663, 664 (1907); Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 428-30, 170 P.2d 748, 752
(1946); Laus v. Braasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 571, 80 N.W.2d 759, 760 (1957).
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suggestion. 312 The designation of a lawyer usually appears in terms comparable to
those used to nominate an executor, even though the latter appointment is generally
binding, barring proof that the individual or institution is incompetent to serve in that
capacity. 3
13
In many instances, the executor-designate and members of the testator's family
are likely to be misled into believing that they should retain the services of the
attorney named in the will, without considering that the provision might not be
legally binding. 314 Even if the executor-designate knows or has reason to suspect that
the provision may not be enforceable, it is still likely that the specified attorney will
be retained, since the executor and members of the testator's family generally want to
carry out the desires of the decedent. 3 15 This, too, can be deceptive when the testator
had no preference in the matter, and simply acceded to the provision inserted by the
drafting attorney in the belief that it was routine boilerplate.
3 16
312. See, e.g., Highfield v. Bozio, 188 Cal. 727, 727,207 P.242, 242(1922); In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381,
383, 35 P. 900, 901 (1894); Haines v. George (In re George's Estate), 11 I11. App. 2d 359, 360, 137 N.E.2d 555, 556
(1956); In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 121, 80 N.E. 663, 664 (1907); Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate),
179 Or. 420, 423-25, 170 P.2d 748, 750 (1946); Pickett's Will, 49 Or. 127, 137-38, 89 P. 377, 380 (1907); Estate of
Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 167, 128 N.W.2d 443,444 (1964). The language of the will in
In re Estate ofOgier, 101 Cal. 381, 35 P. 900 (1894), is typical of the terms that are employed by the draftsman regarding
employment of himself or herself as attorney to assist in the probate of the testator's estate; "I hereby select as the attorney
of my estate John W. Mitchell, and direct my executrix to consult and employ him in all matters pertaining to the
distribution of my estate, and the requirements of this my last will." Id. at 383, 35 P. at 901.
313. See, e.g., T. ATrINSON, supra note 139, at 604-05. But see In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 390 A.2d
591 (1978) (court refuses to appoint the person designated in the decedent's will as executrix because she had engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law in assisting the testatrix in the preparation of her will).
314. One of the principal reasons the executor-designate and members of the testator's family are misled is that the
wills themselves generally do not suggest that the executor utilize the services of a particular attorney, but rather are
written in mandatory terms, For language used in actual wills designating attorneys, see supra note 312. Yet, considerable
authority suggests that such a clause in a will should specifically provide that it is merely advisory and is not legally
binding on the executor. See Ethics Opinion 76-6, 58 CttcAoO B. REc. 169 (November-December 1976), reported in
MAtU 1980, supra note 12, at 180, No. 11022; Opinion 628 (N.Y. County June 13, 1974), reported in MARut 1975,
supra note 12, at 369, No. 9219. The Illinois Ethics Committee recognized the problem with language almost.uniformly
used in wills to designate an attorney to assist in the administration of an estate:
The Committee ... is of the opinion that the use of directory or mandatory language concerning the
employment of a particular attorney to settle the estate is improper. Such language not only may mislead the
testator but may also mislead the executor as to his authority to employ an attorney of his own choice. Such
mandatory language also raises an appearance of impropriety. The Committee, however, does approve of
precatory language requesting or suggesting that the executor employ a particular attorney.
Opinion No. 446, 63 ILL. B.J. 220 (1974) (emphasis added).
Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to find clauses in actual wills that designate attorneys for the estate in terms
that are not binding, it is hard even to find a form whose terms are appropriate for this purpose. One such form provides:
Designation Of Attorney
Having been advised of my legal inability to bind my executors in the selection of an attorney to represent
my estate, I suggest, without imposing any obligation upon them, that my executors retain...__, Esq., as
attorney for my estate and the trusts created under my will, because of his familiarity with my financial affairs
and my family, and because of the confidence in him I have developed during the many years in which he has
represented me.
2 F. Hoops, supra note 4, § 336, at 69.
315. The mere fact that a particular attorney prepared the decedent's will, without more, gives the draftsman a
distinct advantage when it comes to the selection of a lawyer to assist in the probate process. When a clause is inserted in a
will suggesting or recommending the retention of the draftsman, that virtually assures employment of that particular
attorney. P. AsHLEY, supra note 302, at 88; J. BARNES, supra note I, at 8.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 304-09.
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C. A Dearth of Case Law
In spite of the serious nature of the improprieties raised by the conduct of
attorney-draftsmen in preparing wills that name themselves to positions as attorneys
for the executor, very few cases have focused on the ethical aspects of this common
estate planning practice. Perhaps the lack of case law is not as unusual as it first may
appear, because once the problem has been uncovered by an interested party, it can
usually be remedied without the kind of litigation that often serves to highlight
attorney improprieties. Thus, for example, many of the disciplinary cases involving
an attorney who was named as a beneficiary in a will that he or she drafted are
brought in the aftermath of will contest litigation in which the attorney's conduct was
directly in issue. 3 17 By contrast, once a decision has been made to question the
appointment of an attorney under a will, the executor is likely to discover that the
designation is not binding, thereby permitting the executor to select another
lawyer. 3 18 If the attorney who was named has commenced to provide legal services to
the estate before the executor learns that the appointment in the will was not legally
enforceable, the executor can still discharge that attorney and replace him or her with
another lawyer of the executor's own choosing. 3 19 In either case, the executor usually
will not have to resort to a court proceeding to achieve the desired results. 320 Thus,
the drafting attorney's conduct in designating himself or herself as attorney in a will is
generally not subject to the type of close adversarial scrutiny that often leads to
disciplinary action.
Moreover, because attorney designations are not considered legally binding,
disciplinary authorities have undoubtedly treated the matter less seriously than they
might otherwise.32' This is unfortunate, for the real question is not whether such a
provision is enforceable, but rather whether the attorney has engaged in improper
317. See supra note 29.
318. See supra note 310.
319. See, e.g., Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Hogan, I Hawaii App. 560, 623 P.2d 450 (1981); Lachmund v. Moody (In re
Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 170 P.2d 748 (1946).
320. As the cases cited supra note 310 indicate, a number of court decisions have addressed this issue. But the law
now appears to be clear that such a provision is not binding on the executor except in one or two states. virtually every
jurisdiction has reported decisions directly on point. Accordingly, innumerable instances undoubtedly have occurred in
which an executor, once informed of his or her legal rights, has been able to select an attorney of the executor's own
choosing, without formal opposition from the attorney named in the will.
321. If the person or entity named as executor is advised of the state of the law and prefers not to retain the services
of the attorney designated in the testator's will, then the personal representative has the necessary means to correct the
situation by employing his or her own counsel. Thus, in a sense, any overreaching that occurred when the will was drafted
can be remedied if the executor is aware that a clause in a will appointing an attorney is not legally binding. Cf. Magee v.
State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1962). In Magee the attorney in question had
previously been found guilty of undue influence as a result of his conduct in drafting a will in which he was the principal
beneficiary and the will had been set aside on that ground. The court dismissed the subsequent disciplinary proceeding and
explained its position, in part, by indicating that the attorney had already been punished for his actions:
As the instant case suggests. . . attorneys take a grave risk in drawing wills in which they receive more than
a modest gift that is in keeping with the nature of the relationship they have with the client. Petitioner took this
risk, unwisely, and one consequence was that he lost the substantial gift in Mrs. Rohde's will when it was
contested.
Id. at 433, 374 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 846. See also Ruckes v. Magee (In re Rohde's Estate), 158 Cal. App. 2d 19,
323 P.2d 490 (1958).
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solicitation resulting in the executor and other interested parties feeling obligated to
proceed in accordance with the terms of the provision, even though they might have
made other arrangements had they thought that they were free to do so.
1. State v. Gulbankian
In State v. Gulbankian,322 the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically focused on
the ethical improprieties involved when an attorney-draftsman consistently prepares
wills that include provisions for his or her employment. The court's decision is
unparalleled in this regard, although several other cases have discussed and, at least
by inference, criticized the same conduct.323
In Gulbankian, a brother and sister who were engaged in the practice of law
prepared well over one hundred wills in which one or the other, or a sister who was a
real estate agent, were designated as executor or attorney for the estate. In fact,
ninety-four percent of the wills they prepared after 1956 contained a clause instruct-
ing the executor to retain either G.K. Gulbankian or Vartak Gulbankian as
attorney. 324 The court expressed grave concern over this practice, stating that it was
extremely doubtful that a client would request inclusion of this provision in a will,
and indicating that an inference of solicitation might be appropriate in subsequent
cases. 325 As part of their defense to the disciplinary charges, the Gulbankians claimed
that it was the custom in their county for lawyers to name themselves as attorneys in
wills that they draw, and introduced evidence indicating that from twenty-three to
seventy-one percent of the wills drafted by seven other firms practicing in the same
county contained similar provisions.326 Although this eviderpce clearly demonstrated
the pervasiveness of the custom, at least in Racine County, Wisconsin, the court
sagaciously observed that "the extensiveness of a practice does not mean the practice
is legitimate if in fact the practice amounts to solicitation of business."
327
Because it was the first disciplinary case to raise this issue, the court felt
constrained not to judge the attorneys harshly. 32 8 Instead of disciplining the
Gulbankians, the court used the case as an opportunity to provide guidelines for the
proscription of similar conduct in the future. 3 2 9 According to the court, a lawyer
322. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
323. Hartford v. Burford (In re Estate of Miller), 259 Cal. App. 2d 536, 66 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1968); Shelton v.
McHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S.W.2d 173 (1936) (attorney designated as executor and trustee); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976) (attorney who drew will naming himself as a beneficiary
thereunder and who also served as executor and attorney, required to refund his substantial executor's and attorney's fees);
Laus v. Braasch (In re Brasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W.2d 759 (1957). See also ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Informal Dec. 602 (1963); Informal Opinion 008 (N.D. May 14, 1974), reported in MAmJ 1975,
supra note 12, at 430, No. 9672; Opinion 171 (Tex. Mar. 1958), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 270 (1966); Opinion
152 (Tex. June 1957), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 259-60 (1966); Memorandum Opinion 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BuLL.
91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in M.xu 1980, supra note 12, at 614, No. 13193.
324. State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 607, 196 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1972).
325. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 736-37.
326. Id. at 610 n.1, 196 N.W.2d at 736 n.1.
327. Id. at 610, 196 N.W.2d at 736.
328. Id. at 612-13, 196 N.W.2d at 737.
329. Id.
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would not be guilty of unethical behavior if the provision for employment of the
draftsman as attorney was the result of the unprompted intent of the client, but
indicated that these instances are likely to be few and far between, and that the
consistent recurrence of such a designation in wills would constitute improper con-
duct for which an attorney could be disciplined.
330
2. In re Estate of Devroy
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, In re Estate ofDevroy,33 1
is of interest because of its conclusion that if a will specifically conditions the
executor's appointment on the employment of a given lawyer to assist in probate of
the estate, the executor-designate must retain the services of that particular lawyer.
Although Wisconsin law is strongly weighted in favor of carrying out a testator's
intent, prior cases had uniformly held that a clause in a will providing that a specified
lawyer be retained was not binding on an individual executor who refused to employ
that attorney. 332 In Devroy, however, the testator's will designated a particular per-
son to serve as executor "on condition that" he retain a named lawyer to provide
legal services to the estate, and that if for any reason the executor was unwilling to do
so, then an alternate executor would be nominated.33 3 After the testator's death, the
executor-designate, who did not want to retain the attorney who was named in the
will, sought a declaratory judgment in order to determine his rights. The trial court
decided that the clause in the will which, in effect, required the executor to employ a
specific attorney or forfeit his appointment, was against public policy and therefore
invalid, even though there was no evidence of unethical conduct on the attorney's
part.3 34 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that public policy
did not require a testator to put his executor's preference above his own with regard to
selection of an attorney to render legal services in connection with probate of the
testator's estate. 335 According to the court, "[a] testator may very well conclude that
selection of the attorney is more important to him than who serves as the personal
representative."
336
Portions of the decision in Devroy seem inconsistent in spirit with the court's
earlier pronouncements in State v. Gulbankian.337 Gulbankian had indicated that it
was unusual for a testator to specify an attorney in a will without the idea having
originated with the scrivener, and that such an attorney designation might well be the
product of improper solicitation. 338 The Devroy court, while purporting to follow its
330. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 736-37.
331. 109 Wis. 2d 154, 325 N.W.2d 345 (1982).
332. See, e.g., Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964); Laus v.
Braasch (In re Brasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W.2d 759 (1957).
333. 109 Wis. 2d 154, 155, 325 N.W.2d 345, 345-46 (1982).
334. Id. at 156-57, 325 N.W.2d at 346.
335. Id. at 160-62, 325 N.W.2d at 348-49.
336. Id. at 160, 325 N.W.2d at 348.
337. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
338. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 736-37.
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ruling in Gulbankian, actually manifested some fundamental disagreement with its
prior decision. For example, although the court in Devroy conceded that a direction in
a will might arouse suspicion that the attorney had improperly solicited the business,
the court reasoned that this suspicion "will often be unfounded." 339 Further, the
court distinguished Devroy from Gulbankian on the grounds that the record before it
disclosed that this was the only will the lawyer in question had ever drafted that
contained such a provision. Therefore, the court held that, under the circumstances,
the attorney-draftsman had avoided "even the appearance of solicitation. ' '340
While Gulbankian made it clear that it was not holding that a lawyer could never
draft a will that contained a provision that the executor was to employ the draftsman
as attorney, 34 ' this is entirely different from the determination in Devroy that a
testator can, if the right terminology is used, not only specify that a particular
attorney is to be retained, but, in effect, make the designation binding on the ex-
ecutor. Thus, if a lawyer is in a position to take advantage of the close attorney-client
relationship that often exists in an estate planning setting, the drafting attorney may,
according to Devroy, secure his or her appointment whether the executor agrees or
not. 34 2 Although it may seem unlikely that a lawyer would go to such extremes in an
effort to secure future legal business, that possibility seems all too real in view of the
significant number of reported cases involving the preparation of wills that include
substantial bequests to the drafting attorney.343
339. 109 Wis. 2d 154, 160, 325 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1982).
340. Id. at 161, 325 N.W.2d at 348. The appearance of solicitation, like the appearance of impropriety, seems to
relate to whether certain conduct appeared to constitute solicitation in the eyes of the public, not other members of the bar.
Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983). Thus, it is hard to understand the Devroy court's
rationale, since the public would hardly be aware that the will was the only one that the lawyer in question had ever drawn
containing such a provision.
341. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 610-11, 196 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1972). The ethics opinions that have been issued by the
Wisconsin Bar clearly confirm the interpretation of Gulbankian that it is not unethical for a lawyer to draft a will in which
he or she is named as attorney for the executor, if the preference is the result of the unsolicited desire of the testator.
Opinion E-75-3, 52 Wis. B. BuLL. 56 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARJ 1980, supra note 12, at 589, No. 13057;
Memorandum Opinion 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BOLL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 614,
No. 13193.
342. In fairness to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in Devroy, the seeds for that decision were clearly sown
some 18 years before, in the decision in Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d
443 (1964). In Sieben, the will appointed the testator's son as executor, and went on to provide "I hereby request and
direct that the executor ... shall employ the services of [the attorney who drew the will for purposes of probating the
estate]." Id. at 167, 128 N.W.2d at 444. The executor was unwilling to do so, and the attorney brought an action to
compel his appointment. The court held that the executor would not be required to employ the designated attorney, but in
the process the court clarified its position on this issue:
This holding controls the instant situation where the testator names the executor and the attorney the
executor is to employ, but does not indicate any preference between the two. In the absence of a statement of
intent in the will that a named attorney be employed by the personal representative even at the cost of the
resignation of the personal representative, an executor is not required to employ an attorney in opposition to the
executor's own wishes.
Id. at 170, 128 N.W.2d at 445.
343. The numerous reported decisions in which an attorney-draftsman has prepared a will naming himself or herself
as a substantial beneficiary provide excellent case studies of situations in which an estate planner may have taken
advantage of the attorney-client relationship for his or her own benefit. See supra note 11; supra note 69 (discussing
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979) and Office
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976)). If an attorney were in a position to include
himself or herself as a beneficiary even though that might not reflect the true wishes of the testator, then the insertion of a
clause like that which appeared in Devroy would be even easier to accomplish, assuming that the attorney-draftsman
wanted to insert the clause and that the testator could be taken advantage of.
1984] ETHICS OF COMMON ESTATE PLANNING PRACTICES Ill
D. Applicable Ethics Opinions
In contrast to the dearth of case law, a number of ethics opinions have consid-
ered the propriety of a draftsman's inclusion of a provision in a will specifying that he
or she be retained as attorney. Most of these opinions simply confirm the provisions
of EC 5-6 to the effect that it is unethical to include such a clause in a will if the
attorney improperly influenced the testator to insert the language. 3 " Other ethics
opinions, however, add appreciably to the limited scope of the code provisions and
case law.
For example, several ethics opinions approve of the insertion of a clause desig-
nating a lawyer to provide legal services if the testator specifically requested the
drafting attorney to represent the estate and if that intention was not prompted by the
draftsman.345 One of the opinions further states that the terms of such a provision
should not be mandatory, but may suggest or request the drafter's employment, so
long as that provision is accompanied by specific language indicating that the ex-
ecutor is not legally bound by that provision.346 In another opinion, the Wisconsin
Ethics Committee, under the controlling authority of State v. Gulbankian, determined
that it was not per se unethical for an attorney to prepare a will in which he or she was
designated as legal counsel if that was the "unprompted desire" of the testator, but
the attorney who drew the document would be expected to furnish "persuasive
evidence" that this intention was formed entirely on the testator's own initiative.347
A 1974 ethics opinion of the New York County Lawyers' Association 348 pro-
vides an interesting contrast to the holding in In re Estate of Devroy.349 The New
York County Ethics Committee acknowledged that a will could contain precatory
language stating that the testator wanted the executor, who also happened to be the
principal beneficiary, to retain the lawyer who drafted the will to represent the estate
if the provision were inserted at the initiative of the testator.350 However, the drafts-
man would be obligated to advise the testator that the clause was not enforceable,
since the executor could ignore the request and employ his or her own attorney.
Further, the committee determined that it would be unethical "for the attorney to use
an in terrorem clause associated with the request to the effect that the beneficiary
344. See, e.g., Opinion No. 60 (1926-27), OPINIONS OF THE CoMMrITEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs OF THE
ASSOCIATION OFTHE BAR OFTHE CITY OFN.Y. AND THE N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION 26 (1956); Opinion No.
580 (Oct. 15, 1941), Id. at 327; Memorandum Opinion 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in
MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 614, No. 13193.
345. Ethics Opinion 120 (July, 1948), reprinted in 38 MICH. ST. B.J., May, 1959 at 154; Opinion 71, 16 TEx. B.J.
223 (April 1953); Ethics Opinion 23 (Wash. May 1953), reported in 0. MARu & R. CLOUGH, DIGEST OF BAR AsSOCIA-
TION ETHICS OPINIONS 498, No. 4541 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MARU & CLOUGH]; Informal Opinion 3/31/1964, 38
WIs. B. BULL. 52 (Supp. Dec. 1965); Opinion 76-6, 58 CHICAGO B. REC. 169 (Nov.-Dec. 1976), reported in MARU
1980, supra note 12, at 180, No. 11022; Opinion 628 (N.Y. County June 13, 1974), reported in MAR 1975, supra note
12, at 369, No. 9219.
346. Opinion 76-6, 58 CHICAGO B. REc. 169 (Nov.-Dec. 1976), reported in MARu 1980, supra note 12, at 180
No. 11022.
347. Memorandum Opinion 10-76, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 91 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARU 1980, supra note
12, at 614, No. 13193.
348. Opinion 628 (N.Y. County June 13, 1974), reported in MARu 1975, supra note 12, at 369, No. 9219.
349. 109 Wis. 2d 154, 325 N.W.2d 345 (1982).
350. Opinion 628 (N.Y. County June 13, 1974), reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 369, No. 9219.
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would forfeit his interest in the estate if he failed to comply with the above con-
dition."-35 ' Little difference exists between a provision that would require a benefici-
ary to forfeit his or her share of an estate unless that individual, qua executor,
retained a specific attorney to assist in probating an estate, and a clause as in Devroy
that would require an executor to employ a particular lawyer or forfeit the executor-
ship.
In the most far-reaching opinion on this point, the Ethics Committee of the
North Dakota State Bar Association determined that a lawyer should not be per-
mitted, under any circumstances, to draw a will that provides for his or her own
appointment as the estate's attorney.352 This conclusion was reached on the basis that
such a designation is unenforceable since it is the executor's choice and not the
testator's, and since inclusion of such a provision in a will strongly indicates that the
drafting attorney did not properly advise the testator-client.3 53 This approach has
much to commend it because it recognizes certain basic realities, provides for an
all-inclusive prohibition that is not tied to particular circumstances which are difficult
if not impossible to prove, and thus avoids the uncertainties of a case-by-case
approach.
E. Proposed Prohibition of Attorney Designation Clauses
Upon consideration of the various aspects of the problem, including, particu-
larly, the unlikelihood that a testator would suggest inclusion of a provision in his or
her will regarding employment of the draftsman as attorney 35 4 and the fact that this
type of a clause is not binding on the executor under the law in virtually all ju-
risdictions,355 preparation of a will containing such a provision should be considered
unethical and subject to disciplinary sanctions.
EC 5-6 of the current Code of Professional Responsibility at least recognizes the
potential unethical nature of such conduct, but the prohibition against a lawyer's
consciously influencing a testator to name that attorney in a will that he or she is
drafting places too much emphasis on the testator's intent, which is difficult if not
impossible to determine after death.35 6 Nevertheless, EC 5-6 is vastly superior to the
new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which presumably rely on broad concepts
relating to solicitation and conflicts of interest to govern such activity, rather than
specific provisions covering this common practice.35 7 It is unfortunate that the Model
Rules, even in their earlier unexpurgated versions, did not deal directly with this
problem.35 8 Nonetheless, such attorney conduct constitutes improper solicitation and
351. Id.
352. Informal Opinion 008 (N.D. May 14, 1974), reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 430, No. 9672.
353. Id.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 297-98.
355. See supra note 310.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18 & 295-96.
357. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c), Legal Background (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
358. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.8(c) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT
Rule 1.8(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUct Rule 1.9(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
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involves an inherent conflict of interest, and hence can and should be regulated by
disciplinary authorities even without the benefit of a specific rule.
359
An all-inclusive prohibition would have the distinct advantage of putting attor-
neys specifically on notice that such conduct will result in the imposition of discipli-
nary sanctions. Before recommending the adoption of this ethical restriction, how-
ever, the factors in favor of a blanket rule should be balanced against the benefits that
might be achieved by allowing inclusion of such clauses in wills. The general public
seems to gain little if lawyers are permitted to insert provisions in wills regarding
retention of the draftsman, since the advantages of such clauses can generally be
achieved by alternatives that do not raise nearly as serious ethical questions. For
example, if a testator merely wants the executor to know of the testator's preference
that a specific lawyer be employed in connection with probate, a handwritten letter to
the executor-designate, left with the original of the will, would serve this purpose,
and yet would be less likely to give the misleading impression that the choice was
legally enforceable against the executor. 360
In those unusual situations in which the attorney designation is important to the
testator, better methods exist for achieving the desired result. Since it is a rare
occurrence, it might not be unduly restrictive to require that a testator use another
lawyer to draw any will that includes a provision to the effect that the executor-
designate is to retain the services of a particular attorney to probate the estate.
Referral under these circumstances would ensure the benefits of independent
advice, 361 by serving as a buffer to be certain that the original attorney's self-interest
359. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit spoke to an analogous point in Randall v. Reynoldson (In re
Randall), 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1981). when it disbarred an attorney for his conduct in preparing a will naming himself as
sole beneficiary of a multi-million dollar estate:
Furthermore, it appears that the prohibition contained in EC 5-5, prohibiting the drafting of a will by an attorney
making himself a beneficiary, is but the current articulation of a long-standing prohibition against that practice.
Obviously such a situation is fraught with a high potential for overreaching and abuse. The prohibition in EC 5-5
is also only a restatement of old Canon 9, Canons of the American Bar Association. [Citations omitted].
Id. at 905. See also Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444
U.S. 805 (1979) ("llt is obvious the canons cannot contain enough 'thou shalt nots' to identify every ethical temptation a
lawyer will encounter in his or her practice."); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 98-100, 290 N.E.2d
831, 835-36 (1972); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 440 n.5, 366 A.2d 563, 567 n.5 (1976).
At least one court has taken a more conservative approach, however, and refused to apply the more general
provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics to a will drawn prior to the effective date of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even though the will in question violated the provisions of EC 5-5 and 5-6. Disciplinary Bd. v. Amund-
son, 297 N.W.2d 433, 440-41 (N.D. 1980).
360. See Sheppard, supra note 183, at 271-72 (recommending use of a separate and informal writing addressed to
the executor named in the will); Panel Discussion: Professional Ethics, supra note 5, 74.700, at 7-32 to -33 (discussion
of advantages of a letter over a provision in a will, but commenting that such letters are rarely used in New York City). Cf.
Memorandum Opinion 6-77, 52 Wis. B. BuLL. 93 (Supp. June 1979), reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 617,
No. 13209 (explaining the advantages of a written statement separate from the will to convey the testator's intent in an
analogous situation).
361. An example of commendable behavior on an attorney's part appears in Shelton v. MeHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92
S.W.2d 173 (1936). In Shelton, a lawyer who drafted a will and was designated as executor and trustee thereunder was
charged with undue influence. The court, which held in favor of the attorney, commented with approval on his conduct,
which it described in the following terms:
[The attorney] said that he then told testator that inasmuch as he was to be named as trustee he thought it would
be best for testator to employ some one else to write the will in order to avoid any possible contention of undue
influence. It appears from [the attorney's] testimony that testator at first dismissed as ridiculous the thought that
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would not have an improper effect on the terms of the testator's will. Alternatively, if
the testator honestly believes that it is essential that a specific lawyer be designated,
then rather than attempting to impose that choice on the executor, even to the extent
of conditioning the executor's appointment on employment of a particular attorney as
demonstrated in In re Estate of Devroy,3 62 it would be preferable to name the in-
dividual attorney to the executor's post. 3 63 In such circumstances, the propriety of the
designation of the scrivener as executor would, of course, have to comply with any
restrictions on such an appointment, including, particularly, a determination that the
choice of executor was independently arrived at by the testator. 364
Effective imposition of a comprehensive prohibition against such attorney desig-
nations will require considerable cooperation to ensure compliance with such an
ethical standard. Unlike some of the other estate planning practices in which the
lawyer's questionable conduct is often brought to the attention of the disciplinary
authorities as a consequence of private litigation focusing on the same issue, 3 65 the
designation in a will of an attorney for purposes of probate is generally not binding on
an executor; hence it is not usually necessary to file suit in order for an executor to
reject the testator's "choice" in favor of another attorney. 366 Enforcement of this
ethical prohibition, however, can be achieved if those court officials involved in
estate administration would refer any matters relating to the conduct of attorney-
draftsmen in designating themselves as attorneys in wills filed for probate to the
appropriate disciplinary authorities for review. 367
anyone might raise the question of undue influence on that ground, but that at [the attorney's] continued
insistence that either some other lawyer should write the will, or at least be employed to check and go over it
with testator, the latter consented to have some other lawyer check it and go over it with him, which was done.
Id. at 758, 92 S.W.2d at 176. By way of analogy, in the case of legacies to an attorney, the Code of Professional
Responsibility recommends that the testator obtain "disinterested advice from an independent, competent person," and
that the lawyer who is to be named as a beneficiary should "insist" that the client have the will "prepared by another
lawyer selected by the client." MODErL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 169-79 (discussing the need for independent counsel in the attorney-beneficiary context).
362. 109 Wis. 2d 154, 325 N.W.2d 345 (1982).
363. See Miller, supra note 9, at 439. The problem with the Devroy approach is that although it may succeed in
having a particular attorney named to provide legal services to the estate, the executor will then be required to work
closely with the specified attorney, which may not be advantageous to the estate if a personality conflict develops. P.
ASHLEY, supra note 302, at 88. On the other hand, any potential personality problems would be eliminated if the attorney
is named as executor. He or she could then provide legal services to the estate, or retain someone else to provide these
services.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 266-83.
365. See supra text accompanying note 29 (citing numerous cases in which disciplinary action followed on the heels
of a successful will contest challenging an attorney's conduct in preparing a will naming himself or herself as a substantial
beneficiary).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 318-20.
367. An excellent example of how this sort of referral might work appears in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976). In Walker the attorney filed a first and final account in which he claimed
substantial fees for serving as attorney and as executor, and the account also reflected a distribution to himself of $239,000
under the terms of the testator's will. Other legatees filed exceptions, but the attorney was able to settle their objections by
making additional payments to the complaining parties. Since the exceptions were then withdrawn, the probate court
approved the accounting, but the court then referred the question of the propriety of the attorney's conduct directly to the
state's disciplinary board. Id. at 437-38, 366 A.2d at 565-66.
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V. THE CORPORATE FIDUCIARY'S "POLICY" OF NAMING THE DRAFTSMAN AS
ATTORNEY FOR THE ESTATE
It is a widespread practice among corporate fiduciaries to retain the services of
the lawyer who drafted a will or trust in which a bank is named as executor or trustee
to perform any legal work that may be necessary in estate or trust administration.
368
In probating a testator's estate, legal services are virtually always needed because of
the strict application of laws relating to unauthorized practice of law, which preclude
corporate fiduciaries from handling matters processed through the probate court
system. 369 The policy of retaining the draftsman to provide legal services has been
described as a "gentlemen's agreement" between financial institutions and the
bar, 370 as "reciprocal back scratching, "371 as a "symbiotic relationship,"-372 and,
less generously, as a "conspiracy" between corporate executors and lawyers to
exploit the client by recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in
exchange for assurance that the executor, once appointed, will retain the attorney to
assist in the probate of the testator's estate.
373
A. Statement of Principles
The "policy" of retaining the draftsman to provide legal services is part of a
broader attempt to define the role and responsibility of lawyers, on the one hand, and
other professionals on the other, with regard to the provision of estate planning
services. 374 One consequence of this overall effort is a "Statement of General Poli-
cies" adopted in 1941 by the Trust Division of the American Banker's Association
and the American Bar Association that allocates various aspects of estate planning
and estate and trust administration to trust institutions and members of the bar.37 5 For
example, the Statement prohibits banks from drawing wills or other legal documents,
but provides that trust institutions can advertise their estate planning services to the
368. See Bank of America v. Koslow (In re Estate of Effron), 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 173 Cal. Rptr. 93, appeal
dismissed, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981); Hood v. Lawrence Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Harper), 202 Kan. 150, 446 P.2d 738
(1968); In re Rielly, 310 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1957); P. ASHLEY, supra note 302, at 88; Hyme, Unauthorized Practice in
Estate Planning and Administration: A Mild and Temperate Dissent, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 647, 671 (1977); Panel
Discussion: Professional Ethics, supra note 5, 74.700, at 7-33; Role and Function of the Estate Lawyer, supra note 5,
at 238; NEB. L. REV. Comment, supra note 9, at 457-58.
369. See, e.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); People ex rel.
Comm. on Grievances v. Denver Clearing House Banks, 99 Colo. 50,59 P.2d 468 (1936); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778
(Ky. 1964); Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965).
370. NEn. L. REv. Comment, supra note 9, at 457.
371. Bank of America v. Koslow (In re Estate of Effron), 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 919, 173 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95, appeal
dismissed, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981).
372. Sussman, Cates & Smith, supra note 185, at 46.
373. NEB. L. REV. Comment, supra note 9, at 458.
374. See Berle, Estate Planning: Whose Sacred Domain? 9 INSr. ON EST. PLAN. 1800 & 1807 (1975); Hyme,
supra note 368, at 670-71; Pedrick, supra note 145, 71.1902.
375. 7 MARTNMDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY 72M (1978). See also supra note 374 (citing articles providing a
detailed discussion of the various Statements of Principles that lawyers have entered into with other professional groups
with regard to the provision of estate planning services).
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general public.3 76 Significantly, the Statement further stipulates that "[i]n the em-
ployment of counsel, the trust institution should endeavor, in the absence of compel-
ling reasons to the contrary, to engage the attorney who drew the instrument, or who
represented the testator or donor, to perform any legal work required in the course of
trust or estate administration."
377
Similar "agreements" regarding bank policy in favor of employing the attorney
who drew the testator's will have been adopted by local bar organizations and bank-
ing groups, thus making this practice prevalent throughout the country. 378 However,
in response to the threat of governmental legal action based on the alleged anticom-
petitive effect of these agreements, the joint statements have been largely disavowed
in the past few years. 3 79 This is not to say that thirty or forty years of an established
business practice have also been abandoned, but only that the written statements
acknowledging that these practices exist have been withdrawn.
380
B. A Well-Entrenched "Policy"
A number of decisions have indicated that the "policy" endorsed by the 1941
Statement of Principles is pervasive and well established. 38' For example, in In re
Rielly382 a state bar association charged a lawyer with improper solicitation of busi-
ness from one of the executors named in a will that the attorney had prepared. 383 The
will in question designated a bank and the testator's secretary as coexecutors and also
named the latter as a principal beneficiary. After the testator's death, the attorney
called the bank and was assured "that the bank had a long standing custom, whenever
it was named as an executor, of employing as attorney the lawyer who had drawn the
will, and that the bank desired and intended to employ [the attorney in question].- 384
376. Statement of General Policies, Banks with Trust Functions, 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY 72M
(1978).
377. Id. at 73M.
378. The Statement of General Policies issued in 1941 by the National Conference Group, representing the Trust
Division of the American Bankers Association and the American Bar Association, urged local organizations to adopt
similar policy positions:
The National Conference Group hereby recommends to state and local bar and trust organizations the
creation of joint conference committees, composed equally of representatives of the trust institutions and the bar
associations, for the purpose of implementing and making effective the carrying out of these principles and the
amicable and cooperative solution of disputes or misunderstandings in relation thereto.
Id. For examples of this type of local implementation, see People ex rel. Comm. on Grievances v. Denver Clearing House
Banks, 99 Colo. 50, 52-53, 59 P.2d 468, 469 (1936) (referring to similar agreement between Denver banks and the
Denver bar); NEB. L. RE,. Comment, supra note 9, at 457 (quoting at length from a written agreement entered into
between the Hennepin County, Minnesota, Bar Association and the Minneapolis banks).
379. See Podgers, Statements of Principles-Are They On the Way Out?, 66 A.B.A.J. 129, 129-31 (1980). See also
Hyrne, supra note 368, at 669-73.
380. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a bar association
minimum fee schedule because it violated antitrust laws. Yet, in spite of predictions to the contrary, little has occurred in
the manner of determining fees for legal services rendered during probate. See Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees in the
Wake of Goldfarb, supra note 186, at 238-42. The resistance to change is likely to be even greater in the cooperative
agreements between trust institutions and practicing attorneys, which seem to have been highly beneficial for both groups.
381. See supra note 368.
382. 310 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1975).
383. Id. at 524. Actually, the attorney's father, who was also a lawyer, had drawn the testator's will, but after the
father's death, the younger attorney drew several codicils for the testator. Id.
384. Id.
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The individual coexecutor, however, wanted to employ another lawyer because of
her belief that the testator did not want the draftsman to serve as attorney for the
estate. Because of the intransigency of the two executors, a meeting was scheduled
between the various parties. During that meeting, the bank's president indicated
"that the bank had never varied from its policy of employing the attorney who had
drawn the will." 385 The parties finally agreed to a compromise whereby the attorney
who drew the will and a lawyer selected by the individual coexecutor would serve
jointly and split the fee. 38 6 In the aftermath, however, disciplinary proceedings were
brought against the attorney-draftsman for his conduct in improperly soliciting the
individual coexecutor, and he was reprimanded for his efforts to secure her agreement
to his employment as attorney for the estate.
387
The uniform policy of employing the drafting attorney to assist in probate would
be less objectionable if such action were in fact in furtherance of the testator's intent.
Although this may be the case if a will is silent on the matter, 388 it is unlikely,
considering that even when a will specifically contains an attorney designation, the
testator may not have intended it. 389 Certainly, the mere preparation of a person's
will does not give the scrivener a vested interest in the subsequent probate of that
individual's estate. 390 Yet, a general policy that mandates employment of the drafting
attorney, no matter how much sense that may make from a purely business stand-
point, is tantamont to vesting the draftsman with such a right.
C. Conflict in the Corporate Fiduciary's Obligations
From the standpoint of the trust institution, a number of interesting questions are
raised as a consequence of the pervasive practice of naming the lawyer who prepared
the will as attorney to assist in administration of the testator's estate. Because of its
fiduciary position, a corporate executor has a duty to carry out the testator's intent
and to act in the best interests of the estate and the various beneficiaries. 39' While
385. Id. at 525.
386. Id. As it turned out, the two attorneys apparently worked well together, and shared the fee, which amounted to
two percent of the decedent's estate. Id.
387. Id. at 526. One interesting aspect of the case is that the attorney in question, William J. Rielly, practiced
"almost exclusively" in Cincinnati, although he was also admitted in Kentucky. Id. at 525. Thus, without regard to any
personality differences that may have existed between the individual coexecutor and the attorney, there did seem to be
some valid basis for not retaining the lawyer who drafted the will in this case. Rielly attempted to overcome this problem
by retaining a lawyer from Covington, Kentucky, who would assist him in the probating of the estate in Kentucky. Id. The
other unusual facet of In re Rielly is that the individual coexecutor had previously brought a similar solicitation charge
against Rielly with the Cincinnati Bar Association, which exonerated Rielly of any improprieties. Id.
388. H. TwEaD & W. PARSONS, supra note 285, at 86; NEn. L. REv. Comment, supra note 9, at 457. Contra In re
Rielly, 310 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Ky. 1975) (coexecutor, who was testator's secretary, believed that testator did not want the
lawyer who drew his will to serve as attorney for his estate); Hyrne, supra note 368, at 671.
389. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972); Thayer v. Rock County Savings &
Trust Co. (In re Estate of Thayer), 41 Wis. 2d 55, 163 N.W.2d 142 (1968). Cf. Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of
Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976) (attorney's conduct in having himself and his father
named as coexecutors was unethical even though they had just been retained to draft testator's will).
390. See H. DtrItKER, supra note 9, at 94.
391. See Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 430-32, 170 P.2d 748, 753 (1946); E.
ToMtINsoN, supra note 188, §§ 3.1-3.11. See generally T. AnTINSON, supra note 139, at 561-628.
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these interests may conflict at times,392 generally this is not the case with regard to
employment of counsel. Here, the executor has a duty to retain competent counsel
who will provide independent legal advice. 393 If a number of attorneys in a particular
community are sufficiently qualified to provide such representation, then other fac-
tors like the cost of the legal services should be controlling. 394 For example, if a
competent lawyer is willing to provide legal assistance on behalf of an estate for a fee
of $6,000, while others would charge in the range of $10,000 for the same work, the
corporate fiduciary would appear to be under an obligation to retain the less ex-
pensive attorney and save $4,000 in fees, which would ultimately increase the
amount to be distributed to the beneficiaries of the estate. Thus, the automatic
retention of the draftsman, without exploring the possibility of employing other
counsel, seems to be inconsistent with the corporate executor's fiduciary
responsibilities.
D. Regulation Through Disciplinary Proceedings
Some aspects of this problem can and should be regulated through disciplinary
action against unethical attorney conduct. As one court has noted, "an attorney may
urge the selection of a corporate executor, who will be likely to reciprocate by
employing him as the attorney." 3 95 Although the temptations may be great, an
attorney should not attempt to persuade a client to name a corporate fiduciary in order
to secure probate business. 396 If a testator independently decides to designate a bank
as executor, it would clearly be the drafting attorney's responsibility to advise his or
her client of the policy of corporate fiduciaries to name the draftsman as attorney for
purposes of administering the estate.397 It is unfortunate, indeed, that neither the
current Code of Professional Responsibility nor the new Model Rules of Professional
Conduct contain any provisions that prohibit a lawyer from counseling a client to
designate a corporate fiduciary in order to secure appointment as attorney for the
392. See, e.g., E. TOMLINSON, supra note 188, at 49 (executor's duty to refrain from giving preference to one
beneficiary's interest over another's). See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563
(1976) (attorney named as executor and as beneficiary had interests conflicting with his duty to administer the estate in a
fair manner for the benefit of the other legatees); Jackson v. Conland, 178 Conn. 52, 420 A.2d 898 (1979) (conflict of
interest between trustee's duties toward trust beneficiaries and his duties as attorney for firm that represented the trust).
393. See, e.g., Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 430-32, 170 P.2d 748,753 (1946); In
re Longworth, 222 A.2d 561 (Me. 1966) (bank's analogous duty to recommend to estate planning customer an attorney
who will provide independent advice).
394. Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 430-32, 170 P.2d 748, 753 (1946); Cf.
Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Painter), 39 Colo. App. 506, 567 P.2d 820 (1977)
(reflecting greater cost-consciousness by courts and beneficiaries with regard to attorneys' and executors' fees). See
generally E. TOMLiNsoN, supra note 188, at 295-97.
395. Thayer v. Rock County Savings & Trust Co. (In re Estate of Thayer), 41 Wis. 2d 55, 63, 163 N.W.2d 142, 146
(1968).
396. Id. Since it is unethical for a draftsman to recommend or suggest inclusion of a clause naming himselfor herself
as attorney to probate the estate, a lawyer should not be able to accomplish the same thing indirectly, by recommending or
suggesting the appointment of a bank as executor, with the knowledge that the bank always selects the scrivener to provide
legal services to the estate. Cf. State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
397. See Role and Function of the Estate Lawyer, supra note 5, at 238.
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estate. 398 But even if a precise rule were adopted, it would be difficult to enforce
because of the many legitimate reasons for the selection of a bank to serve as
executor. 399
This creates a serious dilemma. If, as proposed, an all-inclusive ethical rule
were adopted that would preclude lawyers from preparing a will containing a clause
designating the draftsman to serve as attorney for the estate,4° ° nothing would prevent
the same practitioners from doing what others undoubtedly already do, and persuade
their clients to select a bank to serve as executor. In view of the widespread policy
among corporate fiduciaries of naming the draftsman as attorney for the estate, an
attorney, if so inclined, could readily achieve the same desired appointment as attor-
ney for the testator's estate without even the "appearance of impropriety" 40 that
would be inherent in a will specifically making such a designation. Accordingly,
enforcement of an ethical provision prohibiting the naming of an attorney in a will
would serve little purpose if the drafting lawyer could avoid the problem simply by
urging that a bank be named as executor. This alternative may not be quite as
attractive, however, in those jurisdictions in which attorneys' fees for probate work
are based on factors other than a percentage of the estate, 402 since a corporate
fiduciary, as opposed to most individual executors, is likely to perform more services
for the estate, thereby reducing the amount of work for the attorney.40 3
E. Statutory Provisions Governing Conduct of Corporate Fiduciaries
The extensive practice of corporate fiduciaries in retaining the services of the
attorney who prepared the will is virtually impossible to control through rules relating
to legal ethics, since the pertinent policy has been implemented by banks, which are
not subject to provisions intended to regulate the conduct of attorneys. The only
solution is the enactment of legislation that would govern the activity of banking
institutions as well ps members of the bar.
398. EC 5-6 provides, "A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or
lawyer in an instrument." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBIITY EC 5-6 (1983). Thus, it is certainly arguable
that it is implicit in EC 5-6 that a lawyer also should not "consciously influence" a client to name a bank as executor in
order to assure the lawyer's selection as attorney for the estate.
399. See S. KEss & B. WESTLtN, supra note 273, 235-36; 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS
form 8.39, comment (1983).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 354-67.
401. The "appearance of impropriety" has always been of grave concern in the estate planning context. Thus, EC
5-6 is written in terms of avoiding the "appearance of impropriety" when a lawyer draws a will in which he or she is
named as executor, trustee, or lawyer. MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-6 (1983). See also In Re
Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251, 253, 527 P.2d 510, 512 (1974) ("We are concerned not only with evil but the appearance of
evil as well."); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
805 (1979) ("The bench and bar are increasingly sensitive to the appearance of impropriety inherent in these situations.");
State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 332, 159 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1968) ("The subjective innocence of Jonn R. Collentine,
however, does not undo the damage he has done the legal profession."); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 123 N.W.2d
488,490 (1963) ("An attorney has a duty not to harm but to maintain the integrity of the legal profession even though this
may call for a personal sacrifice or the omission of acts which are not intrinsically bad.").
402. See, e.g., Wright v. Heron (In re Estate of Wright), 132 Ariz. 555, 647 P.2d 1153 (1982); Colorado State Bd.
of Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Painter), 39 Colo. App. 506, 567 P.2d 820 (1977); Ryan, Attorneys'
Fees and Other Matters, 16 REAL PROP. PRoB. & TR. J. 795, 795-98 (1981).
403. Eubank, supra note 290, at 223; A Bakers' Dozen Topics, supra note 180, at 245; Lawyers Serving As
Executors and Trustees, supra note 180, at 751-52.
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Long-standing legislation in Wisconsin, which apparently has only one counter-
part in other jurisdictions,40 4 offers a possible solution to the problems presented by
the prevalent practice of corporate executors in employing the services of draftsmen
to probate testators' estates. According to the Probate Code of Wisconsin:
Whenever a corporate fiduciary is appointed as the sole personal respresentative, the
person or persons receiving the majority interest from the estate may within 30 days after
the date of the appointment select the attorney who shall represent the personal representa-
tive in all proceedings of any kind or nature unless good cause is shown before the court
why selection should not be so made, or unless the testator's will names the attorney or
firm who shall represent the personal representative . ... 405
Originally enacted in 1913,406 Wisconsin adopted its statute to prevent a
monopoly of probate business in a few select lawyers.40 7 Under the legislation, the
principal beneficiaries of an estate generally control the employment of an attorney to
provide legal services, rather than the bank that, under the terms of a given will, has
been appointed as executor. It would seem, therefore, that in the early part of this
century, in Wisconsin at least, trust institutions did not have a policy of retaining the
services of the lawyer who drafted the will, but, instead, apparently used this oppor-
tunity to favor a few practitioners with whom the corporate fiduciaries had long-term
working relationships.4 0 8 This custom would obviously have been resented by other
lawyers who did not have an opportunity to compete for this business, and legislation
was enacted placing the selection of attorneys in the hands of the principal beneficiar-
404. Louisiana also has a statutory provision, which appears as part of its banking laws, that has a similar purpose
and effect: "The designation in any testament of an attorney for the succession, or the selection of an attorney by the
surviving spouse or heirs, is binding upon the bank [appointed as executor or administrator]." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
6:322(6) (West Supp. 1983). The first clause of the quoted provision simply serves as a statutory confirmation of the fact
that in Louisiana a designation in a will of an attorney to provide legal services to the estate is binding on the executor. See
supra note 310 and accompanying text. The portion of § 6:322(6) relating to the selection of an attorney appears to have
been the subject of litigation in only one case. In Succession of Stovall, 193 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct. App. 1966), the court
held that the testator's great-grandchildren, who were legatees under his will, were not "heirs" who would be entitled to
select the attorney for the executor. Thus, as interpreted, § 6:322(6) is more limited than the Wisconsin legislation because
it is only a "surviving spouse" or "heirs" who are named in a will that are entitled to participate in the selection of the
attorney, and, then, only if the will in question does not designate a legal representative, which appears to be common in
that jurisdiction.
405. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 856.31 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
406. Act of June 23, 1913, ch. 658, 1913 Wis. Laws 871.
407. See Sutherland v. Weinke (In re Estate of Ainsworth), 52 Wis. 2d 152, 158-59, 187 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1971);
Biart v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 191, 54 N.W.2d 175, 179-80 (1952); Comment, Wills-
Effect of Testamentary Designation of Counsel for the Executor, 31 MARQ. L. REv. 231, 236 (1947); Note, Wills-
Direction to Employ Certain Attorney for Probate, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 211, 214 (1952).
408. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "the statute was aimed to prevent the real, or fancied, evil of
corporations acting as executors playing favorites in selecting counsel, thus tending to create a monopoly in probate
business by such favorite counsel." Biart v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 191, 54 N.W.2d 175,
180 (1952). Apparently, some practitioners still have a concern about theclose working relationship between banks and a
few select lawyers. See Sussman, Cates & Smith, supra note 185, at 46.
Interestingly, while the Wisconsin statute dates back to 1913, its Louisiana counterpart, supra note 404, also has
lived a long life, having been enacted in 1902. Act of June 21, 1902, § 1, 1902 La. Acts 59, 59-61.
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ies. Although it has been revised a number of times in its seventy-year history, the
changes to this statute have been largely procedural,4 °9 and the basic provisions have
remained substantially the same.
4 10
F. A Proposed Statutory Provision to Counterbalance Bank "Policy"
Enactment of a statute to counterbalance the practices of corporate fiduciaries
would serve a purpose different from, but even more salutary than, that originally
served by the Wisconsin statute. Such legislation would effectively neutralize the
pervasive policy whereby trust institutions select attorneys who drafted the wills as a
quidpro quo for the designation of banks as executors. In fact, legislation is essential
due to the compelling business logic of the reciprocity underlying such "policy,"
since any milder form of restriction probably would not serve its purpose. 4 11 Accord-
ingly, if a statute were passed prohibiting corporate fiduciaries from selecting coun-
sel for the estate, trust institutions would be precluded from consistently employing
the draftsman of the will. The principal beneficiaries presumably would be inclined to
retain the attorney who prepared the testator's will, 412 but that propensity falls far
short of the ironclad policy presently followed by the banks in this country. Further-
more, since beneficiaries and not corporate fiduciaries would select the attorneys to
provide legal services in connection with estate administration, lawyers engaged in
estate planning would be motivated by factors other than self-interest in recommend-
ing that a bank serve as executor.
One of the major objections that could be raised about such a statutory provision
is that the executor would be deprived of the right to choose the individual who is to
serve as the fiduciary's attorney. Historically, the lawyer who is retained for purposes
409. Compare the original provisions of Act of June 23, 1913, ch. 658, 1913 Wis. Laws 871 with the latest revisions
in Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 233, § 3, 1973 Wis. Laws 717, 718-19 and Act of June 12, 1976, ch. 331, § 13, 1975 Wis.
Laws 955, 957.
410. Thus, in its original version the statute applied whenever a "firm or corporation" was named "administrator or
executor" of an estate, and the "nearest of kin who receive[d] any interest" in the estate or the person who otherwise
received "the largest amount or interest" from the estate named the attorney to represent the estate. However, the statute
did not apply if "good cause" was shown why that procedure should not be followed. Act of June 23, 1913, ch. 658,
1913 Wis. Laws 871. After the latest modification, the statute applies if a corporate fiduciary is appointed as the sole
personal representative, and if the "person or persons receiving the majority interest from the estate" selected the attorney
to represent the estate. Similarly, the statute does not apply if "good cause" is shown, or if "the testator's will names the
attorney or firm who shall represent the personal representative." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 856.31 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
The last clause, making the testator's selection of an attorney binding, is not quite as dramatic a change as it may first
appear to be, because this statutory modification is largely a codification of prior case law that had, at least in situations in
which the corporate fiduciary was willing to comply with the request, interpreted a testator's designation in a will as
mandatory. See Thayer v. Rock County Savings & Trust Co. (In re Estate of Thayer), 41 Wis. 2d 55, 163 N.W.2d 142
(1968); Biart v. Frst Nat'l Bank (In re Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952).
411. Despite withdrawal of the various Statements of Principles by local and national groups of trust institutions and
lawyers, it is obvious that the practice of corporate fiduciaries selecting the drafting attorney to represent the testator's
estate is so well established that its full force and effect will continue for years to come. See supra text accompanying
notes 368-80.
412. See J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8. In some circumstances the attorney-draftsman will be sufficiently familiar
with the testator's family and property holdings that he or she would be a logical choice to perform legal services on behalf
of the executor. NE. L. REv. Comment, supra note 9, at 457.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of probate administration has been viewed as representing the executor rather than the
estate or the beneficiaries of the estate.4 13 Similarly, the executor is considered liable
to third parties for the attorney's acts4 14 and responsible for payment to the attorney
for the services that he or she renders.4"5 Nevertheless, it is the devisees and legatees,
rather than the executor, that stand to benefit the most from the attorney's efforts. The
executor will generally be reimbursed by the estate for any liability to the attorney for
fees or to third parties for the attorney's actions.4 16 Therefore, it is the beneficiaries
who ultimately bear the burden of such expenses. The lawyer thus renders services
for the well-being of beneficiaries named in the will, and in a real sense the attorney
represents the interests of those beneficiaries. Taken in this context, it is not illogical
or improper for the will beneficiaries to be able to select the individual who is to serve
as attorney.
Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that selection by the beneficiaries would
impose an intolerable burden on a corporate fiduciary by requiring it to work closely
with someone not of its own choosing, when, under the dominant policy presently in
existence, a corporate executor does not have any real choice in the matter, since it
simply employs the attorney who drew the will to provide legal services for the
estate. If a bank can work effectively with any lawyer who happened to have prepared
a particular will, then it can work equally well with any lawyer retained by the
beneficiaries of the estate.
Individual executors, of course, would not be affected by legislation based on
the Wisconsin model, since it would apply only to situations in which a corporate
fiduciary has been named as executor.417 Thus, a person who has been designated as
executor would still be entitled to select the lawyer who would be retained to perform
legal services on behalf of the estate.4 18 The individuals who are most likely to be
named as executors are members of a testator's family, and they will hardly have an
automatic "policy" of employing the draftsman as attorney. Accordingly, the right
413. There is no such office or position known to the law as "Attorney of an Estate." When an attorney is
employed to render services in procuring the admission of a will to probate, or in settling the estate, he acts as
the attorney of the executor, and not of the estate ....
In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381, 385, 35 P. 900, 901 (1894). See also supra note 288.
414. See, e.g., Highfield v. Bozio, 188 Cal. 727, 207 P. 242 (1922); In re Estate of Ogier, 101 Cal. 381, 35 P. 900
(1894); In re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907); Laus v. Braasch (In re Braasch's Estate), 274 Wis. 569, 80
N.W.2d 759 (1957).
415. Coyle v. Velie Motors Corp., 305 111. App. 135, 27 N.E.2d 60 (1940); Lewis v. Morgan, 132 N.J. Eq. 343, 28
A.2d 215 (1942); Lachmund v. Moody (In re Lachmund's Estate), 179 Or. 420, 170 P.2d 748 (1946).
416. See T. ATKiNSON, supra note 139, at 654-55; E. TOMUNSON, supra note 188, §§ 20.3-1 to -2(a).
417. On its face, the statute applies only when a "corporate fiduciary" has been appointed as personal representa-
tive. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 856.31 (West Supp. 1982-83). The Louisiana statute similarly applies on its face when a bank is
an executor or administrator. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6:322(6) (West Supp. 1983). Thus, if the will is silent and if an
individual is named executor, then that person, and not the surviving spouse or heirs, is entitled to select the counsel that is
retained.
418. Several Wisconsin cases make it clear that when an individual is designated as executor, that person, and not
the desires of the testator or the beneficiaries under the will, is entitled to select the attorney. Sutherland v. Weinke (In re
Estate of Ainsworth), 52 Wis. 2d 152, 187 N.W.2d 828 (1971); Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re Sieben's Estate), 24
Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964).
[Vol. 45:57
1984] ETHICS OF COMMON ESTATE PLANNING PRACTICES 123
of such individuals to designate an attorney to assist in probate can hardly be consid-
ered contrary to the public interest.4 19
However, one provision in the Wisconsin legislation serves no legitimate pur-
pose, is inconsistent with sound public policy, and therefore should be omitted from
any statute giving estate beneficiaries, rather than the corporate fiduciary, the right to
select the attorney for the estate. Buried in the Wisconsin statute is language that
overrides the right of the beneficiaries to designate the lawyer when "the testator's
will names the attorney or firm who shall represent the personal representative. "420
This exception, which was first added to the statute in 1973,42' appears to be partly
attributable to an effort to incorporate the holdings of several cases that construed the
legislation422 and partly in retaliation for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1972 deci-
sion in State v. Gulbankian,4 23 which was highly critical of the practice of lawyers
who regularly prepare wills naming themselves as attorneys. Unfortunately, this
modification is an open invitation to lawyers in Wisconsin to draft wills providing for
their own retention. Moreover, since a statutory justification now exists for such a
will clause in Wisconsin, at least when a corporate executor is nominated, it will be
considerably more difficult for the courts in that state to conclude, as indicated in
Gulbankian, that inclusion of these provisions is unethical.42 4 If lawyers are not
ethically permitted to prepare wills in which they or their law firms are designated as
attorneys for the testator's estate, then, obviously, a statute should not be adopted
sanctioning such conduct in the context of a will naming a corporate executor.
Enactment of a statute along these proposed lines would prevent evasion of an
ethical rule prohibiting lawyers from drawing wills in which they are designated as
attorneys for testators' estates. This statute would effectively serve to preclude attor-
neys from recommending that a corporate executor be named in order to secure future
419. By contrast, the practice of corporate fiduciaries automatically employing the attorney who drafted the will that
named the bank as personal representative may be against public policy because it permits an attorney to secure his or her
own employment in the future by designating a bank as executor, without the testator having any inkling concerning the
consequences of the fiduciary appointment. In Pedrick v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 Wis. 436, 66 N.W.2d 154 (1954), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a contractual commitment that a bank would employ a particular attorney to probate
estates whenever a will drawn by that individual named the bank as executor was contrary to public policy. Distinguishing
the corporate fiduciary from an individual named as personal representative, the court pointed out that "[n]o such
concentration of the power of appointing attorneys is present when wills nominate individual executors." Id. at 440, 66
N.W.2d at 156.
Further, the retention of the draftsman as attorney to provide legal services to the estate may not be what the testator
had in mind when a decision was made to name a corporate rather than an individual executor. See Hyrne, supra note 368,
at 671. In the analogous situation presented in Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166 (1969),
the court held that the attorney's conduct so violated the spirit of the code of ethics that the bequest to the attorney-
draftsman was void as against public policy.
420. Wts. STAT. ANN. § 856.31 (West Supp. 1982-83).
421. Act of May 31, 1974, § 3, 1973 Wis. Laws 717, 718-19.
422. According to cases decided prior to the 1973 amendment, if the testator's will indicated a preference for a
particular attorney and if the corporate fiduciary designated in the will was willing to employ either the lawyer specified by
the testator or a different attorney selected by the beneficiaries, the testator's desires prevailed. Thayer v. Rock County
Savings & Trust Co. (In re Estate of Thayer), 41 Wis. 2d 55, 163 N.W.2d 142 (1968); Biart v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952).
423. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
424. Id. at 610-12, 196 N.W.2d at 736-37,
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business as a consequence of the widely adopted policy of employing the draftsman
as attorney for the estate. While such legislation would undoubtedly raise questions
concerning its construction and application, the experience in Wisconsin strongly
suggests that such issues can readily be resolved through judicial interpretation. 425
VI. ATTORNEY "SAFEKEEPING" OF CLIENTS' WILLS
Upon execution of a will, an important question is often raised - where should
the testator's will be kept?4 26 The original will should be placed in a safe location
where other persons who have a potential interest in the testator's estate will not have
access to it.427 If, for example, a will was kept in a desk at home, someone who
would stand to gain by intestacy might locate the will and mutilate or destroy it during
the testator's last illness or immediately after death." 28 If the original of a will is
traced to the testator's possession but cannot be located at death, there is a presump-
tion in a number of jurisdictions that the testator destroyed the will with the intention
of revoking it. 429 Similarly, if the original is found, but it has been torn up or
otherwise defaced in a manner consistent with the statutory requirements for revoca-
tion by physical act, then a presumption may arise that the testator intentionally
revoked the will prior to death."30 In view of the testator's death, it could be difficult
to overcome these presumptions in favor of a will's continuing validity.
A number of locations are generally recommended as safe places to keep the
original will, including the testator's own safe-deposit box, 3 1 the lockbox of a close
425. A number of cases have construed the provisions of § 856.31 of the Wisconsin Statutes. See, e.g., Sutherland
v. Weinke (In re Estate of Ainsworth), 52 Wis. 2d 152, 187 N.W.2d 828 (1971) (statute only applicable to corporate
fiduciaries; individual executor entitled to select counsel); Behr v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Behr), 42 Wis. 2d 72,
165 N.W.2d 394 (1969) (policy of bank never to serve as executor unless attorney who drafted will is employed to provide
legal services to estate does not constitute "good cause" to exempt bank from statutory requirements); Thayer v. Rock
County Savings & Trust Co. (In re Estate of Thayer), 41 Wis. 2d 55, 163 N.W.2d 142 (1968) (when corporate fiduciary
remains neutral, designation of attorney in will controls over desires of beneficiaries); Estate of Sieben v. Phillips (In re
Sieben's Estate), 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964) (will provision specifying an attorney not binding on individual
executor); Pedrick v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 Wis. 436, 66 N.W.2d 154 (1954) (agreement in advance that bank will always
employ specific attorney to probate estates in which it is named executor violates public policy reflected by § 856.31);
Biart v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952) (when corporate fiduciary has no
preference, provision in will specifying attorney governs over beneficiaries' desire to employ other counsel). As pre-
viously indicated (supra note 404), even though § 6:322(6) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes has been on the books for
over 80 years, apparently only one case has interpreted its terms regarding post-mortem selection of counsel. See
Succession of Stovall, 193 So. 2d 368 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
426. See, e.g., C. LYMAN supra note I, at 127; Herman, supra note I, at 50, col. 1.
427. See Mimms v. Hunt, 458 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Ky. 1970); Heaverne v. Burleigh (In re Heaverne's Estate), 118
Or. 308, 314-15, 246 P. 720, 722 (1926); W. CASEY, FORMS OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FAMILY AGREEMENTS WITH TAX
IDEAS 596 (1963); 1 A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143.
428. See Herman, supra note 1, at 50, col. I. Also, since an original will kept in the testator's desk could be
destroyed by a fire, a will kept at home should be placed in a fireproof receptacle like a safe. C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at
127.
429. See 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 26, at § 29.139; T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 442-43. See also Mimms
v. Hunt, 458 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1970); Ferguson v. Billups, 244 Ky. 85, 50 S.W.2d 35 (1932); Coghlin v. White, 273
Mass. 53, 172 N.E. 786 (1930).
430. See 3 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 26, at § 29.140; T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 442. See also Porch v.
Farmer, 158 Ga. 55, 122 S.E. 557 (1924); In re Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111, 65 N.E.2d 433 (1946); Bonner v. Borst (In re
Will of Bonner), 17 N.Y.2d 9, 214 N.E.2d 154, 266 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1966); Dawley v. Congden, 42 R.I. 58, 105 A. 393
(1919).
431. See 1 A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143; W. CLAY, THE Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE ro ESTATE PLANNING 85
(1976); R. LYNN, supra note 3, at 102.
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relative,432 in the possession of the corporate fiduciary named in the will as trustee or
executor,433 or on file with the county clerk in those states that have a statutory
provision for the maintenance of wills during testators' lifetimes.4 34 Another popular
alternative is for the testator to leave the will with the lawyer who prepared it.
Because it is a common practice for attorneys engaged in estate planning to serve as
custodians for wills they have drafted, these attorneys either maintain a safe-deposit
box in a bank for this purpose or file the original documents in a safe or vault located
in their offices.435
A. Attorneys' Motivations in Serving as Custodians
Undoubtedly, attorneys provide this free service to their clients for a variety of
reasons. One possibility is the desire of attorneys, without ulterior motive, to help
their clients avoid the dangers associated with retention of a will in their homes.4 36
This service-oriented explanation is more plausible when the attorney has a continu-
ing relationship with the testator than when preparation of the will was an isolated
transaction, with little likelihood that the testator will be a source of additional
business. Moreover, the prevailing fee structure for estate planning work raises a
substantial question about the existence of these altruistic motives. Although con-
siderable discussion has occurred during the last decade or two about charging for
estate planning services on a straight hourly rate basis,4 37 the fact remains that such
work is still undertaken largely for fixed fees significantly below what lawyers charge
432. C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 127. Of course, a relative who would also be an heir would not make a good
custodian unless that person stood to gain by the provisions of the will. Moreover, the testator might find it difficult to ask
such a relative for the original will if he or she wanted to make a new will. Under the circumstances, it might be better to
find another place to keep the original, but to tell the close relative where the original is located (e.g., in the testator's
safe-deposit box). See L. DIXON, WILLS, DATH AND TAXES 38 (rev. ed. 1977).
433. W. CASEY, supra note 427, at 596; 1 A. CAsN.R, supra note 4, at 143; C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 127. Even
if the executor-designate was an individual, that person might also be an appropriate custodian of a will. The testator,
however, still might be hesitant to ask such an individual to give the will back. Although a testator might also be hesitant
along these same lines if a corporate fiduciary had possession of the original will, that concern does not seem nearly as
great as in the case of an individual.
434. See I A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143; L. DIXON, supra note 432, at 38; R. LY'NN, supra note 3, at 102.
435. See J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8; A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143; C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 127. The
ethical propriety of attorney safekeeping of clients' wills has been directly questioned in only one reported case. State v.
Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 611, 196 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1972). This common practice, however, has been noted in
passing in a number of decisions. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nelson, 232 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); In re
Estate of Ankeny, 238 Iowa 754, 758-59, 762, 28 N.W.2d 414, 416, 418 (1947); Heaveme v. Burleigh, (In re
Heaveme's Estate), 118 Or. 308, 314-15,246 P. 720,722 (1926); Nelson v. First Northwestern Trust Co. (In re Estate of
Nelson), 274 N.W.2d 584, 589 (S.D. 1978). In addition, questions about various aspects of attorney safekeeping of wills
has been a frequent topic of state ethics opinions. See Opinion No. 76-6 (Ariz. June 3, 1976), reported in MAR. 1980
supra note 12, at 37, No. 10415; Opinion No. 76-7, 61 MASS. L.Q. 119 (1976); Opinion No. 71-6 (Neb.), reported in
MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 270, No. 8735; Opinion No. 341,46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 460 (1974); Opinion No. CPR-52 (July
18, 1975), 22 N.C.B. 24, reported in MANu 1980, supra note 12, at 441, No. 12303; Opinion No. 3343, 37 OR. ST. B.
BULL. (Special Insert, Oct. 1976); Opinion No. 103, WASH. ST. B. 115 (Apr. 1962), reported in 0. MARU & R.
Ct.oUH, supra note 345, at 506, No. 4621; Opinion No. 22-1973,47 Wis. B. BULL. 29 (Supp. Dec. 1974), reported in
MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 499, No. 10176.
436. See, e.g., Heaverne v. Burleigh (In re Heaveme's Estate), 118 Or. 308, 314-15, 246 P. 720, 722 (1926);
Johnson, supra note 1, at 53.
437. See, e.g., Meyer, An Approach to the Question of Fees in Estate Planning, 2 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 68.400, at
4-22 to -24 (1968); Wormser, Charging For Estate Planning-Methods and Problems, 10 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 800,
810 (1976); A Bakers' Dozen Topics, supra note 180, at 243-44.
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for comparable work involving the same time, skill, and effort. 4 38 Since most prac-
titioners are inadequately compensated for their work in preparing wills, trusts, and
related documents, it seems unlikely that these same lawyers would be interested in
serving as custodians, without charge, simply to provide a service to their clients.
Other factors unquestionably play a significant role in the willingness of prac-
titioners to take custody of original wills for their clients. An attorney who has
prepared a client's will and is safekeeping that document is more likely to be retained
by that testator when the will needs to be modified than if the client has possession of
the original. 439 Retention of original wills, therefore, can enhance a lawyer's future
estate planning practice. Serving as custodian of the original will is also seen as a way
of maintaining with the testator a continuing relationship that might lead to other,
more profitable legal business. 44°
The fact that the attorney-draftsman has the original will in his or her possession,
rather than just a file copy, may impose an obligation on the attorney to contact
clients or former clients44 1 regarding review and revision of wills necessitated by
changes in the tax laws, the economy, or family relationships. 442 For example, the
vast modifications in the Federal Estate and Gift Tax laws brought about by the Tax
Reform Act of 197644' and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981"4 caused estate
planners throughout the country to review their records and contact clients for whom
they had prepared wills and trusts about the possible need to overhaul these docu-
ments because of the substantial alterations in the tax laws. 445 The amount of work
438. See, e.g., Eubank, supra note 290, at 231; Kram, supra note 3, at 493; Sussman, Cates & Smith, supra note
185, at 43-45. Wormser, supra note 437, at 804; Louisville Courier Journal, Sept. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 5 (survey of fees
charged by 1,000 attorneys in Jefferson County, Ky., including fees for wills) [hereinafter cited as Jefferson County
Survey].
439. Accord Opinion No. CPR-52 (July 18, 1975), 22 N.C.B. No.3, 1975, at 24, reported in MARu 1980, supra
note 12, at 441, No. 12303; cf. Cantwell, Estate Planning Economics: Getting a Client, Doing the Work, and Getting
Paid, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 2000, 2001.3 (1980).
440. Cf. Cantwell, supra note 439, 2001.3; McCabe, The Lawyer As Target: Today's Client Is Tomorrow's
Plaintiff, 48 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 525, 537-38 (1977).
441. Although the attorney-client relationship may technically have terminated when the testator executed the will,
if a sufficient nexus exists between the parties, the attorney may be required to bring to the attention of the testator matters
such as changes in the law. See generally Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times Ahead for the
Practitioner, 67 IOwA L. Rv. 629, 654-58 (1982). Furthermore, the failure of an attorney to keep a testator advised
could result in liability for malpractice. Id.
442. A number of ethics opinions indicate that an attorney may have a "duty" to contact the testator periodically to
discuss changes in the law. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 210 (1941); Informal
Opinion No. 195, 57 MicH. ST. B.J. 316 (Special Issue, Feb. 1978), reported in MARU 1980 supra note 12, at 294, No.
11572; Opinion No. 188 (April 28, 1971), 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 56 (1972); Opinion No. 554 (Nov. 6, 1940), OPINIONS OF
THE COMMrrEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETics OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AND THE N.Y. CouNTY LAWYERS'
ASSOCIATION 311 (1956); Opinion No. 231 (N.Y. County June 17, 1932), id. at 114; Opinion No. 813, N.C. ST. B.
11-255, reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 417, No. 9564; Advisory Opinion No. 209, 32 OKLA. B.J. 1570
(1961); Tulsa County Ethics Opinion, TULSA LAW., Sept. 1970, at 6. This "duty" may be even clearer when the attorney
has custody of the original will. See Opinion No. CPR-52, 22 N.C.B., No. 3, 1975, at 24, reported in MARU 1980, supra
note 12, at 441, No. 12303; cf. Opinion No. 76-7, 61 MAss. L.Q. 119 (1976); Opinion No. 334, 37 OR. ST. B. BuLL.,
(Special Insert, Oct. 1976). But see Opinion No. 39 (Miss. June 2, 1977), reported in MARI) 1980, supra note 12, at 318,
No. 11735, in which the committee took the position that preparation of a will was a single act of representation which
placed no obligation on the draftsman to notify the testator of any changes in the law. The committee went on to hold that
even though an attorney was under no duty to do so, he or she could choose to notify testators of any changes.
443. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
444. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
445. See, e.g., Bissell, Malpractice Insurance Coverage for Members of the Estate Planning Team, I I INST. ON
EST. PLAN. 200, 211 (1977); Wormser, supra note 437, 816.
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required as a consequence of these changes was viewed by some lawyers in large,
established firms as a Herculean task that they undertook reluctantly, 446 but for many
lawyers trying to expand their estate planning practices the "duty" to contact clients
and advise them of the desirability of reviewing their estate plans was more of a
benefit than a burden.' 7 In the event that revisions of the tax laws or other compar-
able changes resulted in the need for a new will or trust, the likelihood of a client
returning to the attorney who initially drafted these documents would be considerably
greater if the attorney had custody of the original instrument. While it would not be
necessary to take the original of a will, rather than a copy, to a new lawyer for
revision, the testator might not know this, and he or she might therefore be reluctant
to ask the attorney who drafted the will and was holding it for safekeeping to return
the original so that the testator could take it to another practitioner for mod-
ification. 4
48
An estate planning practitioner is also motivated to serve as custodian for a
newly executed will because possession of the will undoubtedly enhances the chances
of his or her employment after the testator's death. 449 In the event that the attorney is
aware of the client's demise, he or she will typically contact the executor-designate in
order to notify that person or entity of the attorney's possession of the original will.45 0
The executor named in the will, or a close family member, might also call the lawyer
soon after the testator's death to inquire about the original will in order to initiate
probate.45 In either case, the chances of employment are increased because the
attorney-draftsman has the original will; this provides a unique opportunity for an
early face-to-face meeting with the executor or close relative during which the lawyer
can explain the probate process, describe the legal services that will be necessary, and
offer to provide those services.4 5 2 Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for
the executor to hire another attorney, and the safekeeping has served its purpose. In
practice, the process works so well that one commentator has described the employ-
ment of the draftsman-custodian as "almost automatic.", 453
B. Ethical Problems in the "Safekeeping" of Wills
Because safekeeping is a potent device in ensuring subsequent employment, it
raises a number of ethical concerns. By offering to keep the original will, the
446. See Cantwell, supra note 439, 2001.3.
447. Id.; McCabe, supra note 440, a( 537-38.
448. See C. LYIAN, supra note 1, at 127.
449. See State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972); J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8; Johnson,
supra note I, at 53.
450. See, e.g., Opinion No. 76-7, reported in 61 MASS. L.Q. 119 (1976).
451. Cf. Opinion No. 341,46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 460 (1974) (law finn acting as will custodian need not inform client of
attorney-drafter's retirement, as long as client is aware of the partnership).
452. See J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8; cf. In re Rielly, 310 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1957), supra text accompanying notes
382-87. Although the attorney-draftsman in In re Rielly was held to have improperly solicited an executor for appoint-
ment as attorney for the estate, it is unlikely that such conduct would result in discipline today. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) and Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568
S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978). Furthermore, in In re Rielly the attorney-draftsman had a weaker basis for contacting the
executor than if he had custody of the will needed to initiate the probate process.
453. J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8.
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attorney-draftsman has in effect engaged in solicitation and used the attorney-client
relationship to further his or her own self-interest. This conduct may appear rather
mild by comparison to the sort of in-person solicitation that is reflected in decisions
such as Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,4 54 but at least the prospective clients
in Ohralik were generally aware of the purpose of the attorney's contacts and there-
fore were arguably in a better position to protect their own interests. 455 It is the
subtlety of the safekeeper's solicitation that creates the real problem. A client who
has just executed a will and is advised by the draftsman of the advantages of leaving it
at the attorney's office can hardly be expected to comprehend the consequences of
this offer in terms of the attorney's desire to secure additional legal business in the
future.
The tendency to overreach in such situations is largely the product of a dilemma
that estate planning practitioners have themselves created. Attorneys engaged in such
work typically undercharge for their services,45 6 and find it necessary to adopt
questionable practices to increase the likelihood of their subsequent employment to
probate the estate when substantial fees can be and often are earned.457 Presumably,
if estate planning was made more profitable at the outset, there would be less need to
rely on employment after the testator's death to justify the "loss leader" approach,458
and less dependence on questionable practices like the safekeeping of wills. Yet,
there are few indications of any significant changes in the manner in which fees are
charged for estate planning work, 459 and thus it is unlikely that this predicament will
be resolved short of vigorous enforcement of ethical standards that prohibit these
self-serving improprieties.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility contains specific language
concerning the ethical questions raised when a lawyer drafts a will in which he or she
is named as executor or attorney for the estate, 46 no comparable section deals with
the ethical aspects of the attorney-draftsman who serves as custodian for clients'
454. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
455. It is true, of course, that the lawyer's in-person solicitation in Ohralik was inexcusable, particularly since the
prospective clients were only 18 years old. Id. at 449-52. Although the prospective clients may not have been capable of
making informed judgments, they apparently were aware that Ohralik wanted to represent them in any claims arising out
of their automobile accident. Id. Although one of the prospective clients said that "she really did not understand what was
going on" when the attorney visited her, she had enough comprehension to report to her mother, who tried to repudiate
her daughter's consent the following day. Id. at 451-52.
456. See supra note 438.
457. See generally P. STERN, supra note 185, at 34-38; Kabaker, supra note 185, at 577-86; Fiduciary and Probate
Counsel Fees in the Wake of Goldfarb, supra note 186. It is interesting to note how the courts have responded to
complaints about the large fees that attorneys earn for probate work. Compare Bank of America v. Koslow (In re Estate of
Effron), 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 173 Cal. Rptr. 93, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981) with Colorado State Bd. of
Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Estate of Painter), 39 Colo. App. 506, 567 P.2d 820 (1977).
458. See Cantwell, supra note 439, 2004 n.26; Sussman, Kates & Smith, supra note 185, at 43-45; Wornser,
supra note 437, T 804.
459. See, e.g., Cantwell, supra note 439, 2004 n.26; Wormser, supra note 437, T 801, at 8-3, 8-4; Jefferson
County Survey, supra note 438.
460. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983). The new Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, however, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1983, do not cover the ethical problems involved
when a lawyer draftsman is named as executor or attorney in a will that he or she has drafted. See MODEL RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Legal Background, Rule 1.8(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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wills. Nor, for that matter, do the newly adopted Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct contain any provision on safekeeping of wills. Although specific treatment
would benefit the profession by providing notice to those attorneys who might other-
wise act improperly or by furnishing explicit guidelines to those who seek to stay
within ethical bounds, this does not mean that the conduct in question is not circum-
scribed by broad provisions relating to conflicts of interest and improper
solicitation. 46 1 Even under the general terms of the original Canons of Professional
Ethics, which were in effect from 1908 through 1969, an attorney's conduct in
keeping a client's will in his or her office was considered subject to certain ethical
restraints.462
State v. Gulbankian463 appears to be the only reported decision that has de-
nounced the widespread practice of attorney-safekeeping of client's wills. In addition
to condemning attorneys' conduct in consistently preparing wills in which the drafts-
men name themselves as executors or attorneys for the estate,464 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was critical of the practice of retaining original wills:
Nor do we approve of attorneys' "safekeeping" wills. In the old days this may have been
explained on the ground many people did not have a safe place to keep their valuable
papers, but there is little justification today because most people do have safekeeping
boxes, and if not, sec. 853.09, Stats., provides for the deposit of a will with the register in
probate for safekeeping during the lifetime of the testator. The correct practice is that the
original will should be delivered to the testator and should only be kept by the attorney
upon specific unsolicited request of the client.465
By contrast, a number of ethics opinions deal specifically with safekeeping of
testators' wills. 4 6 6 The general theme that the various opinions adopt is that the
practice of providing this type of custodial service is permissible if the testator has
expressly requested that the attorney keep the original will.4 67 But if the drafting
attorney initially offers to furnish this service, the conduct is considered unethical. 468
461. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A), 5-101(A) (1983); MODEL. RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUcr Rules 1.7, 1.8(a), 7.3 (1983). By way of analogy, attorneys were disciplined under the general
provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were in effect from 1908 until 1970) for, inter alia, the preparation
of a will in which they were named as beneficiaries, even though no specific ethical rule condemned such conduct. See,
e.g., State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957); In re Kneeland, 233 Or. 241, 377 P.2d 861 (1963); State v.
Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
462. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972) (disciplinary action covering
attorneys' conduct from 1955 to 1971); Opinion No. 103 (Wash. Apr. 1963), reported in MARU & CLOUGH, supra note
345, at 506, No. 462; Opinion No. 280 (Tex.) reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 352 (1966).
463. 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972).
464. Id. at 610-11, 196 N.W.2d at 736-37.
465. Id. at 611-12, 196 N.W.2d at 736.
466. See supra note 435 (listing state ethics opinions dealing with attorney safekeeping of clients' wills).
467. See, e.g., Opinion No. 76-6 (Ariz. June 3, 1976), reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at 37, No. 10415;
Opinion No. CPR-52, 22 N.C.B. No. 3,1975, at 24, reported in MARU 1980, supra note 12, at441, No. 12303; Opinion
No. 103 (Apr. 1962), WASH. ST. B. 115, reported in MARu & CLOUGH, supra note 345, at 506, No. 4621.
468. See, e.g., Opinion No. 22-1973, 47 Wis. B. BULL. 29 (Supp. Dec. 1974), reported in MARU 1975, supra note
12, at 499, No. 10176. But see Opinion No. 71-6 (Neb.), reported in MARU 1975, supra note 12, at 270, No. 8735,
(attorney-draftsman could serve as custodian of a will if the safekeeping was done either at the client's request or with the
client's permission).
An interesting ethics opinion issued by the Texas bar, in March 1964, found it unethical for the drafting attorney to
include a clause providing that the will was to be executed in duplicate and that one of the originals was being retained by
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Although the difference may seem reasonable on the surface, it again creates the
quandary of attempting to determine whether the testator or the attorney initiated the
discussion about maintaining custody of the will, after the testator has died and is no
longer able to shed any light on this question. 469 Because of the difficulty of resolving
this issue, any effective ethical rule governing the safekeeping of wills should not be
based on such a nebulous distinction. Nevertheless, it is important to restrain attorney
practices in this area because of the serious ethical problems inherent in such activity.
C. Alternatives to Attorney's "Safekeeping" of Wills
Before attempting to proscribe rules regulating attorney conduct in this area, the
benefits to the client of having the draftsman retain the original will should be
balanced against the ethical concerns. There are, of course, certain advantages in
having the attorney serve as custodian, principally because this practice precludes the
testator's retention of the will in an unsafe place where it might be subject to the
whims and caprices of disgruntled heirs and beneficiaries.47 Thus, leaving the origi-
nal with the attorney-draftsman serves little purpose that cannot be achieved equally
well through some alternative form of safekeeping that does not raise the same ethical
questions of solicitation and self-dealing. The attorney should, of course, be certain
to retain a copy of the client's will in the office files, so that it can be reviewed
periodically to determine if a new will or codicil is necessary or desirable"7' and in
order to assist in the probate of a client's will in the event that the original cannot be
the draftsman. Opinion No. 280 (Tex.) reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. Rev. 352 (1966). According to the ethics committee:
It is difficult to conceive of any good reason for a lawyer to include this paragraph in a will he has written. If the
typed-original is available to one interested in the estate, it is unnecessary to know where the duplicate-original
is. If the typed-original is lost or misplaced, the information in it regarding the location of the duplicate-original
is also lost and does not aid in locating the duplicate-original. The most likely reason for a lawyer's using such a
paragraph is to solicit the probate of the estate. The use of the statement violates Canon 24.
Id. It would be interesting to know how that same ethics committee would have reacted if a similar notation was included
in the only original, retained by the drafting attorney, with a number of conformed photocopies provided to the testator.
The notation would then have served a purpose, helping locate the original after the testator's death, but the solicitation
motive would be just as apparent. Yet, if such a will clause were deemed ethically improper, it would seem that
safekeeping of the will by the drafting attorney, without more, should similarly be deemed unethical. No ethics committee
opinion has ever suggested that such safekeeping, per se, constitutes improper or questionable conduct. Even the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972), which was highly
critical of attorneys' safekeeping of wills, stopped far short of total condemnation of that practice. The court stated that it
was proper for the drafting attorney to retain the original will if it was the result of a "specific unsolicited request of the
client." Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 736.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18, 40-41, 52-53, 129-31 (draftsman-beneficiary); supra text
accompanying note 200 (draftsman named as executor); supra text accompanying notes 294-96 (lawyer who prepared will
in which he or she is named as attorney to assist in probate of the will).
470. See Mimms v. Hunt, 458 S.W.2d 759,759-60 (Ky. 1970); Bonner v. Borst (In re Will ofBonner), 17 N.Y.2d
9,214 N.E.2d 154, 266 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1966); Heaverne v. Burleigh (In re Heaverne's Estate), 118 Or. 308,314-15,246
P. 720, 722 (1926); C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 127 (danger of inadvertent destruction of original will when kept in
testator's home); Herman, supra note 1, at 50, col. 1.
471. See generally T. ArTrrNSON, supra note 139, at 354; C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 128-29; R. LYNN', supra note
3, at 102; Cantwell, supra note 439, 2001.3.
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located after the testator's death.472 But in either event, retention of a conformed
copy will serve the client's purposes.
473
As an alternative to leaving the original with the attorney who drafted it, the
testator might keep the will in his or her own safe-deposit box. 4 7 4 Testators are often
concerned about such a location for their wills because of the procedure in many
jurisdictions of sealing safe-deposit boxes until a state inheritance tax official has
inventoried the contents. Lawyers have presumably added their warnings along these
lines as an inducement to clients to leave their original wills with them for
safekeeping. 475 This drawback, however, has been greatly over-emphasized. In real-
ity, there is usually little delay in making arrangements to obtain the original will
from the decedent's box.476 Furthermore, if a conformed copy is readily available,
there is generally no need to have access to the original will immediately upon the
testator's death.4 77
If the sealing of safe-deposit boxes presents a substantial problem in a particular
jurisdiction, the testator can make arrangements to have the original placed in a
relative's box.478 For example, a husband might keep his wife's will in a box reg-
istered in his name, and she could keep her husband's will in her box. Also, a testator
who has designated a corporate fiduciary to serve as trustee or executor may prefer to
leave the original with the bank, which will often provide a safekeeping service when
it has been named to serve in a fiduciary capacity. 479 Although some disadvantages
may exist in leaving an original will with a corporate fiduciary under these circum-
stances, it is a better practice than having the draftsman retain the original for
safekeeping.4
80
Another appropriate course of conduct is to file the original will with a county
clerk in those jurisdictions that have statutes authorizing such safekeeping.4 81 Even
472. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 354, 506-13.
473. A copy of the will is conformed if it has been clearly marked as a "copy," with the date and the names of the
testator and witnesses inserted, preferably typed rather than printed or handwritten (e.g., Isl Thomas T. Testator; Isl Wilma
W. Witness). T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 354. See also I A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143; C. LYMAN, supra note I,
at 128-29. In W. CAsEY, supra note 427, at 596, it is recommended that copies of the will be conformed at the time of
execution, to prevent the testator from inadvertently signing a blank copy at a later date. This advice is particularly
valuable at the present time, since the quality of photocopies is now so good that it is often hard to tell them from original
documents.
474. See supra note 431.
475. See generally W. CASEY, supra note 427, at 596; 1 A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143 n.14; C. LYMAN, supra
note 1, at 128; Herman, supra note I, at 50, col. 1.
476. See, e.g., I A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 143 n. 14.
477. If the original will can be obtained from the testator's box within a week or two of the date of death, it can then
be filed for probate without unduly delaying the process of estate administration. Some information, such as the name of
the executor-designate, might be useful immediately upon the testator's death, but a readily available conformed copy of
the will would serve this purpose. See supra note 473 (discussing conformed copies of wills).
478. See supra note 432.
479. See supra note 433.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 426-29; supra notes 432-33.
481. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 139, at 354, 485; A. CAsNER, supra note 4, at 143 n. 14; L. DIxoN, supra note
432, at 38; R. LYNN, supra note 3, at 102.
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though a number of states have enacted these statutes,482 such custodial services are
not well known and therefore are not utilized to the extent they should be.483 When
this alternative is available every estate planner should make it a practice to advise his
or her clients of this service and recommend that they consider leaving the original of
their wills at the county clerk's office.
4 8 4
Wherever the original is placed, the testator should also keep at least one con-
formed copy in his or her home. A notation should be placed on the front of the copy
specifying the exact location of the original, so that the executor-designate or some
appropriate family member will know where to find the will in order to file it for
probate.4 85 Moreover, the practice of leaving the original will at the lawyer's office
for safekeeping has at least several drawbacks in addition to the ethical concerns it
raises. It is possible that the drafting lawyer may predecease the testator, retire,
change law firms, or otherwise turn his or her practice over to some other attorney or
attorneys.48 6 If advised of this event the testator might want to reclaim the original
and place it somewhere else for safekeeping. 487 Otherwise, on the testator's death the
lawyer who happens to have custody of the will at that time is likely to be retained to
assist the executor in administration of the estate, even though that attorney did not
prepare the will or provide other legal services to the testator.488 These problems can
be avoided if the original will is kept in a safe deposit box in the testator's name, left
in a box in the name of one of the testator's relatives, or filed with the local county
court.
The safekeeping of a client's will can also have disadvantages from an attorney's
standpoint. For example, it is possible that such safekeeping can increase an attor-
ney's obligation to keep estate planning clients advised of changes in the law that
might have an impact on their estate plans. 489 The failure to notify a client of such a
change could result in a malpractice claim if the testator did not revise his or her will
482. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.110 (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, §§ 10-12 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1981); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 700.142 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-901 (1978).
483. See W. CASEY, supra note 427, at 596.
484. Like other safekeeping alternatives, filing the original will with the county clerk's office poses a few risks. For
example, the depositing of a will for safekeeping with a clerk's office in a particular county can affect the appropriate
place for administration of the estate. See Widdowson v. Hergenreter (In re Morgan's Estate), 188 Kan. 84, 360 P.2d
1077 (1961) (court holds that the county where the original will was on file had priority over another county in the same
state in determining the proper jurisdiction for probate).
485. Notation of the location of the original will can serve a useful purpose in certain circumstances. For instance,
the filing of an original will with the county clerk's office is not a widely utilized practice, even though authorized by
statute. Thus, after the testator's death, the heirs or executor-designate could easily overlook such a location in their search
for the original will. This problem could be avoided if the conformed copies contain a notation of the location of the
original.
486. See, e.g., Opinion No. 76-7, 61 MASS. L.Q. 119 (1976); Opinion No. 341, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 460 (1974);
Opinion No. 334, 37 OR. ST. B. BULL. (Special Insert, Oct. 1976).
487. Opinion No. 341, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 460 (1974); Opinion No. 103 (Apr. 1962), WAsH. ST. B. 115, reported in
MARU & CLOUGH, supra note 345, at 506, No. 4621. One author has expressed concern that after the death of the
draftsman-custodian, the will may fall into the hands of other lawyers notwithstanding the testator's desire to limit access
to the personal matters contained in the will. C. LYMAN, supra note 1, at 127-28.
488. Opinion No. 76-7, 61 MASs. L.Q. 119 (1976); J. BARNES, supra note 1, at 8. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 439-53 (regarding the advantages of retaining custody of the original will).
489. See supra notes 441-42.
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to take into account any relevant amendments to the tax laws. 490 It is also possible
that safekeeping might, by itself, increase the drafting attorney's malpractice expo-
sure, since the statute of limitations on any mistake or error in a will might be tolled
during the time that the document is in the custody of the draftsman.
49 1
D. Prohibition of Attorney "Safekeeping"
When the serious ethical questions raised in the draftsman-safekeeping situation
are contrasted with the fact that the benefits to clients of such custodial services can
be readily achieved through any one of several alternatives, it becomes apparent that
the best and most effective ethical rule is one based on an outright prohibition of such
attorney practices. The other logical choice, attempting to determine whether the
drafting attorney or the testator requested the safekeeping, is simply too elusive to be
meaningful or effective. Further, it is unlikely that a client, without being prompted
in any manner, would initiate a discussion and ask the attorney to keep the original
will in his or her office.4 92
VII. USE AND ABUSE OF SELF-PROVING WILLS
Although self-proved wills were authorized by statute as long ago as 1953, 493
the real impetus for the adoption of such legislation came from the inclusion of
self-proving provisions in the Uniform Probate Code, which was approved by the
National Conference on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in
1969.494 At present, at least 30 states have enacted legislation sanctioning self-proved
wills. 4 9 5 Such statutes permit "proof" of proper execution and attestation of a will in
advance by having the testator and the witnesses appear before a notary public, either
as part of the will execution ceremony or at some subsequent time, to acknowledge
their signatures. 496 Upon death of the testator, a self-proved will can be admitted to
probate without the necessity of having the witnesses testify as to the will's execu-
490. See generally Johnston, supra note 441, at 655-57.
491. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 51.
492. Cf. State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 612, 196 N.W.2d 733, 736-37 (1972) (Wisconsin Supreme Court
expresses considerable skepticism about the number of times that a testator might actually initiate a request that the
draftsman serve as executor or attorney for the estate).
493. NEv. REv. STAT. § 133.050 (1979). Although the first self-proving will statute was enacted in Nevada in 1953,
similar legislation was passed in 1955 in Arkansas and Texas. See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 60-417 (1971) and TEx. PRoB.
CoDE ANN. § 59 (1980). For a listing of legislation authorizing self-proved wills, see Schneider, Self-Proved Wills-A
Trap for the Wary, 8 N. Ky. L. R-v. 539, 539-43 (1981).
494. See UNiF. PROB. CODE Historical Note & § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 1, 111-14 (1983).
495. See Schneider, supra note 493, at 539 n.4 for a list of the jurisdictions which have enacted self-proving will
statutes. Included among these jurisdictions are the 14 states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code-Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Utah. In addition, another ten states have statutory provisions that allow proof of a will by affidavit in certain
;ituaitons. Id.
496. UNIF. Paoa. CODE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 111 (1983). Section 2-504(a) provides for simultaneous execution,
ttestation, and self-proving. Section 2-504(b) authorizes the self-proving of a will by affidavit of the testator and
'itnesses after the will's execution and attestation. See infra text accompanying notes 499-507.
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tion, thus simplifying the initiation of the estate administration process. 497 This can
prove particularly useful if the witnesses are deceased, if they are out of the jurisdic-
tion, or if they can not otherwise be located upon the testator's death. 498
As originally proposed, self-proving required two separate steps. The first was
execution and attestation of a will, following the same procedure that would have
been utilized had there been no self-proving provisions; the second required the
appearance of the testator and witnesses before a notary public for execution of a
self-proving affidavit to be appended at the end of the will.49 9 Even if a notary was
present at the will execution ceremonies, the legislation still anticipated a two-step
procedure. 500 In a number of cases the statutory procedures were not precisely fol-
497. Although the legal effect of a self-proving affidavit can vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, even
those states that have limited such legislation agree that the provisions dispense with the necessity of witnesses' testimony
at the initiation of probate. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (providing that "A
self-proved testamentary instrument shall be admitted to probate without the testimony of any subscribing witness, unless
contested, but otherwise it shall be treated no differently than a will not self-proved."). The effect of self-proving may be
considerably greater, however, in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., UtNF. Piton. CODE § 3-406(b), 8 U.L.A. 278-79 (1983)
(providing that the signature requirements for execution are "conclusively presumed" if a will is self-proved). See
generally J. RrrcHIE, N. At-oRD, JR. & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' EsTATEs AND TRUsTs 206-07 n.34 (6th ed. 1982).
498. See J. Rrrcnta, N. AI.ORD, JR. & R. EFF.AND, supra note 497, at 206-07 n.34.
499. UN F. PROn. CoDE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 349-50 (1969), as originally adopted, provided:
An attested will may at the time of its execution or at any subsequent date be made self-proved, by the
acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer
authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, and evidenced by the officer's certificate, under
official seal, attached or annexed to the will in form and content substantially as follows:
THE STATE OF
COUNTY OF
We, and - , the testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are
signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned
authority that the testator signed and executed the instrument as his last will and that he had signed willingly or
directed another to sign for him, and that he executed it as his free and voluntary act for the purposes therein
expressed; and that each of the witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the testator, signed the will as witness
and that to the best of his knowledge the testator was at that time 18 or more years of age, of sound mind and
under no constraint or undue influence.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by -, the testator, and subscribed and sworn to
before me by , and - , witnesses, this - day of ... .
(SEAL)
(Signed)
(Official capacity of officer)
Id. This two-step self-proving procedure now appears in UmrF. PROn. CoDE § 2-504(b), 8 U.L.A. 112-13 (1983).
500. Thus, in many instances, the testator, the witnesses, and a notary public would be gathered in one moom by the
attorney-draftsman. The testator would then sign the will in the presence of the witnesses. The witnesses, in the presence
of the testator and each other, would sign as witnesses. Finally, the testator and witnesses would sign the self-proving
affidavit before the notary, and the latter would, in turn, complete the affidavit by signature and official seal. See
generally I A. CASNER, supra note 4, at 132-46; J. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING TEX- AND PROBLEMS
209-12 (1983). The two-step self-proving process might be expedited by having the testator sign both the will and the
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lowed, and wills were executed, attested, and notarized in a manner that cast a
shadow on their validity. In some instances only the testator executed the will, but the
testator and the witnesses all signed the self-proving affidavit before a notary.50 1 In
other situations, neither the testator nor the witnesses subscribed the will itself, but
they all executed the self-proving affidavit.50 2 A number of the courts that have
considered the issue of the validity of the underlying will in such circumstances have
strictly applied the statutory requirements for execution and attestation, and have
concluded that the wills in question were invalid. 50 3 Courts in other jurisdictions have
been more lenient in their interpretation, and have upheld the validity of the wills as a
matter of substance over form.5 °4
As a result of such litigation, it became clear that the self-proving provisions
should be amended to authorize a one-step as well as the original two-step procedure.
Thus, in 1975, Section 2-504 of the Uniform Probate Code was modified to include a
self-proving form integrating execution, attestation, and the self-proving affidavit so
that only one signature was required by each of the participants.50 5 In addition, the
affidavit, and then having the witnesses, before a notary public, sign the will and the affidavit. Supervising attorneys,
however, should proceed with extreme caution before adopting variations to expedite and consolidate the execution,
attestation, and self-proving procedures, since courts have on a number of occasions held wills invalid because of an
attempted abbreviation of the self-proving will process. See infra text accompanying notes 501-03.
501. See, e.g., In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Petty v. White (In re Estate of
Petty), 227 Kan. 697, 608 P.2d 987 (1980); In re Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 93, 572 P.2d 1232 (1977); In re Estate of
Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1968); Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
502. See, e.g., McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
503. See In re Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 93, 572 P.2d 1232 (1977); Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
1966); MeGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). An Arizona court of appeals took this hard-line
approach a step further in Busse v. Mackaben (In re Estate of Mackaben), 126 Ariz. 599, 617 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1980).
In Mackaben the testator and the witnesses signed both the will and the self-proving affidavit, but the will did not contain
an attestation clause. The self-proved statutory form was followed to the letter. Nevertheless, because of the failure to
include an attestation clause, the court looked to the self-proving provisions for proof that the will had been signed and
witnessed in the required statutory manner since the witnesses themselves had an inadequate recollection of those events.
The court concluded that the affidavit did not supply the necessary proof and found the will invalid.
Mackaben thus represents an extreme example of a court giving little credence to the self-proving provisions by
insisting on independent proof of due execution and attestation. By way of contrast, UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-406(b), 8
U.L.A. 278-79 (1983) provides that "[ilf the will is self-proved, compliance with signature requirements forexecution is
conclusively presumed ......
504. See, e.g., In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Petty v. White (In re Estate of
Petty), 227 Kan. 697, 608 P.2d 987 (1980); In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1968).
505. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 comment, 8 U.L.A. 113 (1983). The one-step self-proving affidavit, which was
added as § 2-504(a), provides:
Any will may be simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proved, by acknowledgment thereof by the
testator and affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the
laws of the state where execution occurs and evidenced by the officer's certificate, under official seal, in
substantially the following form:
I, - , the testator, sign my name to this instrument this - day of -, 19-.--, and
being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and execute this instrument as
my last will and that I sign it willingly (or willingly direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed, and that I am eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind,
and under no constraint or undue influence.
Testator
We, .. the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do
hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signs and executes this instrument as his last will and
that he signs it willingly (or willingly directs another to sign for him), and that each of us, in the presence and
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original two-step procedure was retained whereby the will could be subscribed by the
testator and witnesses, followed by a separate acknowledgement before a notary.
50 6
In an effort to avoid the unfortunate litigation that had arisen in some jurisdictions as
a consequence of the failure to observe precisely the two-step process, several of
these states have now amended their laws to provide for the alternative one-step
approach for self-proved wills.5"7
A. Failure to Utilize Self-Proving Provisions
Since self-proving provisions can substantially expedite the process for admis-
sion of a will to probate, 50 8 the procedures should always be utilized whenever they
are authorized in the jurisdiction where the testator is domiciled. Because so many
states now recognize self-proved wills, it would also seem prudent for estate planners
in jurisdictions that do not have such a statute to use the procedures anyway since the
state where the will in question is to be executed might change its laws and authorize
self-proved wills, or the testator might later become domiciled in another state that
has enacted such a statute. 50 9 But even if the jurisdiction where the testator is domi-
hearing of the testator, hereby signs this will as witness to the testator's signing, and that to the best of our
knowledge the testator is eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue
influence.
Witness
Witness
The State of
County of
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by - , the testator, and subscribed and sworn to
before me by - , and - , witnesses, this - day of __ .
(Seal)
(Signed)
(Official capacity of officer)
UNIF. PROB. CODn § 2-504(a), 8 U.L.A. 111-12 (1983).
506. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504(b), 8 U.L.A. 112-13 (1983) (quoted in full supra note 499).
507. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2504 (West Supp. 1982-1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-504
(Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.225 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-504 (1978). The decisions that have
invalidated wills when the two-step self-proving provisions were not precisely followed appear to have resulted from
inadvertency or the draftsman's attempt to shortcut the specified procedure. See supra note 503. Unfortunately, the
statutes themselves may have given draftsmen more confidence about modifying the self-proving language than was
warranted, because they provide that the self-proving provisions could be effectuated by use of an affidavit "in sub-
stantially" the form set out in full in the statute. See UNIF. PROS. CODE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A. 111 (1983). Whether the
problems were caused by inadvertence or attempted abbreviation, they are less likely to occur when the one-step process is
utilized.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 496-98.
509. Self-proving statutes appear by their terms to be retroactive. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504, 8 U.L.A.
111 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.225 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-504 (1978). Thus, if an affidavit is
employed by a draftsman at a time when the testator's domicile does not have a self-proving will statute, but such
legislation is enacted in the jurisdiction prior to the testator's death, the self-proving statute would be applicable to the
testator's will.
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ciled at the time of death does not authorize self-proving wills, nothing would appear
to be lost by an estate planner's use of these procedures because they should not
adversely affect a will's basic validity.
510
In spite of the benefits of self-proving provisions, lawyers who prepare wills and
codicils, even in jurisdictions in which self-proved wills are authorized, apparently
do not utilize these procedures to the extent they should. 51 A number of reasons
undoubtedly explain the failure to make maximum use of these self-proving pro-
visions. It is possible, for instance, that some lawyers, particularly those who have
been practicing for a number of years, are not familiar with the legislation or are not
fully aware of the advantages of using self-proved wills, and, accordingly, continue
with the same execution procedures they have employed throughout the years they
have been in practice. 5 12 But lawyers are expected to keep up with changes in the
law, at least in those areas in which they practice, and ignorance of or a lack of
familiarity with such legislation is not an acceptable excuse for not using these
procedures. 513 Also, a notary public may not be readily available to a lawyer who is a
sole practitioner or is with a small firm, and hence the self-proving provisions may be
omitted for convenience. 514 This is also not a valid basis for failing to use self-proved
510. The law of the testator's domicile at date of death is generally applicable to will execution and attestation
requirements as to realty whose situs is in that jurisdiction and as to personalty wherever it is located. See generally T.
ArKINSON, supra note 139, at 487-89. Some estate planners are concerned about employing the new one-step self-
proving procedure even though its use is sanctioned in the relevant jurisdiction because the testator may change his or her
residence and die while domiciled in a state that does not have a statute sanctioning self-proving wills or that has
self-proving legislation but limits it to the two-step process. This concern arises because a one-step self-proved will
meeting the requirements of U.P.C. § 2-504(a), 8 U.L.A. 111-12 (1983) might be found fatally defective in some other
jurisdiction that does not have comparable legislation. In view of some of the hardline decisions in the area of self-proving
wills, these concerns cannot be dismissed as frivolous. See In re Estate of sample, 175 Mont. 93, 572 P.2d 1232 (1977);
Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966); McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). These estate
planners have resolved this problem not by avoiding self-proving provisions altogether, but by use of the two-step process
reflected in U.P.C. § 2-504(b), 8 U.L.A. 349-50 (1969). If properly utilized, this procedure should not raise questions
even in jurisdictions that do not recognize any form of self-proving will since the affidavit is added at the end of the will
after the testator's signature, the attestation clause, and the witnesses signatures. Thus, at worst, the affidavit should be
treated as mere surplusage having no effect on the basic validity of the will.
511. For example, in 1974 the Kentucky legislature enacted the two-step self-proved will, which became effective in
that jurisdiction on June 21, 1974. Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.225 (Supp. 1982). In 1982 Kentucky added the one-step
procedure to its self-proved will statute. Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.225 (Supp. 1982). Yet, it appears that self-proving
provisions are not being utilized in Kentucky to the extent that one would expect. Johnston Survey, supra note 180. Wills
that were holographic or that were prepared by out-of-state lawyers for testators who lived in other jurisdictions at the time
of will execution were excluded from the survey. In Bourbon County, Kentucky, that left a total of 60 wills filed for
probate during the one year period, and 21 of those wills were executed prior to the June 21, 1974 effective date for
self-proving wills and the remaining 39 were executed after June 21, 1974. Out of 39 wills, only 4, or 10% included
self-proving provisions. In Fayette County, Kentucky, out of 219 wills filed during the four-month period, 79 were
excluded because they were holographic or were drafted in another state. Of the remaining 140, 34 had been executed
prior to the effective date for self-proving provisions and 106 wills were executed after June 21, 1974. 57 of 106 wills
(54%) contained self-proving affidavits and the remaining 49 (46%) did not.
512. It is also possible that lawyers in a rural county like Bourbon County, Kentucky feel that it is easy to locate
witnesses and have them testify as to execution and attestation of a testator's will, and thus tend to overlook the
self-proving provisions.
513. An attorney's lack of knowledge as to applicable law is often the foundation for a successful legal malpractice
suit. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App.
3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979); Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976); McAbee v.
Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958).
514. This may provide a partial explanation for the low percentage of self-proved wills in Bourbon County,
Kentucky. See supra note 511. However, many lawyers who practice in Kentucky are notary publics and their failure to
utilize self-proving provisions is difficult to understand.
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wills in view of the benefits that may be achieved by utilizing such provisions.
Furthermore, it does not appear that it would be difficult to make arrangements for
execution at a nearby bank, where a notary could readily participate in the procedure.
It is conceivable, of course, that an attorney's failure to use self-proving terms in
a particular will may have been due to the exigencies of the situation, rather than
ignorance or inadvertence. For example, because of a client's health, it may be
necessary for the will to be executed at the testator's residence, nursing home, or
hospital room, where it might be impractical to have a notary in attendance. 51 5 Even
though a lawyer who drafts a will under such circumstances should advise the testator
about the procedures for having the will self-proved at a later time, it is entirely
possible that the testator did not or could not follow that advice. Nevertheless, the
situations in which it would be impractical to include self-proving as part of the
execution ceremonies would seem to account for only a limited number of the in-
stances in which wills are not sqlf-proved. 516 Finally, some lawyers apparently justify
their failure to use self-proving wills on the grounds of their concern about the will
contest litigation that has arisen in a number of jurisdictions as a consequence of the
misuse of the procedures. 517 This rationale also falls short of the mark. In virtually all
of the cases in which the validity of a will has been thrown into question by a mistake
in executing self-proved provisions, the errors would have been averted had a com-
petent attorney familiar with the self-proving legislation properly supervised the
execution, attestation, and acknowledgement. 5 18 Thus, any lawyer who is suf-
ficiently cautious to be concerned about the consequences of misuse of the self-
proving provisions is likely to be careful enough to make certain that the straightfor-
ward procedures are complied with in the precise manner indicated in the statute.51 9
B. Possible Unethical Motives
There may also be a more self-serving reason why, at least in some instances, an
attorney would draft wills that are not self-proving. If a lawyer prepares wills that do
515. If the attorney is a notary public or if he or she is otherwise going to be accompanied by a secretary or paralegal
who is a notary, the will should, of course, contain self-proving provisions. If it is not possible to have a will made
self-proving at the time of execution, then the attorney who drew the will and supervised its execution should immediately
write a letter to the testator urging the client and witnesses to appear before a notary in order to add the self-proving
affidavit.
516. Many reasons explain why testators are prompted to make wills, and concern about death because of old age or
serious illness is only one of these. See generally Sussman, Cates & Smith, supra note 185, at 26-30. If possible, the
testator should come to the attorney's office so that the draftsman can preside over the will execution ceremonies. The
chances of a mistake in executing or witnessing a will are greatly increased if no attorney is present, and it is possible that
a lawyer could be held liable for any errors committed in his or her absence that would not have occurred had the attorney
personally supervised execution and attestation. See Johnston, supra note 441, at 650-52.
'517. See supra note 510.
518. See supra notes 503 & 507.
519. But see Busse v. Mackaben (In re Estate of Mackaben), 126 Ariz. 599, 617 P.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1980), in which
the self-proving provisions were followed to the letter, but the will did not contain an attestation clause. The court gave the
affidavit little credence and invalidated the will when the witnesses were unable to recall the manner of execution and
attestation. Id. at 601, 617 P.2d at 767. Unfortunately, the self-proving affidavit set out in the statute was held not to be a
substitute for an attestation clause, because the affidavit did not provide that the testator signed or acknowledged his
signature in the witnesses' presence, or that the witnesses signed in each others' presence. In addition to the criticism that
should be leveled at the Arizona Court of Appeals for its overly technical decision in Mackaben, it is advisable that a
self-proving affidavit in Arizona and elsewhere set forth the precise execution and attestation requirements of the
particular jurisdiction so that the affidavit could, if necessary, serve as an attestation clause. See Effland, Self Proved
Wills, 16 ARtz. B.J. 31 (Feb. 1981) (in-depth review and criticism of Mackaben).
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not contain such provisions, and uses others in the office to serve as witnesses, then
upon the testator's death it would be necessary for the executor to contact the wit-
nesses in the drafting attorney's office in order to obtain their testimony as a part of
the process of having the will admitted to probate. 520 In such circumstances, it would
be difficult for the executor not to retain the services of the drafting attorney to assist
in probate. 2 ' Thus, the failure to incorporate self-proving provisions may be yet
another practice utilized by some estate planning lawyers to help ensure their reten-
tion after the testator's death. 522
To the extent that such omissions are intentional, this conduct raises serious
ethical questions similar in nature to the solicitation and conflicts of interest issues
presented by the safekeeping of clients' wills. 523 Certainly the solicitation of future
business, or at least conduct calculated to enhance the possibility of future employ-
ment, is so subtle in these circumstances that a testator is hardly likely to know about
or be able to guard against this practice. 524 Even if the self-proving provisions are not
intentionally omitted, but are not used because the drafting attorney did not know of
or fully understand the benefits of such procedure, this would also raise an ethical
issue because the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically warns lawyers not
to undertake matters when they are not able to handle them competently. 525 A
520. Unless a will is self-proved or informal probate proceedings are sanctioned (see UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-301 to
3-311, 8 U.L.A. 245-56 (1983)) the witnesses will have to testify as to the circumstances of execution for a will to be
admitted to probate. See supra text accompanying notes 496-98.
521. This is, of course, analogous to the situation in which the attomey-draftsman has served as custodian fora will
that he or she drafted, where it is difficult after the testator's death for the executor-designate or other close family member
to ask the custodian for the original will without employing that attorney to provide legal services to the estate. See supra
text accompanying notes 449-53.
522. This author first became aware of the possibility of such a practice during a presentation on ethics given at a
C.L.E. seminar on estate planning held in Lexington, Kentucky on July 23, 1982. During the question and answer session
that followed the talk, a lawyer asked about the ethical implications of the conduct of some lawyers he knew who
intentionally omitted use of self-proved wills as a means of enhancing their employment after the testator's death. Later,
during one of the breaks, several other lawyers approached this author and indicated that they, too, believed that this
practice was being utilized by certain attorneys for purposes of securing their retention to assist with probate administra-
tion. Further confirmation came that Fall during a seminar on Estate Planning at the University of Kentucky College of
Law. In the course of a class devoted to ethics in estate planning, several students who were then employed as clerks for
law firms indicated that attorneys in those firms made it a practice to omit the self-proving provisions so that it would be
necessary, in order to commence probate proceedings after the testator's death, to obtain the testimony of those in the
office who had served as witnesses.
523. See MODE. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBtLITY DR 2-103(A), 5-101(A) (1983); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSONAL CONDucr Rules 1.7, 1.8(a), 7.3 (1983). For a discussion of the solicitation and conflicts of interest
problems raised in the context of attorney safekeeping of wills, see supra text accompanying notes 454-69.
Apparently, only one ethics opinion has considered the propriety of omitting self-proving will provisions. See
Opinion No. 360, 35 TEx. B.J. 408 (1972). Although Opinion No. 360 deals principally with attorneys' use of them-
selves, their relatives, or their employees as witnesses to wills they draft, the submitted question was framed in terms of
use of such witnesses when a self-proving affidavit was omitted. The opinion concluded that it was not unethical to utilize
such witnesses, and, in passing, noted that "[an attorney preparing a will may be subject to criticism, but not discipline
for not having used a self-proving affidavit on the will." Id. There appear to be no reported judicial decisions that have
addressed this issue.
524. This is closely analogous to the issue of improper solicitation that is raised in the will safekeeping context. See
supra text accompanying notes 454-56.
525. DR 6-101(A) provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without
associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry DR 6-101(A) (1983). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONStiLrry EC 6-3, 6-4 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESStONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1983).
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lawyer's competency should be questioned if he or she is inadvertently drafting wills
that are not self-proving in a jurisdiction where these procedures are authorized.
Since there has been little or no warning to the members of the bar about the
ethical problems that may be inherent in the failure to use self-proved wills, it seems
inappropriate at this time to attempt to discipline lawyers for not including these
provisions in the wills they are preparing.5 2 6 At this juncture, therefore, efforts
should be made to raise the consciousness of the bar about these ethical concerns.
This can be readily accomplished with an opinion issued by a state's ethics com-
mittee. Once this position has been publicized, a draftsman's failure to utilize self-
proving provisions should subject that attorney to ethical sanctions.5 27 Such conduct,
however, is unlikely to come to the attention of the appropriate disciplinary authori-
ties through normal channels such as client complaints or prior judicial proceedings
highlighting questionable attorney conduct.52 8 For this reason, probate officials could
provide a valuable service by bringing situations involving the failure to utilize
self-proving provisions to the attention of the bar's disciplinary office. 52 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many common estate planning practices raise serious ethical questions. Yet,
with one or two notable exceptions, very little has been done to proscribe such
conduct. Even the recently adopted ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct fail to
establish useful guidelines for attorneys practicing in the area. In fact, it was not until
the last ten years that the courts began to impose stringent disciplinary sanctions on
attorneys who drafted wills for their clients in which they were named as substantial
beneficiaries. Other reprehensible conduct that is not so blatant, like the practice
526. A thorough search uncovered only one ethics opinion even mentioning the ethical implications of intentionally
failing to include self-proving provisions in wills. See supra note 523. In similar circumstances, when a new or different
interpretation governing attorney conduct has been adopted, courts have been inclined to use the proceedings to notify
members of the bar of their position rather than merely for the imposition of discipline of the particular attorney who is
before the court. See, e.g., State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 612-13, 196 N.W.2d 733, 737 (1972); State v.
Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 332, 159 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1968); State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 75, 123 N.W.2d 488, 492
(1963).
527. Such conduct, unless reflecting a continuous pattern, may not be serious enough to warrant suspension or
disbarment. A more moderate form of discipline intended for minor misconduct, like a reprimand or admonition, would
be more appropriate. See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIscIPuNE AND DISABILITY PROCREDiNGS §§ 6.9-6.10 com-
mentaries (Feb. 1979). On the other hand, the consistent and intentional omission of self-proving provisions in numerous
wills by an attorney could warant more serious disciplinary action. Cf. State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d
733 (1972).
528. In this respect, an attorney-draftsman's intentional omission of self-proving affidavits is very different from the
preparation of a will in which the draftsman is included as a beneficiary. In this latter context, a disgruntled beneficiary
whose share has been reduced or deleted by reason of inclusion of a bequest to the attorney-draftsman may complain to bar
authorities about the conduct or institute suit to contest the will on grounds of undue influence. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-30.
529. A comparison to the draftsman-beneficiary situation is again useful. When a lawyer prepares a will in which he
or she is included as a beneficiary, there is a substantial possibility that this conduct may be brought to the attention of a
bar association ethics committee through the complaints of persons who have been adversely affected by such conduct.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. The consequences of failing to include self-proving provisions in a will clearly
do not have a direct financial impact on beneficiaries named in the will. Under the circumstances, the conduct is unlikely
to be brought to the attention of the appropriate bar authorities unless judges and others who are responsible for probate
administration are aware of these shortcomings and fill the void. See supra text accompanying notes 365-67 (pertaining to
the need for simila efforts by probate authorities to bring questions regarding the propriety of a draftsman's designation of
himself or herself as attorney for the estate to the attention of disciplinary authorities).
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among some lawyers of drafting wills designating themselves as attorneys to probate
the estate, has gone largely unnoticed and undisciplined.
Most, if not all, of these questionable practices are an outgrowth of efforts by
drafting attorneys to enhance the chances of their retention after their clients' deaths.
A great deal of discussion has occurred in recent years about making estate planning
more profitable at the outset. If this were to become a widespread reality, it might
relieve some of the pressure from securing employment during probate as a means of
justifying the "loss leader" approach to fees for will drafting. Moreover, if probate
reform were to progress to the point at which estate work were no more profitable
than other legal employment requiring comparable skill and effort, this could also
reduce reliance on questionable practices geared to enhancing retention in subsequent
probate administration. Such changes on any significant scale, however, are likely to
be years away. Further, there is no assurance that higher fees at the outset for estate
planning services or a more reasonable basis for attorney charges in estate administra-
tion would result in a significant reduction in the employment of dubious practices to
secure post-death employment. If anything, the influx of new lawyers into the profes-
sion is likely to increase, rather than diminish, the pressures for obtaining legal work,
including probate administration, and thereby serving to exacerbate the present ethi-
cal problems.
Thus, time alone appears unlikely to bring about the sort of changes or reforms
that might eliminate or significantly reduce the questionable procedures that currently
exist in estate planning. As a consequence, the courts and bar authorities need to
assume responsibility in this area, and deal directly and decisively with these issues.
The first step is to increase attorney awareness of the ethical problems that many of
the common estate planning practices clearly raise. Once alerted to these issues, a
number of lawyers who draft wills and trusts may prefer to avoid a course of conduct
that could be considered unethical. Also, it should be recognized that most estate
planning consumers are not sophisticated in the area or familiar with attorneys'
motives and methods. Accordingly, the disciplinary authorities should develop clear-
cut, stringent standards that preclude solicitation and overreaching in an atmosphere
where clients are not generally aware of what is transpiring and are thus largely
incapable of protecting their own interests.

